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Abstract
It is argued that much of the work on cognitive and
communicative development within the first two years
of life, and particularly work concerned with the
transition to the use of speech, relies upon a concept
of agency, both as a general notion and as a semantic
category 'used' by children, with no clear definition
of what this entails. This thesis attempts to derive
a theoretically rigorous and useful notion of agency
and proceeds to describe within its terms the developing
child's cognition.
It rests upon the assumption - explicitly stated and
justified - that the child should best be seen as the
active constructor of his knowledge, intelligently
directing his search for new knowledge as a means to
achieving active mastery of his environment. There
follows an account of the kinds of knowledge which
together constitute the concept agency; contingency-
detection and the derivation of rules, on the one hand,
and the development of intentional structures, on the
other, are identified as necessary conditions for
cognition. A privileged role is ascribed to (non-verbal)
communicative development within this process, mutual,
cooperative activity being seen as integral to becoming
an agent.
Prom a detailed discussion of the theoretical and
methodological paradigms used to study communicative
development it is concluded that an adapted speech act
approach is most useful. Non-intrusive observation of
mother-child pairs is used as a source of data, which
emphasizes the derivation of methods for evaluating ana
classifying data. Following Myers (1980) a procedure
is developed for the identification of communicative
/ intentions.
X
intentions. An adaptation of this is used to identify
intentions expressed within solitary activity. Criteria
for the description of a third kind of activity, inter¬
personal routines, are given.
On the basis of regular, filmed observations of one child
a process model for the developing cognition of agency is
constructed, between the ages of 8 and 22 months. The
model is then tested against five other children, observed
for three months each, who together span this age-range.
Prom the model it is concluded that the cognition of
agency depends upon fulfillment of five conditions. The
major source of variability between children appears to
be mothering style, for which a dimension is proposed.
Finally an adaptive model is presented, showing the
effects of mothering styles corresponding to the two ends
of this dimension upon the child's use of his cognition.
The child's concept of agency does not develop suddenly.
Its status as a concept depends fundamentally upon his
capacity to derive rules about the way his world is, and
thus effectively to act and to communicate.
The theory and methodology are examined and four specific
proposals for further work are made.
I.
Introduction
0.1 Explanation in Psychology
It is generally accepted that the aim of psychological
theory is to achieve an explanation of the processes of human
behaviour. It is less generally accepted that an adequate
explanation of behaviour may also have to take account of
certain processes which are not in any strict sense behav¬
ioural, that is mental states and mental events. Inevitably
theories in Psychology hinge crucially upon the conception
of man implicit in them, or to put it another way, the con¬
ception of man held by individual theorists constrains the
form of theory which they see as constituting an adequate
explanation of human psychological and behavioural processes.
This is not to deny that different forms of theory should
be justified by rational argument, that is by arguments of
formal logic, but equally it must be remembered that science
exists within an ever-changing socio-cultural context and
the kinds of theory generally accepted at one time may be
seen as inadequate or misdirected at another. Further, our
understanding of the physical world continues to grow and
to provide ideas and conceptual tools which can be trans¬
lated and adopted by the still very young behavioural
sciences. Dalenoort (1972) has recently provided us with
an account of the ways in which technological advance has
provided models for psychology.
There has been in recent years a protracted and some¬
times bitter dispute between two fundamentally different
visions of man, the processes of his behaviour, and the
terms of reference within which these should be described.
Taylor (1964) summarises this dispute as follows:
It is often said that human behaviour, or for that
matter the behaviour of animals or even living organ¬
isms in general, is in some way fundamentally different
from the processes in nature which are studied by the
natural sciences. It is sometimes said that the behav¬
iour of human beings and animals shows a purposiveness
which is not found elsewhere in nature, or that it has
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an intrinsic 'meaning' which natural processes do not.
Or it is said that the behaviour of animate organisms
exhibits an order which cannot be accounted for by the
'blind accident' of processes in nature. Or again,
to draw the circle somewhat narrower, it is said of
human beings and some animals that they are conscious
of and direct their behaviour in a way which finds no
analogue in inanimate nature, or that, specifically in
an account of human affairs, concepts like 'signif¬
icance' and 'value' play a uniquely important part
which is denied them in natural science.
Against this view stands the opinion of many
others, in particular of many students of the sciences
of human behaviour, that there is no difference in
principle between the behaviour of animate organisms
and any other processes in nature, that the former can
be accounted for in the same way as the latter, by
laws relating physical events, and that the introduc¬
tion of such notions as 'purpose' and 'mind' can only
serve to obscure and confuse. (Taylor, 1964:3)
There can be no doubt that this dispute remains un¬
resolved. Whether this uncertainty is a reason for or a
consequence of the fact that 'the sciences of man are in
their infancy' is for Taylor an open question; but it is an
important question because upon it turns the question of
whether it is to theory or to empirical data, respectively,
that we should look for a resolution of the dispute. Taylor
goes on:
In fact there has never been agreement among philos¬
ophers or other students as to what is at stake here,
that is, on the meaning of the claim that human behav¬
iour is purposive, or, what is the same thing, on what
the relevant evidence is which would decide it. As a
matter of fact, it is not even generally agreed that
it is a matter of finding evidence in the first place,
for some thinkers hold that the issue is not in any
sense an empirical one, but rather that it can be
decided simply by logical argument. (ibid.;5)
It is not the aim of this thesis to attempt to resolve
the conflict between 'mechanistic' and 'teleological' ex¬
planations of human behaviour. Inevitably however this work
must represent some modifications of one or other of these
positions, and it behoves the present author at least to
attempt a justification of the stance taken.
In their book 'Human Action and its Psychological
Investigation' (1977) Gauld and Shotter argue that a
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•mechanistic system', that is a hypothetical organism which
simply responds to incoming stimuli, cannot be seen as an
adequate model of man. They insist rather that the approach
of psychology must be 'hermeneutical', assigning meanings
to actions as 'pieces of behaviour which we bring about
rather than find our limbs executing1. Their hermeneutical
explanation is essentially similar to the 'teleological'
explanation invoked by Taylor, that is both constitute what
may be called 'explanation by purpose'. In such explanation
human actions and the actions of certain other animate
beings are explained not in terms of other unconnected ante¬
cedent conditions, as is the case in the behaviourist para¬
digm, but in terms of the order which these actions produce.
To explain an action by purpose is to explain by the goal
aimed at, for the sake of which the action is performed.
Traditionally such forms of explanation have been criticised
as meaningless and empirically empty, and by their very
nature, impossible to confirm. To an extent this point has
to be admitted. We may rely once more on Taylor's formu¬
lation :
In fact, the only empirical evidence for the operation
of the purpose is the behaviour which its operation is
used to explain. There is thus no conceivable evidence
which could falsify a hypothesis of this kind because
whenever the behaviour is emitted the purpose respon¬
sible is ex hypothesi assumed to have been operating.
And at the same time we would never be able to predict
behaviour with the aid of such a hypothesis...If 'x'
is the behaviour and P is the Purpose considered as a
separate entity which is the cause or antecedent of x
... (and if) x having a value of x-^ is due to P having
the value P-^, and if the only evidence for P^ is the
occurrence of x-, then we have no way of knowing before¬
hand what the value of x will be. (Taylor, 1964;7)
There are, however, other justifications for adopting
explanations by purpose and these consist in demonstrating
that alternative forms of explanation, although a^parentt^ more
parsimonious, are inadequate, and that explanation by purpose
has considerable heuristic value. It is to the former that
we now turn.
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0.2 Critique of Reductionism
It might be argued that it is not of paramount impor¬
tance to choose between alternative kinds of explanation;
that, since the debate between opposing schools of thought
continues, it is sufficient for any student of human behav¬
iour or action merely to work within one paradigm while
allowing that others can also make valuable contributions
to our understanding. Unfortunately this is not so. The
behaviourists recognise the necessity to avoid reference
to such ideas as intention and awareness, and, when faced
with unpredictable relationships between learning history
and post-learning behaviour, or in cases of what might be
called orientation learning where no finite list of direc¬
tions can express what is learned, they choose instead to
talk in terms of such things as 'conditional cues', relative
stimuli, sensory integration, acquired drives, and so on.
Similarly, in the case of explanation by purpose, it is
essential to show that the agent's intentions, that is his
reasons for acting in a particular way, are not superfluous
but are an essential part of the explanation of such actions.
It therefore becomes necessary both to select one paradigm
in preference to others and to attempt to justify such a
selection by pointing to the shortcomings of other approaches.
Many writers have offered criticisms of reductionism. This
section aims to draw attention to the principal arguments
of some such criticisms.
Broadly, the object of these remarks is those approaches
to human psychology which take as their unit of analysis
something other than the acting subject in relation with
other similarly acting subjects. Gauld and Shotter (1977)
describe such approaches as 'mechanistic', while FodOr (1968,
1976) distinguishes between 'logical behaviourism' and
'physiological reductionism'. As Beloff (1973) points out,
most such approaches are traceable from Descartes who
formulated the notion of the 'reflex' to support his theory
that animals were nothing more than natural Automata
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whose behaviour was governed by a strictly mechanical
cause-effect relationship. But for Descartes man was able
to influence the workings of his nervous system and over¬
ride its reflexive nature because he possessed a soul.
Beloff goes on:
Descartes' successors, however, uninhibited by this
dualist metaphysic, welcomed the concept of reflex
action precisely because it promised to reveal man,
no less than other animals, as a machine. (Beloff,
1973;13 0)
It is Fodor's contention, and that of Bannister and
Fransella (1971), that such a view of man is logically
unsound, and it is Gauld and Shotter's argument that this
view is unsound in observable fact.
The case which Gauld and Shotter make can be stated
quite briefly. They point out that the limits of mechan¬
istic theories in general are determined by the ultimate
theoretical constraints upon the capabilities of the
'generalised machine', and,
If it can be shown that a human agent can do things
which it is in principle impossible for a generalised
machine to do, it will a fortiori have been shown that
mechanistic explanation in psychology, at least as that
sort of explanation has generally been conceived,
breaks down at a certain point. (Gauld and Shotter,
1977;17)
To put this another way, any system whose behaviour
could not be fully represented on a generalised machine
would be a system whose behaviour is not fully describable
in terms of causal laws. They then point out that,
Gbdel (1931) proved that within the system of element¬
ary arithmetic we can show to be true certain theorems
whose truth cannot be arrived at by algorithmic methods
from the basic axioms of the system. From this it
follows that if you embodied the axioms and rules of
the system in a generalised machine it would be unable
to generate these particular theorems. However, human
mathematicians can show them to be true by invoking a
metasystem, a system which takes the original system
as its subject matter...(T)his shows that human beings
can do something which machines cannot do.. .men will
always be one jump ahead of the machines. (Gauld and
Shotter, 1977;19)
For a machine realistically to be said to simulate
human action that machine would have to be able to understand
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what it is. doing, or be so programmed as to duplicate the
behavioural capacities of a concept- or rule-possessing
human being. Gauld and Shotter argue that even on the most
minimal definition of 'concept-possession', that is of con¬
cepts which are stimulus-neutral (Watson, 1958), a mechan¬
istic approach fails because it is impossible to analyse
possession of these in terms amenable to embodiment in a
machine table.
The case made by Bannister and Fransella (1971) can be
put very simply. Behaviourism, they say, claims to take
as its subject matter only those phenomena about people which
may by direct observation be said to exist, that is overt
behaviour. But it is impossible to talk about events at
all unless one does so under some description, and this is
as true of those sorts of events which we call human behav¬
iour as it is of any other sorts of events:
Immediately we label it, assess it, or even select it
by pointing to it, we have placed a construction upon
it ... True, 'behavioural' terms are terms at a low
level of abstraction, but they are still terms at a
level of abstraction. And, of course, concepts such
as stimulus, response, reward, punishment, drive,
negative and positive reinforcement are all concepts
at an enormously high level of abstraction, certainly
at as high a level of abstraction as concepts like
'mind'. (Bannister and Fransella, 1971;46)
Certainly this is not an argument against behaviourism
as an approach to the study of human psychology but it is_
an argument against the case which behaviourists commonly
try to make, that their approach is in some sense more
scientific and 'harder' than other, mentalist, approaches.
Fodor adopts a much stronger line and seeks to show not only
that behaviourism does not constitute a harder approach but
also that the claim that it does so contains an inherent
logical inconsistency. This line of argument occurs chiefly
in two books, 1968 and 1976. It will suffice here merely
to present his conclusion:
... Even if the behaviourists were right in supposing
that logically necessary and sufficient conditions for
behaviour being of a certain kind can be given (just)
in terms of stimulus and response variables, that fact
would not in the least prejudice the mentalists' claim
that the causation of behaviour is determined by, and
explicable in terms of, the organisms internal states.
So far as I know, the philosophical school of 'logical'
behaviourism offers not a shadow of an argument for
believing that this claim is false. And the failure
of behaviouristic psychology to provide even a first
approximation to a plausible theory of cognition
suggests that the mentalists' claim may very well be
true. (Fodor, 1976;8)
Below (Section 0.2) there follows an account of one
particular manifestation of the behaviourist/mentalist
dispute - the argument about the framework appropriate for
the study of language-learning and language-usage - but there
is another kind of reductionism which must first be discussed,
and this is that branch of psychology which seeks to explain
in terms of neurological events. This discussion aims to
bring out two key points concerning physiological reductionism
the first is the belief that all the organismic causes of
behaviour, or action, are physiological does not commit one
to the belief that psychology is reducible to physiology.
The second, complementary, point is that arguing against the
reducibility of psychology to physiology, or, what is the
same thing, arguing for some kind of mentalism, does not
commit one to a dualist position."'" To put this another way,
it is both possible and coherent to talk in terms of a
materialistic mentalism.
It is the assumption of neurophysiology that the study
of the neurological organisation of the central nervous
system will tell us everything there is to know about the
way the brain works. To some extent this seems to be a good
assumption. The work of Sperry, Hubel and Wiesel, Campbell
et al., Trevarthen and others has discovered a great deal
about visual pathways, and has given us a good idea of the
ways in which those aspects of objects which are visible
are projected in the brain. We are still, however, very
far from achieving an adequate theory of perception within
"'"The dualist conception is not consistent with the rationale
of contemporary developmental psychology which assumes that
an infant's behaviour can provide direct evidence about the
nature of his cognition (see Chapter 1).
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this tradition. There is, in other words, no guarantee
that physiology does or could supply the appropriate vocab¬
ulary for the construction of psychological theories. Even
if parsimony requires that we confine our paradigm to en¬
compass only those (conceivable) mental events which are
physiological it does not follow that descriptions of such
events in physiological terms can answer all those questions
which psychology might pose; one cannot a priori assume any
simple correspondence between form and function. Fodor
summarises the argument like this:
It is entirely possible that the nervous system of
higher organisms characteristically achieves a given
psychological end by a wide variety of neurological
means. It is also possible that given neurological
structures subserve many different psychological
functions at different times, depending upon the
character of the activities inwhich the organism is
engaged. In either event, the attempt to pair neuro¬
logical structures with psychological functions could
expect only limited success. (Fodor, 1976;17)
And, turns out that the functional decomposition of
the nervous system corresponds precisely to its neuro¬
logical (anatomical, biochemical, physical) decompo¬
sition, then there are only epistemological reasons
for studying the former instead of the latter. But
suppose that there is no such correspondence? Suppose
the functional organisation of the nervous system
cross-cuts its neurological organisation. Then the
existence of psychology depends not upon the fact that
neurons are so depressingly small, but rather on the
fact that neurology does not posit the kinds of things
that psychology requires. (ibid;24)
It remains to be seen whether an ideally completed
science of physiology would be able to answer even those
kinds of questions which psychologists presently ask. There
seems to be no self-evident ontological argument available
to suggest it will be able to do so. The existence of a
vigorously pursued and frequently successful neurophysio-
logical approach to the study of psychology does not there¬
fore constitute grounds for opposing the development of a
mentalist, or teleological, or hermeneutical approach, as
recommended by, for example, Fodor or Gauld and Shotter.
Before going on to discuss one strand within such an approach,
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the concept of Agency, it is worthwhile looking in more
detail at one particular manifestation of the behaviourist/
mentalist dispute, and that is the argument as to which
approach is adequate and appropriate to the study of
language-learning and language-usage, since this thesis aims
to contribute to our understanding of the processes involved
in the acquisition of language by young children.
Skinner's book, Verbal Behaviour (1957), was the first
major attempt by a behaviourist to tackle the problem of
linguistic behaviour and treat it under a functional- analysis,
that is an analysis which seeks to specify the controlling
input and eiicitatory variables. In his review of the book
Chomsky (1959) comments:
What is so surprising is the particular limitations he
has imposed on the way in which the observables of be¬
haviour are to be studied, and, above all, the partic¬
ularly simple nature of the 'function' which, he claims,
describes the causation of behaviour. One would natur¬
ally expect that prediction of the behaviour of a complex
organism (or machine) would require, in addition to infor¬
mation about external stimulation, knowledge of the in¬
ternal structure of the organism, the ways in which it
processes input information and organises its own behav¬
iour. These characteristics of the organism are in gen¬
eral a complicated product of inborn structure, the
genetically determined course of maturation, and past
experience. (Chomsky, 1959;27).
It would not be appropriate here specifically to discuss
Chomsky's own thesis of language structure and man's linguis¬
tic competence; we aim, rather, to bring out the main kinds of
criticism which Chomsky makes of Skinner's extreme behaviour¬
ist analysis. Chomsky's own position is briefly discussed
in a later section, (2.2).
The force of Chomsky's attack on Skinner seems to rest
on an argument involving three stages. Its conclusion,
which appears in a different form in his book Syntactic
Structures (1957), is that a theory of the environmental
causation of verbalisations - in the sense in which a behav¬
iourist would construe such a theory - does not constitute
a theory of language. The steps of the argument which lead
to this conclusion are roughly as follows:-
1. Verbal utterances do, presumably, have causes, but these
do not reside exclusively in the external environment.
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In trying to assess what might have been responsible for
making someone say something which he did say, in add¬
ition to 'environmental variables' we must consider,
inter alia, his knowledge about the conventions of his
language, his personal system of beliefs and values,
and his reasons for producing an utterance. The impor¬
tance of these factors, Chomsky argues, is apparent,
whereas:
The claim that careful arrangement of contingencies of
reinforcement by the verbal community is a necessary
condition for language learning...is based not on actual
observation, but on analogies to laboratory study of
lower organisms, (Chomsky, 1959;39)
And,
Lashley recognises, as anyone must who seriously con¬
siders the data, that the composition and production
of an utterance is not simply a matter of stringing
together a sequence of responses under the control of
outside stimulation and intraverbal association, and
that the syntactic organisation of an utterance is not
something directly represented in any simple way in
the physical structure of the utterance itself. A
variety of observations leads (Lashley) to conclude
that syntactic structure is 'a generalised pattern
imposed on the specific acts as they occur' and that
'a consideration of the structure of the sentence and
other motor sequences will show...that there are,
behind the overtly expressed sequences, a multiplicity
of integrative processes which can only be inferred
from the final results of their activity'. (ibid;55)"
2. If the production of an utterance involves the inter¬
action of many complex variables whose workings we can
only infer, then the theoretically interesting properties
of a corpus of utterances, and of the occurence of any
particular linguistic structures will not be revealed
by a classification of such utterances and structures
according to the environmental conditions with which
they are associated. There is no reason to believe that
a taxonomy of this kind would succeed in more than a
minimal sense, though, equally, a sufficiently elabor¬
ated psychology might succeed in identifying the nece¬
ssary and sufficient conditions for the production of
verbal utterances. But it does not follow from the
latter that an analysis which groups together those
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utterances which have in common certain elicitatory
stimuli will also turn out to have grouped together
those utterances which have common referents. In other
words, the supposition that verbal productions refer in
some sense to the stimuli which elicit them is false.
The utterances a given stimulus elicits may be arbitra¬
rily heterogeneous depending upon the internal state of
the person on whom the stimulus acts.
3. If 1 and 2 are true, then a functional analysis will
not group together those structures which have seman-
tically interesting properties such as coreferentiality.
Furthermore, even were it to do so this would be theor¬
etically irrelevant because the factors governing the
referential use of language do not include the criterion
that co-referring utterances should have common elicit¬
atory stimuli.
In summary, Chomsky seems to agree with Skinner that
verbal behaviour is indeed caused —that is it should, at
least in principle, be possible to discover the mechanisms
which govern verbal behaviour — but he does not accept that
verbal productions are also (therefore) responses; he argues
that learning a language does not consist in learning S-R
connections, and consequently that no useful insights into
the use of language can be provided by a classification of
utterances according to the stimuli presumed to elicit them.
We might support this view with a general comment from
Beloff:
Behaviouristics incorporates within itself certain
indubitable truths (the principles of association and
hedonism) on which it has imposed a more dubious theor¬
etical superstructure. ... The besetting weakness of
the behaviourist approach has been its rash assumption
that these two principles provide an adequate basis for
a comprehensive psychology. (Beloff, 1973;154)
This section has attempted to present some reasons for
believing that a behaviouristic approach, specifically to
,the problem of how young children go about learning the
■ language of their community, cannot be expected to provide
either a useful framework or an adequate theory. It has
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further attempted to show that while neurophysiology provides
a strong and coherent approach within its own terms we can¬
not necessarily expect it to provide answers to the kinds
of questions in which psychologists are interested. Having
said this, it is important to bear in mind two caveats.
First, to deny behaviourism is not to deny the importance
of the principles of association learning, or even of oper¬
ant conditioning. Piaget (1951) attempted to assess the
role of learning and imitation in early cognitive develop¬
ment, and this topic continues to exercise students both of
general psychology (for example,3oAc(u/ufWaters,I"?fc3) and of
developmental psycholinguistics (e.g. Rodgon, 1976). Second,
the claim that neither behaviourism nor physiological reduc-
tionism is able to provide an adequate framework for a
general psychology or for developmental psycholwinguistics,
and the consequent necessity to rely on some kind of mental-
istic explanation, should not be taken to imply a 'dualist
metaphysic'. The fact that we do not know the material
mechanisms which correspond to those mental states which we
might describe as 'having a belief, desire or intention'
does not commit us to invoking 'immaterial' factors. The
principle of parsimony, if nothing else, requires that we
should assume that mental states and mental events are
caused. A more elaborated science of neurophysiology would
be necessary to specify these mechanisms, but, as Fodor
points out, the fact that neurophysiology may not (ever)
explicate such mechanisms does not, and could not, constitute
proof that they are not 'real'. That is to say, the argu¬
ment in favour of what the present author has chosen to call
'materialistic mentalism' must remain, at least for the time
being, a teleological one.
The only grounds on which such kinds of explanation
are defensible are those of their heuristic value; if
'explanation by purpose' offers a worthwhile approach it
will enable us to make more sense of the sorts of events
which we are observing. This discussion must of necessity
be left to the Conclusion (Section 6.2). What we must now
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do is try to define more closely the terms and ideas with
which we shall be working.
0.3 Towards a Concept of Agency
The idea for this thesis grew out of a dissatisfaction
with the ways in which the notion of semantic relations,
derived from formal linguistics (e.g. Fillmore, 1968),
tended to be applied by psycholinguists to the first
verbalisations of young children. The reasons for this
dissatisfaction are more fully discussed elsewhere (Sections
2.2 and 2.5) but we may briefly touch on them here. They
fall into two types. First, that in order to be able legit¬
imately to apply, even an adaptation of, some analytic
system, based on a corpus of utterances produced by adults,
to the utterances of young children it is necessary to
demonstrate that these children use the elements of the
system in something like the same way as that in which they
are used by adults. Not only is this not usually done but
there are also suggestions in the literature that children's
use of language corresponds only very poorly with adults 1
use. (See, for example, Halliday's (1975) different 'gram¬
mars' for Nigel at different ages, or Brown's (1973) stages
of language acquisition, and BOwerman (1973). Second, it
is not clear in quite what sense it is psychologically
meaningful to say that a child has mastered or acquired any
particular 'semantic category' which he is presumed to have
used. Each category is assumed to be unitary, that is it
is defined under a single set of criteria, while at the
same time the child's grasp of a category is described as
developing gradually. How then is one presumed use of a
category by a child at one age equivalent to his use of the
'same' category at another age, and, especially, in what
sense is it equivalent to an adult's use of that category?
Further, if the assignation of an utterance to a particular
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category rests only on an adult's conception of how that
utterance might be interpreted as appropriate in some con¬
text there can be no guarantee that an analysis in terms of
adult-like semantic categories does not obscure some more
useful 'child-centred' approach, or even that the child is
cognitively capable of encoding the presumed category.
Sheridan (1975) points out that language is our most valuable
tool. Its manipulation relies upon the ability to grasp
and relate the semantic categories represented in it. Any
account of early language must therefore also be a psycho¬
logical theory; it must base itself in the development of
the cognitive pre-requisites for understanding semantic
relations.
These criticisms do not by any means apply equally to
the many systems of semantic categories which have been
used by psycho-linguists in studying child language, but
one concept to which they do seem to apply quite generally
is that of Agency. Agency is a central notion in case
grammars, and is one whose study can help greatly in asses¬
sing the child's knowledge of language structure, but it is
also fundamental to the development of communication, both
verbal and non-verbal, between a child and his mother.
Until quite recently semantic, syntactic, cognitive and
communicative types of approach to language development were
viewed as alternatives, and each tended to concentrate on
just one aspect of a child's verbal productions, ignoring
up to 50% of his output (Rodgon, 1976). Rodgon, Brown
(1973), Nelson (1974) and Bates (1976), among others, have
each attempted a more synthetic approach, drawing on data
and ideas from all these perspectives. Bates, in particular,
relates contributions from Speech Act theory, from Piagetian
developmental psychology, from linguistics and from social
psychology. This attempt is entirely well-founded; it is
only by collating and relating concepts from all sources
that a comprehensive developmental psychology can ever be
achieved, for the ways in which, for example, language and
cognition correspond are not readily apparent. As Beilin
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points out:
The conception of the relationship between cognition,
logic and language that seems most consistent with the
data is one that posits an abstract cognitive system
of structures whose basic relations and functions are
realized in systems of thought (logical and otherwise)
and in language, each system with properties indepen¬
dent of the other. The fundamental relations, then,
between these systems are not direct but are mediated
through a common abstract system of relations and
structures. (Beilin, 1975;361-2).
Bates draws heavily on Piaget's (1953) analysis of the
course of cognitive development within the sensori-motor
period, specifically associating the development of perfor¬
mative frame-works into which words are subsequently slotted
with sensori-motor sub-stage V, the beginnings of the cap¬
acity for tool-use, and sub-stage VI, the ability to symbol¬
ise. There is a number of respects in which this synthesis
is unsatisfactory, both as regards Piagetian theory and in
Bates' interpretation of it - as we shall see later in
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 - but Piaget's approach has offered
insights to the study of development which are invaluable.
Piagetian theory1 is both a cognitive theory and an
epistemological one; it is a theory both of what is known
and of the mechanisms by which knowledge and understanding
are achieved, as a cognitive theory it is a theory of the
organisation of knowledge and cognitive processes in struc¬
tures which develop, from birth to adolescence, through a
series of stages. The structures in which different aspects
of thought are represented within any one stage are of a
similar kind and together constitute a mode of cognitive
functioning. There are four major stages during develop¬
ment, each of which is characterised by the particular mode
of functioning governing thought within it. These are the
sensori-motor, pre-operational, concrete operational and
formal operational stages; it is the first two of these with
which we shall chiefly be concerned. A cognitive structure
consists of a number of co-ordinated schemata, each of which
Sources: Flavell, 1963; piaget, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1971.
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represents a 'unit' of knowledge. In the course of develop¬
ment schemata become elaborated, broadened and modified to
take account of new information through a process which
Piaget calls accommodation (see below). Inevitably the
experience of the child will result from time to time in
some schemata becoming more refined than others within a
particular structure, leading to apparent inconsistencies
in the level of the child's understanding from one task, or
area of knowledge, to another. These inconsistencies are
known as horizontal decalages.
The concept of horizontal decalage represents the fact
that, whereas it may be useful to think of an indiv¬
idual as being generally characterized by a given cog¬
nitive structure (or 'mode of functioning') he will not
necessarily be able to perform within that structure
for all tasks. (Flavell, 1963;238).
When the child moves from one mode of functioning to
another, with a corresponding reorganisation of cognitive
structure, he may still be observed to deal with the same
task in a similar way. These uniformities of behaviour
across different stages are known as vertical decalages."'"
Piaget's theory, therefore, describes the way in which know¬
ledge is cognitively represented throughout development and
it attempts to account for both the heterogeneities in cog¬
nitive structure within each stage and the homogeneities in
function across different stages.
As an epistemological theory the Piagetian corpus
involves principally the notions of assimilation, accommo¬
dation and equilibration. The child is seen as an agent,
actively constructing and determining his knowledge of the
world. He governs and directs his activity in the world,
his search for new knowledge, on the basis of his existing
knowledge. In the course of his acting on the world the
Vertical decalages are therefore phenomena occurring in
. development; they are not, as Bates (1976;69) seems to
suggest, processes of development. She also (1976;87) uses
the phrase 'accommodative edhemes', describing as structure
a concept which Piaget uses as a process notion. It is un¬
clear whether these confusions are only terminological.
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child is exposed to new relationships and contingencies
existing within it. In order to take advantage of these,
that is to assimilate them into his existing system of
schemata, the child must accommodate such schemata as are
affected. Assimilation and accommodation are thus two
aspects of the same process. Different kinds of activity
do, however, involve different proportions of them. Play,
for example, is described as mainly assimilatory, since it
involves the application of existing schemata to new activ¬
ities; it is not the construction of new knowledge but the
determination of the range of application of old knowledge,
and the 'exercise of activities for the mere pleasure of
mastering them' (Piaget, 1951;89) . The notion of equilibra¬
tion is a complex one. It has two components; the process
of equilibration itself, and the discontinuous states of
equilibrium to which this process leads. The process
operates continually and is homogeneous throughout develop¬
ment, but the equilibrium states achieved are not stable,
nor are they necessarily equivalent; some states are
'better equilibrated' than others. A state of equilibrium
exists when all of the child's schemata are (ideally)
coherently integrated at the same level of functioning.
The assimilation-accommodation process, resulting from the
child's activity in the world, serves continually to disturb
potential equilibrium states through the selective modifi¬
cation of schemata and equilibration functions to restore
congruence. The model is thus an essentially dynamic one.
We shall refer to ideas and concepts from the Piagetian
corpus in later discussions, but what chiefly concerns us
here is the nature of the role ascribed to the developing
child. The child is seen as constructing his knowledge of
the world on the basis of his interactions with it; any
experience he has which results in learning involves an
interaction between his existing structures and some phen¬
omenon of the world, mediated through his action. In one
sense this means that what he is able to learn is prescribed
by what he already knows; within any one stage, only those
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phenomena which can be represented in the same terms as
those phenomena which are already represented can be assim¬
ilated."1" But in another sense it means that the child
determines his own search for knowledge - he 'knows what he
wants to know* - and the sorts of things he wants to know
about are those which will allow him better to direct his
own activity.
This conception of the nature of knowing and of action
is central to the philosophy of John Macmurray. In the
Introduction to 'The Self As Agent' he writes:
Most of our knowledge, and all our primary knowledge,
arises as an aspect of activities which have practical,
not theoretical objectives; and ... it is this know¬
ledge, itself an aspect of action, to which all reflec¬
tive theory must refer. (Macmurray, 1957;12)
And in Chapter One:
It is characteristic of Man that he solves his practical
problems by taking thought; and all his theoretical
activities have their origins, at least, in his prac¬
tical requirements. (These activities) also find their
meaning and their significance in the practical field
... Activities of ours which are purely theoretical,
if this means that they have no reference to our prac¬
tical life, must be purely imaginary - exercises of
phantasy which are not even illusory unless we relate
them to the practical world through some misplaced
belief. The truth or falsity of the theoretical is to
be found solely in its reference to the practical.
(ibid; 21-2)
Macmurray posits this as a reason for pursuing an
inquiry into the analysis and interpretation of common ex¬
perience, but if he is right that 'the function of a phil¬
osophical form is to exhibit the unity of human experience"
and if 'the form of the personal is the emergent problem of
contemporary philosophy' then his thesis must be taken
seriously and its implications explored by psychologists.
It is therefore necessary to examine Macmurray's account to
see whether it might assist us in arriving at some concept
of Agency useful to the study of child development.
What Macmurray is concerned to do is both to show that
Representation is discussed in Section 1.2.
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even the most adequate of modern philosophies - the Critical
Philosophy of Kant - fails, because its major premiss is
contradicted by its conclusion, and to argue that only an
approach which treats thought as a subsidiary, negative
aspect of action can allow for the possibility of our know¬
ledge of one another and, by extension, of common experience.
Let us briefly look at these in turn.
Knowledge, Kant argues, is the product of a synthetic
process which consists in combining the elements of exper¬
ience in a form not itself given by experience. If this is
so then the knowledge we construct of the world can only be
an (imperfect) model of the world; we can never know the
world as it is in itself, independently of our ways of
apprehending it. This is Kant's 'denial of knowledge' and
herein lies the basis of the distinction between the phen¬
omenal and noumenal worlds. The argument goes on, thought
and knowledge are only possible through the observance of
rules. We may call these 'rules of logic', that is rules
which describe how we are to think, or 'rules of thinking',
rules which describe what constitutes the process of thought.
In either case thinking according to rules, or Reason, serves
to guide our search for knowledge. If it is a faculty of
rules, and not of cognition, reason itself must be served
by action for it is only through action that understanding
of the world, that is the formation of rules about the world,
can be achieved. Without rules and concepts - a framework
within which experience may be construed - no experience is
possible. In action we presuppose that we determine the
world by our actions and we derive rules about the world on
the basis of our perception of the effects of such actions.
Reason must therefore be primarily practical. (Note the
similarity of this argument with that of Piaget.) The prob¬
lem, as Macmurray points out, is that Kant's argument was
based on the premiss of the 'cogito', that thought is primary
and that reason is abstract and theoretical.
Besides the problem of formal coherence the Critical
Philosophy is inadequate and this again is due to the
fact that it takes the 'Cogito' as its starting point
and centre of reference. Its inadequacy lies in the fact
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that by assuming that thought is individual the system
excludes the possibility of our understanding one another.
If thought is essentially private, and if thought is the
contrary of action, then thinking about another person can
never constitute understanding of him. Fundamentally the
problem lies in the dualism between theory and practice, or
thought and action, or again Subject and Agent, which is
instituted by making the 'I think' the primary postulate.
What we need, Macmurray argues, is a philosophy which can
account for the full concrete activity of the mind and the
body together, a philosophy of action:
(Linguistic philosophy) substitutes for the 'I think',
the 'I say', and thought becomes that aspect of speech
which makes it intelligible - its logical structure.
Speech is public. It is at once thought and action
... as a result it establishes communication, and
introduces the 'you' as the correlative of the 'I'.
For if the 'I think' logically excludes the .second
person, the 'I say' makes the second person a logical
necessity. The 'I say' is logically incomplete. To
complete it we must formulate it as follows: 'I say
to you; and I await your response'. Thus the problem
of the form of the personal emerges as the problem of
the form of communication. (Macmurray, 1957;74)
Macmurray therefore rejects Kant's premiss of the
primacy of thought, claiming that this is contradicted by
the conclusion that reason is primarily practical. Only a
philosophy of action can be adequate, since it is only
action that involves the 'full, concrete activity of the
mind and body, the Self'. Our central concern therefore
becomes not the study of thinking but the study of doing,
and it becomes a concern with the study of selves acting in
relation with one another rather than with the study of
individual subjects.
The implications of the above are that if we are to
provide an adequate account of the processes of human action
and interaction we must do so within the framework of an
approach which assigns a central role to the notions of the
Self and Agency, and that it is to communication, construed
as the exchange of information and the negotiation of rela¬
tions between persons, that our efforts would best be
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directed. Recent work by Trevarthen and others (Trevarthen
et al 1975-9) seems to support this view, but as was pointed
out above (pages 13 - 14) developmental psycholinguists have
not always ensured that their treatment of communication is
as defensible in psychological terms as it is in the terms
of linguistics. The present author therefore proposes to
examine the notion of Agency as a conceptual tool providing
a framework for the description of the behaviour of young
children and their mothers, and as a category in case
grammars. These are directed to an attempt to describe the
developing cognition of Agency in young children, and to an
examination of the justifications for the claim that the
child is able to encode the semantic category 'Agent1 in
his early linguistic utterances. Any account of knowledge
of this kind is necessarily an account of the interpersonal
and, it will be argued, requires an approach somewhat
different to that of most of Psychology which takes as its
object of study the individual Subject.
Only someone who is a participant in (the) hermeneut-
ical circle (the whole complex of a person's conceptual
systems and psychological make-up) can understand the
meaning of (an) agent's actions, for that meaning is
given by the agent's own conceptual and psychological
systems, and cannot be adequately captured within any
other systems. And it is impossible for anyone to
come to share the agent's own conceptual and psycho¬
logical systems by applying the methods of natural
science to his behaviour, by observing that behaviour
in a detached fashion and trying to frame laws setting
forth or explaining physical regularities detectable
in it. The possession of concepts and conceptual
systems, of intentions, desires, beliefs, etc. does
not manifest itself in any physically specifiable
regularities in behaviour. (Gauld and Shotter, 1977;9)
0.4 Introduction Summary and Plan for Part I
In this introduction I have tried to argue that both
logical behaviourism and physiological reductionism (Podor,
1968) are inadequate to the explanation of human behaviour.
I have presented in detail one argument supporting their
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rejection; Chomsky's (1959) reply to Skinner's attempt to
account for the learning and use of language from a
behaviourist perspective (1957). I have then drawn on
the work of Piaget and of Macmurray (1957) in order to
outline the sort of approach I believe to be necessary for
an investigation of the concept agency.
Chapter One is devoted to the derivation and explic¬
ation of a notion of agency which is both coherent and
adequate in itself and which can meaningfully be related
with what is known of the young child's cognitive abilities.
To this latter end a discussion is included - Section 1.2 -
on the nature of cognitive representation and the form
which the young child's cognition - including his cognition
of agency - should be seen as taking.
Chapter Two carries the analysis forward, applying
the central notions of intentionality and contingency to
communicative behaviour and then deriving a framework, by
reference to other theories of communication, within which
the child's communicative activity and the cognition upon
which it depends may be examined. Two other types of
activity are identified as worthy of investigation; these
are interpersonal routines and solitary activity. (Chapter
Three describes the methods by which these three types of
activity will be studied.)
My reasons for devoting a substantial part of this
thesis to theoretical and methodological considerations are
basically two. First, the blossoming of research on early
communicative development and the borrowing of terms and
ideas from related fields has led, I believe, to the
inappropriate use and incoherent relation of some of these
ideas. Some notion of agency, for example, is appealed to
by many writers, but it has been explicitly defined and
examined by only a few. The form of exposition followed
here seemed to me the best way to make clear the assumptions
upon which this work rests and the meanings of the terms
used. For this reason also there is no literature survey
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as such, but relevant work is referred to or reviewed at the
point at which the discussion touches upon it most closely.
The second reason is more specific. In previous
presentations by Myers (1979a, 1980,) of a version of the
procedure here described for the identification of a child's
communicative intentions that procedure was criticised as
behaviouristic. It is my purpose to demonstrate that this
view is unfounded; that while the insistence on triad
sequences of action in which the moves of mother and child
are contingent upon each other and explicable by reference
to one another is superficially of a behaviourist kind,
the conception of the child underlying this procedure and
the putative nature of his learning and knowing, and of his
acting and communicating, deny any such affinity. Once
again the best way to clarify this issue seemed to be a
careful derivation of theoretical perspective and of the
methodology appropriate to it.
PART ONE
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Chapter One; Defining Agency
1.1 Some Previous Work
If the approach outlined above is reasonable the prob¬
lem with which developmental psychologists are faced is
that of describing how an apparently almost completely
helpless neonate develops, or is changed, within a very
short time, into a person, who is capable, within limits,
of carrying out rule-governed mental operations, who can
conceive and execute meaningful action, and who can interact
and communicate with other similarly able persons. Since
the neural mechanisms upon which these faculties depend are
not, and may never be (see pages "$-8 ), accessible to us,
all the developmental psychologist can do is to observe and
describe the unfolding or development in the infant of
these abilities to intend, to act and to communicate, and
then to isolate and assess some of the more important influ¬
ences on that development. What are available to us, how¬
ever, are not just the unfolding or development of particular
concepts, or of intentions of a particular kind, but the
nascent processes of becoming intentional, and of becoming
able to comprehend and to follow rules for action and for
communication, both verbal and non-verbal. It was argued
in the Introduction that an analysis in terms of Agency may
shed light on these processes. Although Agency is a notion
appealed to by many writers and students of child develop¬
ment comparatively few studies have set out specifically to
examine the child's understanding of it, or of the factors
which might be thought to comprise it. Most of those which
have been carried out have involved observation of or exper¬
imentation with mother-infant pairs; I propose to leave the
discussion of these until a later section (2.5). The dis¬
cussion in this section will focus on two of these studies
which have attempted to assess the comprehension of the
individual child in isolation.
Golinkoff (1975) claims to have developed a methodology
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'which permits a non-linguistic perceptual translation of
action role concepts. The concepts of agent and recipient
were operationalised by presenting action sequences on
motion picture films in the serial presentation habituation
paradigm and observing infants' visual responses' (1975;183).
Forty eight male infants between the ages of 14 and 18
months and between 20 and 24 months were used. All the in¬
fants were presented with two films, one involving two
actors, a man and a woman, and the other an actor and an
object, a man and a table. Each film portrayed four differ¬
ent events. The first (the Standard condition) showed the
man pushing the woman (or the table) from left to right.
The second (Position Direction Reversal) showed the man
pushing the woman (or the table) from right to left. In the
third (Action Role Reversal by Position) the woman (or the
table) pushed the man from left to right, and in the fourth.
(Action Role Reversal by Direction) the woman (or the table)
pushed the man from right to left. Each of these events,
which lasted approximately six seconds, was repeated to
give six successive re-enactments in a block of trials. The
Standard block was repeated before each of the three exper¬
imental blocks, making six blocks of trials per film, or a
total per film of thirty-six scenes eighteen of which were
identical. Of the total of eight different events the two
which involved the table pushing the man are described as
'anomalous' or 'maximally different from the standard event'.
The main experimental hypothesis was that, if the infants
have expectations about action role relationships then,
these anomalous events would be 'greeted with increased
attention and surprise'; scenes representing violations of
the typical behaviour of animate and inanimate things should
be looked at most.
As might be expected Golinkoff's results show a pro¬
gressive habituation of the infants to the Standard blocks
in both films. They also show that the infants spent less
time watching those scenes in which the table pushed the
man than they did watching those in which the woman pushed
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the man. In fact the two blocks of anomalous events received
the least attention of all the experimental trials. Because
the habituation effect to the Standard blocks was greater
in the Man-Table film than in the Man-Woman film, the dif¬
ference between the patterns of looking at the standard vs
the experimental blocks are larger in the Man-Table film,
but this merely obscures the issue. For if the classifica¬
tion of those events in which the table pushes the man as
anomalous represents a classification meaningful in terms
of what the child knows, then the standard scenes presented
immediately prior to an anomalous event, and the amount of
time spent watching such standard scenes, should be irrele¬
vant to his reactions to anomalous events, provided also
that 'amount of looking' is a good measure of his perception
of anomaly. If we accept Golinkoff's methodology, then,
since the two anomalous events received the least attention
of all the experimental trials, we are forced to conclude
that infants, even at the age of two years, understand
little or nothing about the action role distinctions between
persons and inanimate objects. There is an extraordinary
volume of work which suggests this is not the case (see Sec¬
tion 2.5). It is worthwhile to point out here that all of
the infants in this study were over the age at which the
infants in the study by Greenfield and Smith (1976) are
claimed first to have encoded the semantic category Agent
in their single-word speech. If there is any basis to the
current assumption that the semantic and cognitive under¬
pinnings of language develop prior to the syntactic and
phonological systems (Bates, 1976; Brown, 1973; Edwards,
1973; Greenfield and Smith, 1976; Macnamara, 1972), a view
apparently held by Golinkoff herself, then the appropriate¬
ness of her methodology to the study of infants' understand¬
ing of semantic relations must be seriously questioned.^"
We shall return to this point in a moment.
Central to the notion of Agency is the idea of voluntary
"'"The question of what might constifcufce- 1 understanding' for an
infant is discussed in the next section.
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or intentional action. Only an agent is capable of such
action. Other classes of action, or, more precisely, of
movement, are involuntary movements and object-like move¬
ments, both of which are non-intentional. A number of
researchers have investigated in the laboratory the ability
of children to distinguish between intentional and acciden¬
tal action sequences, and have generally concluded (e.g.
Berndt and Berndt, 1975; King, 1971) that it is not until
they are five or six years of age that children are able to
do so reliably. Smith (1978) argued that these studies had
overlooked the complexity of the distinction between volun¬
tary and involuntary action, and that one must also take
into account the effects of such actions. It is often, he
claims, by our perception of the reactions of a person to
the effects and consequences of his actions that we are
able to judge whether or not those effects were intended;
this in turn provides us with evidence as to whether or not
the action itself was intentional.
Smith's subjects were four-, five- and six-year old
children, and adults. He presented them with two series of
video-tape films of a single young woman. In the first
series she performed four Voluntary, four Involuntary and
four Object-like movements. In the second series she per¬
formed the same action eight times, watching what she was
doing in four of them and not watching in the other four.
Two of the four actions within each of these five types had
desirable effects and the other two had undesirable effects;
in other words, of the total of twenty actions, ten had
desirable effects and ten had undesirable effects. The
subjects were interviewed individually. After each sequence
they were asked questions of the form: 'Was she trying to
do X?', 'Did she want to do X?', designed to reveal whether
or not the subject had interpreted the young woman's actions
as intentional or unintentional; for all questions an affir¬
mative answer implied the attribution of intention.
The results are interesting. The responses to questions
involving the verb 'try' closely parallel the results for
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questions involving the verb 'want', which Smith takes as
indicating that: ...'both words trapped the same conceptual
referent.1 Certainly the subjects seem to have interpreted
the words similarly at all ages. More interestingly, all
of the subjects judged the young woman's voluntary actions
as intentional, whereas only the four-year olds, and to a
lesser extent the five-year olds, answered in the affirma¬
tive a significant number of those questions relating to
her involuntary and object-like movements. Smith concludes
that his results show '...clear age differences in the
ability to recognise intentional action. The four-year olds
tended to regard all acts/movements as intentional.' (1978;
740) .: There are several reasons for doubting such a con¬
clusion. First, the questions are not counterbalanced, in
the sense that an affirmative answer always implied the
attribution of intention to the action being judged. This
could easily have been avoided by including questions of
the form: 'Did she do X by mistake?'. A consequence of
the lack of counterbalancing is that if the children did
not understand a question and simply concurred with the
experimenter they will be presumed to have judged the action
referred to as intentional. This is likely to happen more
often for the younger than for the older children. Second,
some of the questions themselves are anomalous. One scene
showed the young woman tripping on the edge of a rug while
walking across the floor, and falling into a chair. One
of the questions asked was: 'Was she trying to trip?'. If
the children understood the question, and the meaning of
the word trip, they would know also that to trip is not
something one usually tries to do. The less sophisticated
younger children are likely to have been less able to cope
with such anomaly and will have tended to agree with the
experimenter, that is to reply in the affirmative. Third,
the task for the subjects in this experiment is not that of
interpreting in an everyday situation the behaviour of
another person which may have consequences for the inter¬
preter - which is something we do automatically and which
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is clearly something that young children must also be able
to do - but that of answering questions requiring a conscious
verbal evaluation of the activity of a single person seen
on video-tape film. The adult subjects in the study were
far from being 100% correct in their judgements (the very
notion of correctness assumes that the young woman's actions
were always unambiguous), and it is noteworthy that the
transition for the children occurs at about the age at which
formal schooling begins. It may in fact be that the dif¬
ference between the four-year olds and the six-year olds lies
more in the degree to which they are accustomed to answering
formal questions from adults than in their understanding of
the actions they have observed. In the course of routine
interactions we do not stop to reflect upon whether each
movement we observe is or is not intentional. We do make
such judgements, and act upon them, but these judgements
tend to be neither conscious nor verbally mediated. While
it is interesting that six-year old children are better able
to answer questions concerning the intentionality of the
actions of a young woman on film than are four-year olds
this cannot be taken as indicating that four-year olds are
unable to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
action. In Section 2.5 we shall consider a number of studies
which suggest that even very young infants are able to take
account, to an extent, of the intention structure of a co-
interactant.
Although dealing with children quite different in age
these studies by Golinkoff (1975) and Smith (1978) are sim¬
ilar in that they adopt a methodology for testing the child's
understanding of presenting material on film to subjects
taken individually. This practice seems to have two major
shortcomings. The first is that it seeks to investigate
an area of human competence which finds its normal expression,
and its usefulness, in the context of mutual action and
goal-directed behaviour under conditions in which these are
effectively prevented. The second is that it produces
results which quite clearly underestimate the child's abil-
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ities as evidenced by studies using different methodologies.
Since our ability to interpret the behaviour of others, and
to adjust our own behaviour accordingly, depends upon and
is useful in social situations where the effects and con¬
sequences of such behaviour are salient for us, it would
seem appropriate to study the developing understanding and
interpretive abilities of young children in situations where
these factors may operate rather than in isolation where
even the possibility of such salience is denied. Donaldson
(1978) argues strongly that meaningfulness in the child's
terms is perhaps the most important principle of all to be
observed by developmental psychologists. The attempt to
study inherently social abilities and capacities in isolation
clearly violates this principle.
So far in this discussion the words understanding,
comprehension and knowledge have been applied rather loose¬
ly to infants and young children. Before proceeding further
we must try to clarify what might constitute 'understanding'
in a pre-verbal or minimally verbal child, and make some
attempt to assess the 'conceptual status' o.f a child at
this stage in respect of the nature of his grasp of semantic
relations and action roles. This is the subject of the next
section.
1.2 Some General Comments on Representation
There is a danger, in talking of the achievement by the
infant of an 'understanding' of a semantic category or
relation, or of the infant's 'knowledge' of certain facts
about his physical and social worlds, of implying that the
terms 'understanding' and 'knowledge' as applied to children
carry the same connotations as when applied to adults. The
ways in which knowledge is represented by adults are by no
means clearly understood, and the question of whether the
principal mechanism is that of imagery or of some kind of
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linguistic coding is far from resolution. Given this uncer¬
tainty it is impossible to say how similar, both in form and
incapacities, the representational system possessed by
youngsters in middle childhood is, in fact, to the represen¬
tational system typical of adulthood. The authenticity of
Piaget's concrete and formal operational stages have been
seriously challenged, for example by Wason (1949) . What
does seem fairly certain is that the ways in which know¬
ledge is represented in infancy differ markedly and in more
than one respect from the ways in which it is represented
in adulthood. We do not know whether the lack of a formal
language denies to the child any capacity for 'reflective
abstraction' or the possibility of 'linguistic coding' -
there may be a 'language of thought' (Fodor, 1976) - but if
these are available to infants they must have quite different
characteristics to their counterparts in adult thought.
Given this we must try to clarify what the terms understand¬
ing and knowledge are to be taken as meaning when applied
to infants. It would be inappropriate here to present an
account of the several controversies concerning 'the nature
of representation'; it is, in any case, beyond the scope of
this thesis. However, all theories of development presuppose,
or at least set certain constraints upon, the kinds of
representational systems with which they would be compatible.
Some writers, such as Piaget or Fodor, have made explicit
statements of their views on epistemology while others have
not. It seems necessary to consider here the kinds of
representation which the infant's, or the minimally verbal
child's, putative understanding of Agency might entail, in
order to arrive at some working definition of that 'under¬
standing' . First we must look at what it is the child has
to understand.
Broadly, the problem for the developing child is that
of acquiring a culture in order to integrate himself, or to
become integrated, into the social world into which he has
been born. (Richards, 1974). as Gauld and Shotter (1977)
point out:
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A child who acquires a culture has not merely acquired
'solutions', developed over long periods of time, to
the problems involved in satisfying his biological
drives, he has acquired a whole framework of thought,
feeling, perception and action, a reality he shares
with others. (1977;73)
The problems with which the child is faced are not those
of discovering his biological drives and of finding his own
solutions to them, while at the same time learning a set of
rules for social and communicative behaviour, but those of
learning what count as problems to those in his culture,
and what count as solutions to them; learning, for example,
that a referential language exists at all, as well as learn¬
ing how it is used. And learning how to use a language is
not simply learning a symbolic means of communicating what
one already knows, it involves learning the types^ci: concepts
and categories which are permitted by the form of^language?
it involves learning the nature -of the reality within which
problems and the solutions to them appear to the members of
that culture or language-using community. It is difficult
for adults, as competent and practised users of a language,
to conceive of a perspective on reality different to that
which their language permits. If this were not so, reliable
communication through the use of their language would be
impossible? in particular, referring expressions would be
different in meaning for all speakers of the language.
Furthermore, these differences in meaning would be inacces¬
sible to any of the speakers of the language. Fodor (1976)
maintains:
Verbal communication is possible because, when U is a
token of a linguistic type in a language L (understood
by the speaker S and by any other suitably situated L
speaker), the production/perception of U can effect a
certain kind of correspondence between the mental
states of the speaker and the hearer. (1976?103)
Such a correspondence could only be achieved if the
speaker and hearer construe their reality in similar terms,
that is if the speaker and hearer share in common the con¬
cepts and categories realizable through their language, and
agree about the kinds of computational operations which can
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be carried out in terms of them. It follows that any
theory of communication must be embedded in a theory of cog¬
nition, and in particular that a theory of language devel¬
opment must intrinsically be part of a theory of cognitive
development. Whether the emphasis adopted by the student
of language development be on the syntactic, semantic or
pragmatic aspects of language his theory or model must be
congruent with some superordinate theory of development as
a whole. And the question to which that theory must address
itself is, How does the infant come to perceive the world,
and to act in the world, on the same terms as do those around
him?; how does he become a 'competent member of a social
community'? (Richards, 1974). It is the knowledge allowing
such competence which must be handled by the child's cog¬
nitive systems.
Just as verbal communication is a means of effecting
a 'correspondence between the mental states of the speaker
and hearer' (Fodor, 1976) so linguistic development depends,
in part, upon the socialization of thought. Later in child¬
hood language becomes, 'an important instrument of social¬
ization, ... allowing the efficient transmission of cultural
norms, of presenting absent realities, of allowing quick
and abstract thought, and of facilitating the definition
and communication of subjective experience' (Ryan, 1974),
but this would be impossible unless the infant had already
learned the rules for thinking upon which the competent use
of his language depends. We shall return to this topic of
the 'cognitive underpinnings of language' in Section 2.4.
The immediate question concerning us is the form of the
system in and through which the 'social construction of
reality, or socialization of thought, might occur prior to
the appearance of language', as the child begins to acquire
his culture. What are the theoretical options on the form
of this system?
We have already briefly discussed Piaget's theory of
knowledge (Pages )5 ~ \~f ) . For Piaget facts about the world
are represented through schemata organized into a cognitive
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structure which is relatively homogeneous during any one
stage of development. The mode of cognitive functioning
characteristic of the sensori-motor stage, which lasts from
birth until approximately 18 months when language appears,
involves thinking which is non-discursive. Sensori-motor
schemas are imagistic in that they are simple, discrete
representations of relationships existing between the child
and his world; these schemas are the joint outcomes of per¬
ception and action and as such allow for no separation of
thought (which consists only of these schemas) and action.
It is conflict between these schemas which, through reflec¬
tive abstraction, results'in the formation of higher order
rules or more abstract schemata. However, it is difficult
to see how Such conflict could be perceived unless, atten¬
dant to the capacity to form schemas, there exists some
(rule-governed) system in terms of which sensori-motor
schemas are to be compared. This requirement is precisely
analogous to the argument presented by Gauld and Shotter
against the ability of a generalised machine to form concepts
(see pages 5 -fe); it is a point we shall return to in a
moment.
Bruner's theory of early cognitive development mirrors
Piaget both in its appeal to stage-like progressions in the
mode of functioning and in its suggestion as to the charac¬
teristic nature of these stages. For Bruner cognitive
development is_ the development of different ways of repre¬
senting the world; the earliest representations are Enactive,
that is indissociably involved with action, these are grad¬
ually replaced by Iconic representations, in which thoughts
still resemble the things they are thoughts about, and
finally by Symbolic representations, in which there may be
arbitrarily little resemblance between the vehicle of thought
and its object. (Bruner, 1973). In the theories of both
Piaget and Bruner the child gradually comes to separate
thought from action in his schemas, and his concepts of
objects and events in the world become independent of the
actions by which they are realised; they become freed from
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the contexts in which they are formed. The acquisition of
language, involving the conventional use of arbitrary signs,
is seen as emerging from these developments.
There is little doubt that the notion of the schema,
as a unit of knowledge of some form, is one of the most
powerful descriptive tools presently available to us.
Further, the idea that the nature of the schemas character¬
istic of different modes of cognitive functioning changes
qualitatively in an ordered way in the direction of increased
abstraction and generality is an intuitively appealing one.
However, while we may accept that we can do no more at
present than attribute the motivation for development to a
'desire for active mastery' (Donaldson, 1978), a problem
remains concerning the mechanisms whereby schemas at any
level may be compared and abstracted from. One solution,
implicit in the definition of schema offered by Neisser
(1976), is to associate with each schema a set of rules
governing its range of application and disallowing any over¬
lap with the range of application of another schema:
A schema is that portion of the entire perceptual cycle
which is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by ex¬
perience, and somehow specific to what is being per¬
ceived. The schema accepts information as it becomes
available at sensory surfaces and is changed by that
information; 'it directs movements and exploratory
activities that make more information available, by
which it is further modified ... It is some active
array of physiological structures and processes; not
a centre in the brain, but an entire system that in¬
cludes receptors and afferents and feed-forward units
and efferents. (Neisser 1976;54 my emphasis)
This logically requires, and Neisser goes on to say it,
that the infant must possess, prior to and independent of
experience, some (discursive) system for ordering the infor¬
mation which experience affords:
What babies do know, I believe, is how to find out
about their environment, and how to organise the infor¬
mation they obtain so it can help them obtain more,
(ibid.;63)
Our model of the infant's representation system must
be broad enough to capture both these aspects of knowledge;
the knowledge of information about the world, constituted
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in schemas, and the knowledge governing the organization and
inter-relation of this information, in a rule-system of
some kind. The early forms of representation described by
Piaget and Bruner do not seem adequate to capture both of
these aspects. Fodor claims:
What is conspicuously lacking in the Piagetian version
is a theory that explains how the organism manages to
differentiate its schemata in the right direction ...
Piaget's views preclude his presenting such a theory
since, on the one hand, he wants the characteristic
difference between levels of equilibration (i.e.
between stages of development) to consist in the ex¬
pressive power of the 'logics' they invoke, and, on
the other, he wants the mechanism of equilibration to
be learning; ... these two desiderata cannot be simul¬
taneously satisfied. (Fodor, 1976;91)
What Fodor goes on to argue is that, while it is alto¬
gether possible that some of the child's early knowledge
can be described in terms of sensori-motor or enactive
schemas, such schemas cannot constitute the whole of his
knowledge; schemas must be organized within a structured
internal code which shares many of the characteristics of
a natural language.
A rather different solution is offered by Bower (1979).
He describes an experiment which demonstrates, he claims,
that what the child must represent on the basis of his per¬
ception of some event is a rather abstract, general descrip¬
tion of that event. This information is transferable to
other, broadly similar events. Only after repeated exposure
to a particular event does the child's representation of
that event become specific and non-transferable. The fact
that the ability to transfer is lost suggests both that the
form of the infant's representation moves from the general
to the specific, and that the infant cannot retain both an
abstract and a specific (schematized) solution to the same
problem. Bower is claiming then that thinking progresses
from the formation of abstract representations to the for¬
mation of specific representations which, ostensibly at
least, disposes of the problem of how information might
later be abstracted from initially highly specific schemas.
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He does however explicitly allow the existence of rules
governing the organization of these representations, be
they abstract or specific. It could be suggested that what
he is really describing is the process of schema-formation,
and that the early, abstract form is simply an imperfectly-
formed variety; its ability to transfer lies in its indef-
initeness. However that may be, it is clear that for Bower
also schematic knowledge cannot be the child's only cognitive
faculty.
Fodor's book The Language of Thought (1976) is, in
part, an attempt to argue that the possession of a discur¬
sive representational system is an intrinsic part of being
human. One of the things which all humans do is form
concepts, and, he argues, simple learning cannot adequately
account for this process. For concept-formation involves
generating hypotheses and testing them against experience,
which requires both a source of inductive hypotheses and
some form of confirmation metric existing prior to that
which is learned. This is just as true of infants as it is
of adults; if there is a means by which the infant can
compare and integrate discrete schemas this faculty must be
rule-governed, and these rules must be represented in some
way independently of the iconic or imagistic representations
upon which they operate. Infantile thinking cannot only
consist in the capacity to form S-R representations, it
must also be a faculty for the derivation of rules:
Even if Bruner is right and the vehicles of reference
are different for adults and children, the mechanisms
of reference - whatever they are - must be pretty much
the same for both. (Fodor, 1976;184)
We may note in passing that Fodor is arguing that
Chomsky's advocacy of a Language Acquisition Device must be
broadly correct but that, since learning a natural language
is a matter of hypothesis formation and confirmation, and
since it is therefore impossible to learn a language whose
terms express semantic properties not expressed by the
terms of some language (of thought) you are already able to
use, the LAD must in fact form part of a general cognitive
4
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faculty. Chomsky's recent writing (e.g. Chomsky, 1976)
seems to endorse this view.
We may now ask the question, What does it mean to talk
in terms of the child's understanding of Agency? Adults are
not ordinarily able to produce any explicit and accurate
verbal definition of concepts like that of agency, yet we
should not assume that they are not 'versed' in such con¬
cepts. They conduct their lives in the clear appreciation
that other people have intentions, and do things related to
realizing them,, and that their own intentions are communi¬
cable to bthers - social action of all kinds depends upon
just these abilities. As Smith (1978) points out, we use
the effects and consequences of the actions of others in
assessing whether or not these actions were intentional.
And we know from our own experience what it means to do
something on purpose or by accident. I hope to demonstrate
that infants, also, behave in ways which demonstrate that
they know the difference between something done on purpose
and something done by mistake, both in their own behaviour
and in the behaviour of others. They know the difference
because, in Donaldson's (1978) phrase, it makes 'human
sense'. If Fodor is right and it is true that systems of
representation differ between infancy and adulthood in the
form and complexity of their 'vehicles' rather than in their
nature and discursive mode of operation, then the principal
difference between the 'understanding' of infants and adults
resides not in whether or not concepts can be inspected,
manipulated and abstracted from but rather in the complexity
of these concepts and the form in which they are available
for inspection, manipulation and abstraction. There may
very well be qualitative differences between the kinds of
concepts in which children of different ages are able to
deal; this would not at all prejudice the claim that the
rules and constraints governing their operation remain
broadly similar - are, in fact, an inevitable function of
the structure of the human nervous system itself. If, as
seems likely, such qualitative differences do exist, then,
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in addition to the fact that infants are unable to commun¬
icate their thoughts to others - or presumably to themselves
- in words, that which their thoughts are about must also
be different; their knowledge and understanding must be
different, in ways which are probably systematic but about
which we as yet know relatively little. I accordingly
propose to use the term Cognition to describe the infants
conceptual knowledge. Cognition should be taken as meaning;
knowledge, in some form indefinitely similar to that
characteristic of adulthood, of some group of facts about
the world which may or may not coincide with a grouping of
facts, that is a concept, typical of adult thinking. In
attempting to describe the child's cognition of Agency we
shall inevitably be comparing the infant's cognition with
that of adults; hopefully this is a lesser evil than compar¬
ing their understanding, which term usually implies reflec¬
tive awareness.
1.3 Two Kinds of Agent
It was pointed out in the Introduction that linguists
such as Fillmore (1968) and Chafe (1970), in trying to arrive
at semantically based analyses of language, have drawn upon
the notion of Agency as one of the components in their case-
grammars. In studying the development of the ability to
communicate and to use language in young children some
psychologists (such as Greenfield and Smith, 1976; Bates,
1976) have used case-grammars as the foundation.of their
approach; I have briefly mentioned some of the reasons for
caution in such a procedure (see pages 13 - 1-4) . I have
also attempted to argue that, nevertheless, Agency is central
to the study of communication, when this is construed as
the exchange of information and the negotiation of relations
between persons, and indeed that the study of agency is the
most promising line for such an inquiry. Communication in
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its broadest sense includes the 'kinesics1 and 'bodily
communication' studied by Birdwhisteil (1970) and by Argyle
(1975) and his co-workers as well as formally linguistic
communication. Only a synthetic approach, drawing on data
and ideas from all fields of communication, seems adequate
for the study of communicative development. The potential
for inroads in both the study of social competence and,
specifically, the study of language development afforded by
semantic categories and relations seems to me indisputable.
In Section 1.1 it was argued that certain methodologies and
experimental techniques are inappropriate to the study of
the child's cognition of agency, and that the procedures
used should be those most conducive to the demonstration
of his ability by the child; those which maximize the infor¬
mation he can give us as to the state of his cognition,
involving, I have argued, situations and events.which are
meaningful and salient for him. The rest of this chapter
and the whole of the next are devoted to an attempt to 'un¬
pack' and operationalize this abstract concept, Agency. In
the interests of continuity the relevant literature is
discussed in appropriate sections rather than en masse. To
alter slightly Fillmore's (1968) definition, an agent could
be described as 'the typically animate instigator of the
action identified by the perceiver'.^ This description,
although it obscures the fact that in everyday life we do
not usually consciously identify or perceive most of the
actions of those around us, does at least capture the facts
that actions of our own are to be included as well as those
of others and that it is through their actions that we judge
the aims, goals and intentions of other persons. Immediately
therefore, we must distinguish between our cognition of our¬
selves as agents, which we know directly, and our cognition
This definition should not be taken as implying that no
event can be an action, that is be performed by an agent,
unless it is independently witnessed, since a) the agent
is necessarily his own witness, and b) it is impossible
ever to identify an unwitnessed action.
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of others as agents, which we know only indirectly, perhaps
by induction from our knowledge of ourselves - but this is
to anticipate; let us first look at each of these more
closely and then consider how they might arise and develop.
Cognition of one's own agency consists in the ability
to do things for oneself, to develop goals and the strategies
for achieving them. It involves learning about and exploit¬
ing the contingent relationships that exist between actions
of our own and events in the world; it depends upon the
derivation of rules about the way the world is ordered. It
also involves our ability to conceive and execute goal-
directed strategies or ordered series of actions; it
depends upon the development of intentional structures. In
short it consists in learning what sorts of things it is
possible to do and how it is possible to do them. One of
the things involved in these processes is the discovery that
quite often other people can help us to do, or can do for
us, things which we are unable to do ourselves. Learning
how to enlist the help of others, then, is part of what
discovering our own agency involves. But enlisting the help
of others must involve our cognition of their agency: it
depends upon our recognition that they too are capable of
achieving reliable effects through their actions in the world,
(and even that their abilities may exceed our own) and that
they are capable of comprehending our attempts to communicate
our wishes. Now neither of these cognitions seems logically
prior to the other and one could not a priori say that the
child must master the one before the other. For just as it
would be possible to argue that only after he had learned
through his own experience that it is possible to act in the
world could the child possibly conceive of others as acting
also, so we could argue that itais only through the atten¬
tions and responses of others that the infant ever reaches
the stage of being able to act independently of them; that,
initially at least, the situations engineered by others
constitute the infant's only experience of contingent re¬
lationships in the world, and without which he would neither
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survive nor develop. Good arguments could be made in favour
of both of these hypotheses, but these arguments could not
be such as to exclude the alternative hypothesis. Because
the child is learning simultaneously about his own agency
and that of others it seems probable that experience of
these two kinds is mutually beneficial and that each pro¬
vides 'building-blocks' for the other. Certainly, an appre¬
hension of contingencies and the ability to intend are
involved in both cases. In the child's terms there may be
little difference between using an adult to achieve a
desired end and using another object, for example to bring
a desired object within reach. Bates (1976) considers the
possibility that adults are initially perceived simply as
rather complicated mechanical objects, while Piaget's notion
of Animism, on the other hand, refers to the attribution by
the child of animate (human-like) qualities to ordinary
toys. However this may be, 'self-as-agent' and 'other-as-
agent' are logically separable and, since children engage
in solitary activity and they engage in mutual, co-operative
activity with others, and since the nature of these episodes
differs, it seems sensible to deal separately with the
evidence afforded by each. The next three sections are
given over to an attempted analysis of agency, and to dis¬
cussion of what appear to be the common factors in the cog¬
nition of agency, that is Contingency and Intentionality.
Two caveats are in order at this stage. First, the
distinction between self-as-agent and other-as-agent is a
methodological one and may not constitute a real distinction
in the terms of the child's cognition. indeed if learning
of each kind really is mutually beneficial then the distinc¬
tion is only a methodological one, and its validity or use¬
fulness must be examined afterwards. Second, the evidence
of Piaget and others shows clearly that children do not
always succeed in integrating schemas derived in different
circumstances or situations and, therefore, evidence as to
the child's cognition in one sphere of activity cannot con¬
stitute counter-evidence as to his cognition in any other
44.
sphere of activity. There can be no requirement that the
child's apparent abilities should 'make sense' in the terms
of adult thinking. Bower's (1974) account of the develop¬
ment of the object-concept is one example of a 'counter¬
intuitive' theory.
1.4 The components of Agency
Macmurray (1957) argues that only a 'philosophy of
action' can be adequate to take account of the full concrete
activity of the mind and the body together (see pages 18 -20) .
The objectives of all our primary knowledge are, he claims,
practical ones, and it is 'this knowledge, itself an aspect
of action, to which all reflective theory must refer' (op.
cit.; 12). In the present context, this view of knowledge
and of action requires that for a child to act as an agent
he must 'know' how to do so; his cognition of self-as-agent
is evidenced by the extent of his ability to do (at least
some of) the things that agents can do. And we, as adult
observers and inte-ractors, can assess the state of his cog¬
nition in different circumstances on the basis of those
actions he performs or attempts to perform. We are able to
do so because:
We do not need to refer to generalisations (about how
people usually act) in order to understand their actions,
nor does it seem that in most cases reference to the
generalisation adds anything to our understanding of
the actions. We 'understand' why people who have in¬
tentions do what they believe most likely to fulfill
those intentions because we know 'from the inside' that
this is part of what is involved in having an intention.
And there is no other way of knowing what is involved
in having an intention. ... One's understanding of in¬
tentions depends upon one's capacity to intend and not
upon the observation of numerous examples of intending.
(Gauld and Shotter, 1977;87)
Similarly to the extent to which the infant behaves
towards others, and especially towards his mother, as if
they were agents he must 'know' that others besides himself
are able reliably to cause effects in the world; his cog¬
nition of other-as-agent is manifest in his ability to
communicate and engage in co-operative activity with others."'"
In the previous section I suggested that the cognition
of agency, or, what is the same thing, the ability to perform
actions in the world, depends primarily upon two things:
the derivation of rules about the way the world is ordered,
and the development of intentional structures. These,
respectively, provide the mechanism and the motive for the
execution of meaningful action, and I take it that these
requirements are similar in principle regardless of whether
the agent in question is acting independently or in concert
with others. When others are involved their behaviour
becomes one aspect of the world about which a prospective
2
agent must form rules. Evidence exists which suggests that
the abilities to detect contingent relationships and to set
out to do so on purpose are present within a few weeks of
birth (Watson, 1973). Each of these is examined in more
detail below.
It is not sufficient, however, for the developing child
to be endowed with a capacity and a desire to achieve mastery
over his environment; the ability to become an agent. If
such processes were to operate uniquely for each individual
there would be no possibility of a group of individuals
coming to construe the world in similar terms. In other words,
there would be no possibility of the development and trans¬
mission of culture. As we argued above (pages 32.-34-) part
of what acquiring a culture involves for the child is the
"'"The child can of course be wrong, in adult terms, as when,
for example, he treats a toy or an animal as if it were a
human interactant. Being wrong on purpose, on the other
hand, is a common form of play throughout childhood, and
should be distinguished from 'mismatches' with adult cog¬
nition.
2
In Chapter 4 I shall provide some evidence in support of the
hypothesis that one reason for the commonly observed 'fear
of strangers' in the second six months of life is that
strangers violate the rules for communication and interaction
which the child is deriving through contact with his mother
or principal care-taker.
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socialization of his thought, a process whereby he comes to
adopt the framework of thought, feeling, perception and
action characteristic of his culture. I now want to argue
that this could only occur through communication, and,
therefore, that communication, both non-verbal and verbal,
enjoys a privileged role in the process of the child's
developing cognition of agency. For the task facing the
child is not simply that of becoming a person capable of
intentional action but of becoming a person capable of
actions which are intelligible and relevant to those around
him. The value of culture lies in its cumulative nature and
in the scale of the effects it permits us to have upon our
environment, and although this requirement of conventionality
at first places greater demands upon the developing child's
learning ability it very soon greatly increases his scope
as an agent. Learning to communicate seems to require of
the child these same basic abilities, to derive rules and
to encode intentions, but it adds a further dimension to
his capacities; that of engaging with others in mutual, co¬
operative activity. The cognition of other-as-agent is,
then, an integral part of what is involved in becoming a
full-fledged human agent and is not simply a by-product of
that development. In Chapter-2 we shall try to develop a
framework within which to study the cognition of other-as-
agent. We first turn to the evidence concerning the ability ■
of infants to detect contingent relationships and to do so
intentionally.
1.5 Contingency Detection in Infancy
If we are 0oing to make the claim that the ability to
deteci^contingent relationships is an essential pre-requisite
to meaningful action, including communication and the mastery
of language - since the use of language is one kind of
action - then we must show that the infant is at least
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minimally able to recognise and exploit the conditions which
obtain within his world. If this can be shown to be so it
is reasonable then to examine the development of the proces¬
ses rendered possible by this faculty. If it cannot, the
methodology of explanation by purpose must be abandoned as
untenable. For our purposes here it will be sufficient
only to demonstrate the existence of the faculty of contin¬
gency detection; I propose to leave any discussion of the
specific abilities to which this faculty may lead, partic¬
ularly with respect to communicative, social and linguistic
development, until the next chapter, and to examine evidence
only as it pertains to the existence of the rule-forming
capacity itself.
Piaget has written widely on the understanding of
causality by children, claiming that this understanding
'becomes objective and adequate only at the end of a long
evolution whose initial phases are centred on the child's
own action, while he is still unaware of the spatial and
physical connections inherent in the material causal schemes'.
Piaget argues that during the early period, up to about 4-§-
months (sensori-motor stage III), although the child has
begun to enact various schemes, that is to manipulate
objects in an intelligent way to some extent, he still
'knows no other cause but his own action, and is not aware
of the necessity of spatial contact'. This early notion of
causality is described as 'magical-phenomenalist'; 'phenom-
enalist' because the contiguity of two events is sufficient
to make them appear causally related, and 'magical' because
it is centred on the action of the subject without consider¬
ation of the spatial connection between cause and effect'.
After this time, from s-m stage IV onwards, 'the child
begins to react to persons in a more and more specific
manner because they behave differently from things, and
because they behave according to schemes which bear some
relation to the schemes of the child's own action. .Sooner
or later there is established a kind of causality whose
source is others'. (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969;17-24) There
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are two points to be made here. First, we have already
discussed the distinction between cognition, as the mental
process underlying action, and understanding, as used here
by Piaget to mean a grasp of the mechanics of a cause-effect
relation. Just as it is unnecessary for us to be aware of
the precise nature of the operation of an internal combustion
engine in order to be able to drive a car, so it is unneces¬
sary for the child to be aware of the precise nature of the
relation between an action and an event in order to be able
to exploit that relation. The child will be unable to repair
the relation should it break down, but as long as it obtains
he will be able to exploit it once he has perceived that it
exists. The detection of a contingent relation is, then,
different from understanding the basis of that relation.
Second, since in Piagetian theory knowledge develops by
reflective abstraction from schemas based in perception and
action, the child could not achieve an understanding of
causality unless he had already perceived the existence of
a number of contingent relationships. In Piaget's terms,
the formation of a sensori-motor schema is, precisely, the
perception of a contingent relationship between an action
of the child's and some event in the world. Although we
have disputed some aspects of Piagetian theory, this con¬
ception of the nature of schema-formation is one which we
fully accepted. In theoretical terms then, contingency-
detection is essential to cognitive development. Can we
find experimental evidence to support this viewpoint?
Watson (1973) was interested in the learning abilities
of young babies, and particularly in their ability to detect
relationships between their own behaviour and events in the
external world. He set up a number of situations for the
babies he studied, and observed their discovery of the con¬
ditions he had arranged. All the relationships which Watson
arranged involved movements commonly produced at random by
infants such as head-turns and kicks of the feet. His work
is relevant to this discussion in two ways. He showed that
infants of under two months old can recognize that it is one
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turn of their head, to the left, for example, which was res¬
ponsible for switching on a projector display, or for the
sweet-tasting substance they received in their mouth. He
showed that there is a large number of such simple 'links'
which very young infants are able to appreciate. Watson's
second point is that, almost invariably, in the process of
discovering how to repeat an event which had first happened
by chance, that is as a result of random movement, an infant
will smile vigorously. This smiling, he claims, indicates
an intellectual pleasure at having discovered something about
the causal structure of the world.^ It matters little that
this relation has been created artifically by an adult and
is of only a temporary nature. Watson concludes that 'the
games adults play with infants are all basically contingency-
detection games - between some behaviour of the child and a
response (poke, tickle, 'boo') by the adult ... People become
associated with the pleasure that is inherent in tie game of
contingency-detection'. (Watson, 1973). The implications
of this conclusion are extraordinarily far-reaching.
Other researchers too have performed such experiments
with results similar to those of Watson. Siqueland and
Lipsitt (1966) found that babies only a few hours old could
learn in about ten trials that, on hearing a buzzer, a head-
turn to the left resulted in their receiving a sweet-tasting
solution, while, on hearing a tone, a head-turn to the right
had this result. Supporting evidence of a similar kind has
been presented by Bower, Broughton and Moore (1970),
Carpenter (1974), Dunkeld and Bower (1980), Uzgiris and Hunt
(1975) and Wertheimer (1961), among others. Papousek (1969)
discovered that infants are able to master quite complex
problems if these are built up in gradual stages. Once a
baby* has detected a contingency he will usually stop perfor¬
ming, and will start again only if the contingency is
changed. By allowing the infant to detect a simple action-
event pairing, and by then altering the conditions so that
two actions
This 'pleasure at discovery' is a point to which we shall
return on page 55.
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were required to produce the same event, Papousek was able
to elicit fairly complex action sequences from his infants;
for example, two head-turns to the right followed by two
head-turns to the left. He concludes that what is important
is not the actual characteristics of the event the baby is
producing, nor is it the particular action or combination
of actions which is required; what matters is that there
be a relationship between a given behaviour and a given
event in the external world. Babies will learn until they
have discovered just what behaviour of theirs produces this
event, which discovery results in vigorous smiling and coo¬
ing, not directed at the event in particular, but rather
seeming to reflect some internal pleasure.
It would seem that infants from just a few hours of
age onwards are indeed able to discover that it is possible
for connections to exist between their behaviour and events
in the world. On the basis of an event which is originally
brought about by their random movement they will experiment
until they identify just which movement is responsible. At
that point, when a previously random movement comes to be
performed in order to produce some event in the external
world, that movement becomes an action. It becomes a move¬
ment performed 'on purpose' and about whose, consequences
its instigator has certain expectations; it becomes inten¬
tional. But we are now encroaching on the territory of the
next section.
1.6 Can infants 'Act'?
Many or all of the experiments des cribed in the previous
section could be taken as evidence of the conditionability
of infants and, within the terms of operant conditioning
theory, it makes perfect sense to interpret them in this
way. One particular aspect of the subject's behaviour,
occurring randomly under normal circumstances as part of
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that subject's behavioural repertoire, is reinforced by an
experimenter and achieves an enhanced frequency of produc¬
tion. One question which may be more difficult for a con¬
ditioning theorist to answer is why the identification of
the behaviour responsible for the 'reward' should be a
source of delight to the subject, though he could presumably
argue that this delight simply reflects the subject's satis¬
faction at receiving the reward or reinforcer. However, as
we have tried to argue in Section 0.2, while we may admit
the value and importance of the principles of association
learning and operant conditioning, a behaviouristic approach
cannot be expected to provide either a useful framework or
an adequate theory of the processes of human behaviour, and
a broader, mentalist approach, involving reference to such
notions as goal, purpose and intention, is required for the
explanation of human action. Now a proponent of the behav¬
iourist school would be entitled to ask whether, since we
choose to interpret the child's ability to detect relation¬
ships between his behaviour and the receipt by him of, say,
a sweet-tasting solution as evidence of his 'intentionality',
and since rats in Skinner-boxes are capable of solving prob¬
lems of a similar complexity, we are also suggesting that
rats are similarly intentional beings. And if rats and
other lower animals are to be seen as having intentions,
wherein lies the particular value of this notion for the
explanation of human behaviour? These are serious questions.
To attempt to answer them we must try to clarify what is
meant by the claim that infants are capable of action.
'Intention' is a notion which has puzzled philosophers
for centuries and is not one which it is possible to treat
both briefly and adequately. What we must rather try to do
is to delimit those kinds of intention, or those interpre¬
tations of Intentionality, in which we are chiefly interested.
There seem to be three rather different levels at which
young children can be regarded as intentional beings; these
will be briefly described.
In the first place, intentionality can be regarded as a
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pure force whose expression is the continued existence of
the organism; a motivation to grow and to develop, to fulfill
the innate genetic, or epigenetic, potential of the organism.
This kind of 'intention' must be characteristic of all living
organisms; it is not an interpretation about which we shall
have anything further to add. Secondly, intentionality can
be contrued as the director of intelligence, that which is
responsible for the desire to achieve 'active mastery' over
the environment, presumably, one way in which the organism
endeavours to ensure its survival is through discovering the
principles of operation of the environment in which it is
to survive, insofar as it is capable of such discovery. This
capacity is determined by its intelligence, its ability to
derive rules capturing these principles of operation. A
third kind of intention is that which is associated with
particular actions, the intention to achieve some direct
and fairly immediate goal.. It is this third meaning which
has been used so far in this chapter in our discussion of
Intentionality as the necessary corollary to contingency-
detection for the performance of actions.
It seems clear that intentions of the third kind, that
is intentions associated with particular actions, find their
relevance within intentionality in the second sense above.
To put this another way, besides achieving their immediate
goals particular actions resulting in learning - assimilation
and accommodation in Piaget's terms - increase the organism's
cognition of its environment. An organism performs actions
in order to test or modify hypotheses, in order to achieve
active mastery over that environment. If this seems to
attribute a great deal of 'structure' to the organism it
must be pointed out that these capacities are precisely
those which would be allowed by a discursive, rule-governed
representational system, as discussed in Section 1.2. If
the necessity of such a system is allowed, then to argue
that the child's intentions are directed to achieving active
mastery over his environment is to argue that intentionality
is linked with intelligence; the intentions which the organ-
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ism can entertain are constrained by the hypotheses and goals
of which the organism is able to conceive. The organisms
intentional structures are delimited by the rule-deriving
capacities of its representational system. The capacities
of this system are, in turn, given by the structure of the
nervous system itself. Our answer to the behaviourist would,
then, be as follows: Animals which have demonstrated their
ability to learn associations and which are susceptible to
operant conditioning must indeed be regarded as intentional
in our terms, but the intentionality of different species
is not therefore equivalent. Although all organisms seek
to achieve mastery over their environment as a means to
their survival, their capacity to do so is limited, broadly,
by the structure of their nervous system, and therefore the
intentional structures of which they are capable are quali¬
tatively different , Only Man seems capable of constructing
for himself codemic systems which significantly increase
his ability to grasp and to order in hierarchical systems
the relations which exist in his world. (See Bateson's
(1973) notion of 'deutero-learning'.)
In this view, intentionality does not develop ontogen-
etically, but becomes realized through its expression in
conceptual development; through, in man, the development of
the ability to communicate and through its channelling in
socially recognizable and understood ways - since other
persons constitute a large and significantr~aspect of that
environment which the child is attempting to master. Gauld
and Shotter put this as follows:
The infant's coming to act, to have concepts, frame
goals and intentions and so on is not the upshot of
some synthesis or compounding of behavioural elements
each individually non-conceptual and non-intentional
... The development of the conceptual and the inten¬
tional can only be thought of as a process of the dif¬
ferentiation and unfolding of capacities in an organism
which is ... inchoately proto-conceptual and proto-
intentional or latently conceptual and latently inten¬
tional. (Gauld and Shotter, 1977;84)
If intentionality does not develop but achieves expres¬
sion through the discovery by the child of the means of
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achieving effects upon his environment, then the develop¬
ment of the ability verbally to encode communicative inten¬
tions, that is the acquisition of language, must be one
aspect of the potential of the human nervous system."^ To
reiterate our point of page 38, the faculty of language
acquisition must in fact form part of a general co_gnitive
faculty. An examination of the notions 'communicative
intention' and 'interactive act' and of how these may be
studied in the young child forms part of the subject matter
of the next chapter*
We have so far avoided confronting directly the question
of what evidence there is for the proposition that infants
can intend in the first place. What exactly would constitute
evidence of this kind? In the Introduction Taylor (1964)
is reported to have pointed out that there has never been
agreement as to what the relevant evidence is which would
decide whether or not human behaviour should be seen as
purposive, and. we concluded Section 0.2 by arguing that in
such cases the value of a theory resides in the explanatory
power which it affords. In other words, there cannot be
evidence in any strictly empirical sense which would enable
us to state that infants are, or are not, intentional beings,
and our decision as to whether or not we should regard them
as such must depend upon post-hoc explanatory adequacy rather
2
than upon a priori logical grounds. There can be no evidence
other than the infant's behaviour to inform us of the kinds
of things of which he is capable; he cannot inform us by any
other means. The validity of regarding the infant as inten¬
tional, therefore, depends upon our being able reasonably
to attribute purposefulness to some proportion of his behav¬
iour. It depends upon whether we can reliably identify
actions within behaviour much of which will be random.
"^Whether or not this faculty is uniquely human need not con¬
cern us here.
2
This is not to deny that other kinds of explanation can
a priori be demonstrated to be inadequate.
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There are a number of criteria which can be used to
assess the infant's behaviour which will be discussed in a
later section (3.1), but one further point is worth making
here. We must restrict our claims about the infant's cap¬
acity to intend to those intentions which are actually en¬
coded, those which are mediated through immediate, particular
and largely successful actions, since such actions are our
only basis for claiming that intentions exist at all. To
return to the experiments cited in the previous section, we
take it that the infant's 'pleasure at discovery' of the
behaviour of his responsible for the observed event is
evidence of his" intentions to cause that event to recur and,
at the same time, to identify the- behaviour of his which
causes that event. The infant's reactions to his own success
or failure can, I would suggest, tell us a great deal about
what it is he was trying to do in performing some actionk
This in turn can tell us something of the possibilities and
goals of which he is able to conceive. In assessing his
cognition we could extrapolate from such instances to other
situations of a similar complexity or logical structure but
this would be ill-advised since we cannot know to what
extent his cognition of any concept is integrated and coherent.
It seems safer to restrict our claims about the infant's
cognition to just those which are required for a full descrip¬
tion of his identifiably intentional actions.
In this chapter I have tried to argue that the examin¬
ation of the child's 'understanding' of agency through the
methodology of testing subjects in isolation is unlikely to
be worthwhile, and that agency is essentially an interactive
notion. I have discussed the question of quite what is in¬
volved for the child in his 'cognition' of agency, and have
then attempted to analyse the concept itself. Both when
applied to others and to oneself, cognition of agency seems
to depend upon the capacities to intend and to grasp or make
sense of contingent relations in the world. Finally I have
argued that the beginnings of these capacities can be demon¬
strated to be present, under the terms of our definitions,
56.
in infants of just a few hours of age. The problem now
becomes to describe the development or unfolding of the
abilities to which these faculties lead, in particular the
ability to communicate and specifically to use language.
To do this we must examine rather more closely the concept
of communication itself.
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Chapter Two: Agency and Communication
2.1 The Application of this Analysis to Communication
One of the most ubiquitous ideas among students of
child development is that infants must possess some more or
less pre-determined 'intention to communicate'. This phrase
is sometimes used interchangeably with the phrase 'communi¬
cative intention'. In attempting to refine a framework
within which we may study the young child's developing
ability to communicate I wish to argue that these phrases
should be taken as referring to two quite distinct things,
and that the tendency to treat them as synonymous is the
source of a great deal of confusion. It disallows, in fact,
the possibility of agreement among students of development
as to whether the ability to communicate per se is innately
given or is the result of social learning. This arises
because the word 'Intention' is being used in different
ways corresponding, I would suggest, to the second and third
kinds described in Section 1.6. To say that children, in
common with other animals, must be innately intentional, and
that communicative intentions are a certain class of inten¬
tions, is not at all the same as saying that children must
innately be able either to have or to express communicative
intentions. It is altogether possible that children have
to discover both the very possibility of communicating with
others as well as the conventional means for so doing - that
the ability to communicate is entirely a product of learning
- but it is impossible that this should be so unless they
are endowed with at least the potential for neural structures
adequate to this process. I have argued that the organism's
possible range of intentional structures is delimited by the
rule-deriving capacities of its representational system, and
that the intentional structures which develop are directed
to enabling the organism to achieve active mastery over its
environment. Now, other persons constitute a highly signif¬
icant aspect of our environment, and the desire to communi-
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cate with them, to enlist their aid and to engage in mutual,
co-operative activity, must exist at the same level as the
desire for active mastery; it is part of the same thing.
Insofar as this desire depends upon intentionality, children
must indeed possess the inborn 'intention to communicate',
but this sense of that term is quite distinct from that
connoted by 'communicative intention'. To clarify this
distinction we may briefly anticipate a later discussion
of Speech Act theory (Section 2.3). We may characterise a
communicative intention as:
A's intention, expressed in the performance of a com¬
municative act, that B should recognise that A intends
B should do or believe X;
where A and B are the addressor and addressee respectively,
and X is some event. A communicative intention is therefore
a specific case, inherently tied to and taking account of a
certain state of affairs in the world. The expression of a
communicative intention - that is, the performance of a
communicative act - requires that A should employ a means
recognised within a convention he shares with B. Ekman and
Friesen (1969) argue that conventionality depends upon
(i) agreement between the users of the system, and (ii) ar¬
bitrary coding of signifier and signified. It is clearly
the case that such conventions, which include language,
vary to a greater or lesser degree between constituencies of
communicators, and that conventions must therefore be a
product of social learning. If this is so, then the ability
to express communicative intentions must equally be a product
of social learning. What is not clearly established is
whether the ability to 'have' communicative intentions, in¬
dependently of their expression, must also be learned.
Nevertheless, the child's having a communicative intention,
however this may arise, is quite different from his having
an intention to communicate; insofar as the intention to
communicate falls within the aegis of the human capacity and
desire for active mastery, whose extent and nature we can
only guess at, any further discussion of this notion is
beyond the competence of this thesis. In discussing the
I
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nature of the child's cognition of agency we are, however,
required to enlarge upon the possible source of his communi¬
cative intentions.
The expression of a communicative intention requires
the learning of the conventional means for so doing; this
chapter aims to arrive at a theoretical framework, based in
the notion of agency, within which the child's cognition
of other persons (who, if they communicate, must by defin¬
ition be agents) as well as his cognition of the convention
may be placed. These two are almost impossible to separate
since, in a fundamental sense, the child's cognition of
others depends upon how good he is at communicating with
them. Of course the child is greatly helped by adults who,
whether or not the child's early 'utterances' are communi¬
cative in the strict sense, nevertheless regard them as
being so and act to fulfill the child's needs, as they per¬
ceive them, long before these needs are encoded in a form
obedient to the conventions of the wider community. Joanna
Ryan (1974) describes this process at the time when the
first words begin to appear:
Much of what a child utters in the early stages is
difficult to understand if not unintelligible (though
the) child's speech and other vocalisations take place
within a context of interaction with adults who are
motivated to understand the child's utterances ...
Many children experience extensive verbal interchanges
with their mothers. During these the mother actively
picks up, interprets, comments upon, extends, repeats
and sometimes misinterprets what the child has said.
The grammarians' emphasis on well-formedness and
semantic sense obscures the role of these interpreted
exchanges in preparing the child for language use.
(Ryan, 1974;199-200)
We shall argue later (2.4 and 2.5) that the grounds
for language use are prepared well before the appearance of
the first words, and that the ability to express communicative
intentions is clearly present during pre-verbal interaction.
During the pre-verbal period also, mothers attribute communi¬
cative intentions to certain of the child's behaviour; they
act as if children are intentional from a very early stage,
by picking up on and 'labelling' - that is, attaching a
to,
(certair^ significance td^ aspects of the child's behaviour.
And this has important consequences for our discussion of
the source of the child's communicative intentions.
In previous discussions of the ideas of Piaget, Mac-
murray and Fodor we argued that the source of the child's
cognition lies in perceptuo-motor routines, called schemes,
'organised within a discursive system through which a process
of abstraction may occur, leading to the formation of higher
order schemas. We subsequently argued that, while intention-
ality, in some sense, must be seen as a 'given', that which
the child may have intentions about depends upon the level
of his cognition. Now if, as is here maintained, communi¬
cative intentions constitute one class of those intentions
which are dependent upon his cognition, it follows that the
child's ability to have communicative intentions, as well
as his ability to express them, also depends upon his cog¬
nition; of the way the world is ordered, of what other per¬
sons are like, of the fact that communication is possible,
of the sorts of things it is possible to communicate about
and of the conventions of his constituency. To restate
this more simply, the child's having a communicative inten¬
tion must be a faculty of learning. Now this is not a claim
to be taken lightly since there is a mass of evidence which
shows, some maintain, that the rudiments of communicative
ability are present virtually at birth, ranging from the
recognition of patterns roughly corresponding to the human
face (Bower, 1966), to elementary 'gestures' and the existence
of pre-speech mouthing movements and sensitivity to other
persons (Trevarthen, 1974) . Perhaps for the time being we
may take these to be instances of the 'intention to commun¬
icate' and, as such, explicable in terms of the blueprint
of the human nervous system. Though a pre-condition for
This constituency may initially be a very small one.
Trevarthen and Hubley (1979) remark: 'Each mother-infant
pair we have observed created together a unique repertoire
of games. The habits of play evidently became the basis of
a unique companionship in each pair'.
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communicative development, this aspect is not relevant to
our discussion. We are nevertheless obliged to show that
it is at least reasonable to talk in terms of the child
having to learn to have communicative intentions.
Almost from the moment of a child's birth his mother
interprets certain of his behaviour as having meaning; it
does at least have meaning for her whether or not it does
for the child also, She distinguishes hunger cries and pain
cries, for example, and acts so as to fulfill the child's
needs as she perceives them. (See, for example, Wolff,
1966; Ricks, 1971.) We have already granted to the child
the ability to construct schemas on the basis of his per¬
ception of the effects of his behaviour - that is, on the
detection of a contingency between some behaviour of his
and some event in the world - and we have argued (1.5) that
this ability can be demonstrated soon after birth. One
aspect of the child's cognition of self-as-agent could, then,
consist in his gradual appreciation that he can instigate
the relief of hunger or pain, and that different end-points
depend upon different behaviours. Several mothers have
reported to me a time, around four months, when their infants
cried in their cots only to burst into smiles when the mother
appeared. This may be an example of the pleasure which
Watson (1973) argues that babies show upon discovering some¬
thing about the causal structure of their world."'" Such
early learning experiences may be of paramount importance.
Nelson (1974) argues that the kinds of meanings which the
child can master and express are in part determined by the
ways in which he is disposed to structure and interpret the
world. And Piaget's claim is that the way the child struc¬
tures the world depends crucially upon his own experience
in it. It follows that the form and outcomes of early learn¬
ing experiences with the mother may have important effects
upon his later cognitive and communicative development. The
"'"Or of 'play' in Piaget's (1953) sense, for the sheer
'pleasure of mastery'.
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importance which Trevarthen (1977, 1979) attaches to the
notion of 'intersubjectivity', and Garvey's (1974) 'formats'
- habitual exchanges providing the basis for the interpre¬
tation of communicative intentions - point further to the
idea that the child is dependent upon his mother in develop¬
ing his communicative ability; that it is her attribution
of communicative intention to his early attempts which pro¬
vides the data for his learning. Donaldson (1978) points
out that the child's only evidence as to whether or not his
early attempts to communicate are orthodox lies in his
mother's responses to such attempts. There is also the inter¬
esting fact that infants will often allow adults to 'define
their intentions for them', by taking up and expanding the
child's apparent meaning. Such selective 'reflecting' by
the mother of the meaning which she takes the child's behav¬
iour to have expressed would constitute a means for the
child to learn what sorts of things count as communicable
intentions within his constituency. Communication, even
prior to language, becomes an instrument for the socialis¬
ation of thought. But the implications are larger even than
this. For once the child has learned that it is possible to
convey certain of his beliefs and desires -within a conven¬
tional system, by virtue of occasions when such desires are
ignored, refused or diverted he will learn also that commun¬
ication can be used as a means for negotiating one's relations
with other persons. as we shall see- later this aspect of
communication is important to our understanding of the child's
cognition of agency.
We have now identified our problem as being to describe
the development of the child's ability to express communi¬
cative intentions. (We take this to be the same thing as
his having' such intentions; see page 54*) . Before going on
to review some of the literature in the field of communicative
and early linguistic development it may be helpful to restate
the major points the discussion so far has attempted to draw
out:
1. Theories in psychology tend to be of two kinds, those
which allow the existence of mental events and those
which do not.
2. Theories which do not allow the existence of mental
events are inadequate to account for human action.
3. Within those theories which do allow such events, know¬
ledge and directed action are fundamental ideas.
4. The concept of agency is central to the explanation of
directed action.
5. Agency is also a fundamental notion in semantic analyses
of language.
6. The notion of agency can be used as a conceptual tool in
studying the development of communication, which includes
language acquisition.
CL
7. We can make^ theoretical distinction between the child's
understanding of self-as-agent and of other-as-agent.
8. The agency of others is only salient to the child when
it affects him directly and his understanding of other-
as-agent cannot be studied in any other circumstances.
9. Early cognitive processes consist of schemes organised
within a rule-governed, discursive system through which
abstraction occurs.
10. Since we cannot know whether the pre-verbal child has
any capacity for reflective awareness we should use the
term Cognition to refer to his knowledge and understand¬
ing.
11. The child's cognition of self-as-agent ana other-as-
agent are probably inter-dependent.
12. The cognition of agency depends upon the derivation of
rules about the way the world is ordered (contingency-
detection and abstraction) and on the building of inten¬
tional structures.
13. The capacity to 'be intent-ional' must be innate, and is
defined by the nature of the central nervous system, but
its realisation and expression through action depend
upon learning.
14. The nature of any particular intention depends upon the
level of the child's cognition.
15. The 'intention to communicate' is part of innate inten-
tionality, and is defined by the nature of the central
nervous system.
16. The expression of a communicative intention requires
the learning of a conventional system.
17. The nature of a communicative intention depends upon
the level of the child's cognition.
18. Since the child's actions are our only basis for claim¬
ing that the child has intentions, including commun¬
icative intentions, we should restrict our claims to
those intentions which are actually expressed.
2.2 Syntax or Semantics?
In a celebrated paper in Cognition, Bruner wrote in
1975:
At the most general level, we may say that to master a
language a child must acquire a complex set of broadly
transferable or generative skills - perceptual, motor,
conceptual, social and linguistic - which when approp¬
riately co-ordinated yield linguistic performances
that can be described (though only in a limited sense)
by the linguist's rules of grammar. Such rules of
grammar may bear no closer resemblance to the psycho¬
logical laws of language production, comprehension and
use than do the principles of optics bear to the laws
of visual perception - in neither case can the one
violate the other. (Bruner, 1975;256)
And again,
The infant is not only learning ... what constitutes
indicating something to another, or having something
indicated to him, but he is also learning how to sub¬
stitute new means for doing so in order to achieve
less uncertain outcomes by the use of more ritualised
techniques. When, finally, he reaches a stage at which
lexical indicating is psychologically within his reach
he already knows a great deal about the nature of indic¬
ative contexts and conventions for dealing with them,
(ibid.;261)
In this paper Bruner reflected a changing conception of
the way in which the language acquisition process should be
viewed, from an emphasis on the child as constructor of the
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grammatical rules of language in isolation, as it were,
from his other accomplishments, to a broader, 'synthetic'
view in which the child's ability to use language is seen
as the product of a number of complementary and inter-related
achievements. To help us to identify the sources of the
ideas in this current view as are relevant to our discussion
I propose to devote this section and the following two
sections to a brief appraisal of the contributions made by
linguists,, by philosophers of language - especially with
respect to Speech Act theory - and by cognitive psychologists.
In Sections 2.5 and 2.5 we shall examine some recent work
which builds upon these foundations, and attempt to draw
together this work and our preceding discussion into a
framework which we can use to study the cognition of agency
prior to and into the beginnings of language use.
The impact of Chomsky's theory of transformational
grammar on the study of language development lay in his
assertion that the only way in which we can make sense of
the child's ability to construct for himself the grammatical
rules of language, in a relatively short time and on the
basis of scanty and impoverished data, is to assume that the
child is born with a knowledge (sic) of the highly restric¬
tive principles of universal grammar and a predisposition
to make use of them in analysing the utterances he hears
about him. Chomsky argued that the language which the child
hears is too incomplete, and too full of errors, distortions
and hesitations to provide adequate data for language-learning
in the way that an empiricist theory would require. Further¬
more, an empiricist theory cannot account for the creativity -
that is, the production of unlearned surface forms - which
is observable in the language of very young children, nor
could it account for the (likely) existence of universal
grammatical features in all human languages. He was led to
the conclusion that universal principles of language must
reflect the structure or mode of operation of the human brain,
and that it is this congruence between the principles of
grammar and brain function which permits the child to develop
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a creative command of his native language allowing him,
very quickly, to understand and produce sentences he has
never heard before. The problem for the young child was,
in Chomsky's 'terms, that of discovering how to map his innate
'knowledge' of the deep structure of language into the sur¬
face forms recognised within his own particular language-
using community, by means of the application of an ordered
set of transformational rules, some of which apply cyclically.
The transformational rules, by virtue of their universality,
must also be innate and constitute part of the language
acquisition device. The mapping process which the child
must master therefore consists mainly in learning the sur¬
face structure forms characteristic of his community in
time with the unfolding or maturation of his genetically-
given language structures.^ Within the transformational
grammar approach two lines of work have conspired to deter¬
mine the emphases adopted by students of language acquisi¬
tion. These are the work o'f psycholinguists, submitting
Chomsky's ideas to psychological scrutiny, and the challen¬
ges to standard theory from other linguists. We shall briefly
examine these in turn.
The publication of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax
(1965) marked the effective beginnings of the discipline
called psycholinguistics, although some psychologists,
notably George Miller (see, Chomsky and Miller, 1958), had
been interested for some time in the implications of gener¬
ative grammar for the investigation of the psychological
processes underlying linguistic performance. Psycholinguists
set out to test experimentally the psychological validity
of the transformational processes invoked by Chomsky's
standard theory, measuring, for example, the time taken by
normal speakers and hearers to process linguistic structure
of varying complexity. Two major reviews of work in this
field (Fodor, Bever and Garrett, 1974; Clark and Clark, 1977)
point to the conclusions that there is no direct link between
"'"Sources; Allen and Van Buren, 1971; Chomsky, 1957, 1965,
1972, 1976; Lyons, 1977
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transformational complexity and psychological complexity
and that, for methodological reasons, it is almost impos¬
sible to separate the components of syntactic processing
and semantic processing in the comprehension of sentences.
During this time Chomsky himself has begun to devalue the
notion of deep structure in the semantic interpretation of
sentences. Where previously the interpretation was deter¬
mined jointly by the deep-structure and the surface-structure,
in Reflections on Language (1976) he writes: 'A suitably
enriched notion of surface-structure suffices to determine
the meaning of sentences under interpretive rules.1 He has
also begun to refer to linguistics as a branch of cognitive
psychology, though insisting upon the importance of gener¬
ative grammar for the investigation of the structure and
predispositions of the human mind. These developments have
been partly responsible for the adoption by psycholinguists
of an approach involving a greater interest in semantics,
and in the importance of taking into account all of the
contextual and acoustic information that a hearer may use
in interpreting an utterance. Yet an emphasis on the central
role played by syntax dominated child language studies until
the early 1970s. In 1973 Bowerman wrote:
The form of a particular grammar is adequate only to
the extent to which it accurately represents the know¬
ledge of sentence structure available to a speaker of
the language. (Bowerman, 1973;10)
Brown, Cazden and Bellugi (1969) had written:
The most demanding form in which to pose the question
of the child's knowledge of structure at any time is to
ask for a generative grammar that represents his know¬
ledge .
Bowerman's 'ideal' grammar for one of the children in
her study, a 23-month old boy called Seppo, consisted of a
table of 'syntactic interpretations' of his utterances and
a list of the syntactic classes required to represent his
speech. (See Bowerman, 1973;lOFootnote.) Table 1(below)
presents a summary of the grammar for Seppo at MLU 1.42.
Similarly, Braine (1971) wrote in the introduction to his
survey of work on the 'acquisition of language':
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This review is concerned only with the acquisition of
linguistic structure. Thus, work on child language
where the concern is with social and/or intellectual
development will not be reviewed.
However, within the field there were signs of a more
semantically-oriented approach. Bowerman's (1973) final
chapter examines the same data under a case-grammar analysis,
while Bloom (1970; 1973) and Brown (1973), looking at the
one-word stage before syntax, adopt a view quite different
to Chomsky's.
Table One












N + pois, 'away'
N + kiinni, 'closed'
N + N






Syntactic classes needed: Noun, Verb, Adjective and Pro-
locative .
(Nouns were sub-divided according to the case notions,
Animate - Inanimate, Vehicle - Nonvehicle.)
Source: Bowerman (1973)
The new emphasis on semantics sprang in part from the
challenges to standard theory made by other linguists. Two
of these have been the approach of 'generative semantics',
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which treats the rules of the semantic component as gener¬
ative in themselves rather than merely interpretive - that
is, involving the assignation of a semantic representation
to the output from the deep structure base-component as in
Chomsky's view - and the 'case-grammar1 approach advanced
by Fillmore (1966, 1968, 1971). Although generative seman¬
tics is generally taken to be the more serious of these
challengers (Lyons, 1977), involving as it does an over¬
turning of Chomsky's central idea of the relation between
the syntactic base-component and the semantic component
which receives input from it, it is not directly relevant
to our discussion. The emphasis on meaning-relations adop¬
ted by such workers as Bloom (1970; 1973), B^own (1973),
Clark (1973)/ Halliday (1975), Schlesinger (1971) and many
others involves the consideration of ideas from outwith the
field of transformational grammar, or the structure of lang¬
uage. And there is not, as Lyons (1977) points out, any well
enough developed post-Chomskyan model of generative grammar
available to allow psycholinguists to choose between them,
or to derive precisely formulated general psycholinguistic
hypotheses. This has led, he suggests, to a flexibility in
the choice of theoretical frameworks and methodologies.
However, certain ideas from Fillmore's case-grammar approach
have been appealed to quite directly by a number of develop¬
mental psycholinguists (for example, Bates (1976); Greenfield
and Smith (1976); Rodgon (1976, 1977) and his 'case for
case' merits our attention here. The semantic grammar
approach has of course been hotly disputed by Chomsky on
the three grounds that such grammars either do not tally
with the empirical data, or they are logically inconsistent,
or they are merely notational variants of the standard
theory, different in expression but not in substance.
Fillmore's argument against standard theory seems to
rest on three main points. First, that although syntax is_
a central notion,- categories like 'subject' and 'object' are
relatively superficial, their definition varies from language
to language, and they play no part in determining the meaning
70.
of the sentence as such. As Fillmore puts it:
No semantically constant value is associated with the
notion 'subject of' ... and no semantically relevant
relations reside in the surface subject relation which
are not somewhere also expressible by 'labelled' rela¬
tions. ... All semantically relevant syntactic rela¬
tions between noun phrases and the structures which
contain them must be of the 'labelled' type. ... This
eliminates the category VP and makes the relation
'subject' exclusively a surface-structure phenomenon.
(Fillmore, 1968;17)
The second point is that the assumption that the case
forms of nouns can be assigned in straightforward ways in
the semantic component on the basis of simply defined syntac¬
tic relations - in the output from' the base -component -
'seems to be based too much on the situation with English
pronouns'. Fillmore is challenging the basic assumption
of generative grammarians that 'case' is not present in
deep structure at all, but is merely the inflexional real¬
isation of particular syntactic relationships. His third
point supports this challenge, arguing that there are many
semantically relevant syntactic relationships involving nouns
and noun phrases and, although these are largely covert,
they are empirically discoverable and they form a specific
finite set. In other words, case notions do deserve a place
in the base-component of grammar. The modification of
standard transformational grammar which Fillmore proposes
suggests that the sentence in its basic structure consists
of a proposition (P) in a certain modality (M); the prop¬
osition consists of a verb and one or more noun phrases,
each associated with the verb in a particular case relation¬
ship. (See Figure 1.) The verb occupies a central, or
pivotal, role in the sentence; each verb governs a set of
deep
obligatory and/or optional^structure cases. Each case
relationship may occur only once in a simple sentence. The
cases:
comprise a set of universal, presumably innate, concepts
which identify certain types of judgements human beings
are capable of making about the events that are going
on around them, judgements about such matters as who
did it, who it happened to, and what got changed. The
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cases that appear to be needed include:
Agentive (A), the case of the typically animate per¬
ceived instigator of the action identified by the
verb.
Instrumental (I), the case of the inanimate force or
object causally involved in the action or state iden¬
tified by the verb.
Dative (D), the case of the animate being affected by
the state or action identified by the verb.
Factitive (F), the case of the object or being resulting
from the action or state identified by the verb, or
understood as a part of the meaning of the verb.
Objective (0), the semantically most neutral case, the
case of anything representable by a noun whose role
in the action or state identified by the verb is




Comparison of Fillmore's suggested analysis with that
of 'standard theory'.
Source: Fillmore (1968)
Most grammarians admit that notions of agency and
causation are of more obvious semantic relevance than are
the grammatical relations associated with the distinction
between subject and predicate or between subject and object.
Yet most would hesitate to agree with Fillmore that:
If it is possible to discover a semantically justified
universal syntactic theory, ... if it is possible by
rules ... to make these 'semantic' deep structures into
the surface forms of sentences, then it is likely that
the syntactic deep structure of the type that has been
made familiar from the work of Chomsky and his students
is going to go the way of the phoneme. It is an arti¬
ficial intermediate level between the empirically
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discoverable 'semantic deep structure' and the obser-
vationally accessible surface structure, a level the
properties of which have more to do with the method¬
ological commitments of grammarians than with the nature
of human languages. (1968;88)
For there are a number of problems associated with the
case-grammar approach of which the principal two are that
dependency-relations appear to exist between some cases
quite apart from the influence of the verb,"'" and that when
it comes to classifying the totality of verbs in a language
in terms of the cases which they govern, the semantic
criteria which define these cases are all too often unclear
or in conflict, (Lyons, 1977). Clark and Clark (1977)
maintain that, although a semantic approach as applied to
sentence comprehension 'exploits the real meat of a sentence'
and uses the facts that listeners know that sentences should
make sense and refer to their surroundings, a 'pure' semantic
approach will not work, it is not enough for a listener
merely to sort a sentence into its main propositions, he
must also find constituents in the sentence that reflect
these propositions. A semantic strategy in sentence proces¬
sing must be 'checked' or backed up by a syntactic strategy.
And, they ask, if this is so, what sort of strategy is
applied first, and how do these strategies fit into a system
of comprehension? They conclude that 'there are major issues
yet to be resolved in the semantic approach' (1977;79) . It
appears that case-grammar can be faulted on both theoretical
and psychological grounds, and it may not, therefore, con¬
stitute a viable alternative to standard theory.
On the other hand, Bowerman (1973) and Brown (1973)
quickly realised that Fillmore's proposals had unique pos¬
sibilities for the description of language development.
For example, Bowerman noticed that all the syntactic subjects
in Seppo's speech were in fact Agents and, since grammatical
For example, the occurrence of a 'benefactive' phrase in a
sentence has more to do with whether the sentence contains
an Agent than with independent specific properties of the
verb.
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subjects are not restricted to the class of semantic agents,
it seemed more accurate to attribute to Seppo the semantic
concept 'Agent' rather than the syntactic concept 'subject'.
She also pointed out that there is no empirical justifica¬
tion for attributing the structure 'verb phrase', as a dis¬
tinct constituent of a sentence, to a child in the one- or
two-word stages, and that granting equal status to all noun
phrases relative to the verb fits the developmental data
much better (see Figure One). It also allows the existence
of NP-NP phrases, of the kind reported by Bloom (1970), which
were explicitly denied by Chomsky (1965). The difficulties
which Bowerman identifies of applying the case-grammar
approach are to do with the definitions of the semantic
categories themselves - some of them seem 'either too
abstract to apply to child language or too empty semantically
to be useful' (page 21l) - 'or to do with the account of mod¬
ified nouns, or to do with the modality constituent. In these
two latter cases, the case-grammar rules which apply to adult
speech were 'an inaccurate representation of children's
competence'. She concludes:
The formulations of case-grammar do not provide a fully
adequate account of the competence underlying children's
speech production. The chief value of case-grammar for
a theory of language acquisition may lie in its insis¬
tence on the grammatical significance of semantic con¬
cepts and in its rejection of certain fundamental
assumptions of transformational generative grammar which
seem to be inappropriate for child speech, such as the
basic division between subject and predicate^. (Bower-
man, 1973,-216)
In spite of these difficulties, Bates (1976), Greenfield
and Smith (1976) and Rodgon (1976; 1977) have applied
modifications of Fillmore's cases. Greenfield and Smith
claim:
Case-grammar allows one to refer to the role of a noun
in a sentence without reference to other nouns in that
sentence ... Case terminology is, of course, ideally
suited to one-word speech in which there is no sentence
to which to relate a word. To call an isolated word
an Agent is reasonable, provided that an action has
occurred, to call it a subject is ludicrous, (1976;16)
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This confidence seems to me entirely unjustified.
First, Fillmore (1968, 1971) himself admitted that nouns
and noun phrases are not necessarily independent, some cases
being partially governed by the occurrence in the sentence
of other cases, and second, all of the cases which Fillmore
identified are defined in terms of their relation to the
verb. It is not true that within the terms of case-grammar
it is reasonable to call an isolated word an Agent. In
Fillmore's analysis there is, within the ideal sentence, a
single governing element - the verb - and a set of depen¬
dent expressions whose number and semantic, or logical,
type is determined by the valency of the verb. The selection
of a particular verb determines to a considerable degree
the grammatical structure of the sentence.
Their reason for claiming that an isolated word can
reasonably be called, for example, an Agent is that Green¬
field and Smith want to argue that a case-grammar approach
'opens the way to a theoretical treatment of one-word speech
as structurally continuous with later grammatical develop¬
ment' . as we have seen, case-grammar may not, in fact,
offer an appropriate analysis for language. In addition,
certain modifications to the analysis are necessary in
order to render it applicable to early speech. The modifi¬
cations which various workers propose in applying case-grammar
to the one- and two-word stages are different in detail but
similar in kind. Bates (1976) regards the one-word utter¬
ances of children as representing a verbally encoded 'comment'
upon an implicit topic which is available to the speaker and
hearer by virtue of the context of their interaction.
Greenfield and Smith use the term 'semantic function' to
refer to that portion of a semantic relation or case which
is verbally encoded, the remainder of the relation being
expressed 'through intonation and gesture or action'.
While both elements of a relation must, therefore, be
represented in the total structure of the speech event,
the child himself encodes only one element at the
single-word stage. (1976;49)
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Rodgon (1976) adopts a similar approach, distinguishing
those utterances by the child which do express a semantic
relation (holophrases) from those which do not (imitation/
repetition or naming) and relying upon the 'action-accompani¬
ments to utterances' -and the salient features of the situation
in judging the nature of the relation only partially expressed
in language. It is not my purpose here to question the valid¬
ity of the assumption that some proportion of the child's
meaning - perhaps most of it - resides in and is recoverable
from the context of interaction; this is a methodological
issue to which we shall return later (Section 3.1). The
present point is a theoretical one. For if early language
use and, by implication, the process of language development
itself depend in part upon factors which are wholly
extrinsic to language, then to attempt to apply notions
based purely in a structural analysis of adult language is
not legitimate. If, on the other hand, these notions are to
be applied under different definitions and in conditions
different to those in which they were derived, then they must
be independently derived and defined. It must be demonstrated
that these notions are psychologically valid and applicable
to young children quite independently of any validity they
may have in structural linguistics. There is, in these
works cited, no evidence offered that these structures, the
semantic relations, are being used by children in a sense
co-extensive with that in which they are used by adults.
It is assumed that a child using a single word must be ex¬
pressing one of the meanings which an adult could express
by that word, implying that the child shares both the con¬
ceptual organisation and the verbal coding rules of the adult,
and is using that word to express an adult-like communicative
intention. Neither of these assumptions is warranted. If
Piaget is at all correct then the young child's conceptual
organisation is quite different to that of an adult, and,
"'"In fact, Bowerman's report suggests that these \meanings'
are not co-extensive. (See, BOwerman 1973;211-216)
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since the meanings of which a child can conceive ultimately
depend upon his cognition, there need be little congruence
between the communicative intentions he can attempt to en¬
code and those intentions which are characteristically
encoded by adults.
It would appear, then, that it may be difficult to
support the claim that a case-grammar approach allows us to
treat early speech as structurally continuous with grammatical
development. On the one hand, the criteria under which case-
grammar is defined cannot directly be applied before the
appearance of combinatorial speech, while on the other, if
these criteria are redefined to include factors extrinsic
to language structure, so that case notions can be applied
to children's early speech, then the validity of the claim
to structural continuity is lost. I suggest that case-grammar
has principally been useful to the study of language-develop¬
ment by virtue of its emphasis upon semantic relations. But
as a structural analysis of language it concentrates upon
the formal aspects at the expense of the functional, and
treats language as distinct from the context in which it
operates as one dimension in a richly diverse system for
communication. To render the ideas of case-relations useful
and appropriate .to the study of communicative development,
therefore, they must be defined and derived independently
of their role within the structure of language. This is what
I have attempted to do for the concept Agent in the Intro¬
duction and Chapter One. As we saw, this provides us with
a framework somewhat broader than that allowed by Fillmore's
definition of the Agentive case, as on page "71 . It is also
somewhat broader than the descriptions of examples of the
Agentive in single-word speech described by Greenfield and
Smith (1976).' (Since this and the other works cited above
do, in fact, go far beyond a purely structural approach we
shall defer further discussion of them until Section 2.5.)
We now turn to a discussion of Speech Act theory to see to
what extent it may help us in arriving at a framework for
studying communicative development, on which the child's
cognition of agency in part depends.
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2.3 Speech Act Theory
We opened the previous section with a passage from
Bruner (1975) whichargues that the child's ability to use
language should be seen as the product of a number of com¬
plementary and inter-related developments. Among these is
of course cognition of language structure per se. We then
considered the extent to which the structural analyses of
language offered by linguists may be helpful in contributing
to a framework within which communicative development may
be studied. We concluded that certain ideas are useful
- including, the emphasis on semantic relations - but that
none of these can directly be applied to early speech and
that developmentalists should not concentrate on the formal
aspects of language at the expense of the functional. In
this section we turn to a discussion of the contribution of
speech act theory to communicative development. This will
entail an expansion and refinement of the notion of a com¬
municative intention which we characterised on page 58. It
was argued, in Section 2.1, that the child's having and
expressing communicative intentions must be a faculty of
social learning and requires, inter alia, the learning of
a conventional system. I hope to show that speech act theory
has significantly clarified our conception of what that
system consists in, and the rules by which it works, by an
explication of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the successful performance of certain speech acts, and its
suggestions of the means by which a speaker's communicative
intention may be inferred. In this approach the functional
and pragmatic aspects of language use achieve a fuller con¬
sideration. We shall then go on to look briefly at one or
two of the many studies which have attempted to trace the
early development of speech acts, and we shall close the
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section with an evaluation of the contribution of speech
act theory to our aim of formulating a model for studying
communication and assessing the child's cognition of
' other-as-agent' .
The roots of speech act theory can be traced from
Wittgenstein (1953), Grice (1957) and Austin (1962) but it
achieved its fullest treatment in Searle's 1969 account,
which he subsequently modified (1975). Searle maintained
that in the utterance of a sentence a speaker character¬
istically performs three types of act; he utters words
(morphemes, sentences), he refers and predicates and he
'states, questions, commands, promises, etc'. These three
types of act are, respectively, utterance acts, propositional
acts and illocutionary acts.^" These do not all enjoy equal
status for Searle follows Frege's insistence that only in
the context of a sentence do words have reference; as Searle
puts it, 'propositional acts cannot occur alone; one cannot
refer and predicate without also asserting, asking, promis¬
ing, etc.' When a proposition is expressed it is always
expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act. We
may thus distinguish these two elements in the syntactic
structure of the sentence - the propositional indicator and
the illocutionary force indicator which shows how the prop¬
osition is to be taken. These two together constitute the
speech act. Searle's point of departure with previous theory
even in his 1969 account, was in the devices he recognised
as relevant for indicating illocutionary force. In addition
to linguistic and paralinguistic cues such as word order,
stress, intonation contour, punctuation, mood of verb and
the use of a performative verb, he allowed that:
Often, in actual speech situations, the context will
make it clear what the illocutionary force of the utter¬
ance is, without its being necessary to invoke the
appropriate explicit illocutionary force indicator.
(1969;30)
"'"Austin (1962) claimed that there are over 1000 verbs denot¬
ing illocutionary act type in English.
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Searle's account established the illocutionary act as
the unit of linguistic communication, but problems remained
in cases where the illocutionary act is performed non-
literally. In the literal performance of an illocutionary
act the structural description can be assigned straight¬
forwardly; for example, statements, mands and questions are
realised grammatically by the forms declarative, jussive"'"
anci interrogative respectively. But frequently in normal
discourse the illocutionary act is performed non-literally,
as when an interrogative form is used to express a mand.
Consider the range of inflection which can be put upon the
sentence, 'Do you know what time it is?' It can represent
a polite form - a mand softened to an (indirect) request:
'Tell me what time it is' - or, at the other extreme, a
2
sardonic command: 'Hurry up I' What an account whose
focus is primarily grammatical - even though certain intru¬
sions of context are allowed - cannot resolve is how the
addressee determines'whether or not the illocutionary force
intended is that which corresponds with the grammatical form
used and, if not, what particular illocutionary force is
intended.
Searle's (1975) solution to the problem of indirect
speech acts involved a change of approach from grammar to
pragmatics. At this time interest in the theoretical power
of pragmatics was growing (see, for example, Lakoff, 1973;
Bates, Camaioni and Volterra, 1975; Grice, 1975; Sinclair
and Coulthard, 1975; Bates, 1976; Miller and Johnson-Laird,
1976). In the 1969 account the 'essential condition' could
occasionally be satisfied without the use of the explicit
illocutionary force indicating device for that essential
condition; in the 1975 version the steps for deriving
"'"Lyons (1977: vol 2) describes 'mands' , which include re¬
quests and commands, and the 'jussive' sentence type.
2
The forms which will constitute acceptable realisations of
any illocutionary act type will vary in quite subtle ways
according to the relationship of the participants in a dis¬
course. This is a point to which we return in Section 2.6.
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illocutionary force do not include the essential condition,
since it is a semantic and not a pragmatic notion. Also
excluded are 'conversational postulates' of the kind pro¬
posed in the generative-semantic approach of Gordon and
Lakoff (1971). The major role in Searle's scheme is ascribed
to inference. Inferences about the properties of the con¬
text of utterance, shared by speaker and hearer, taken to¬
gether with their knowledge of conventional linguistic usage
and their shared experience of each other, will enable the
participants in a discourse to assign illocutionary force
to an utterance and to interpret it appropriately. Labov
(1970) makes a similar point, arguing it is not so much the
superficial linguistic structure of an utterance as its
perceived illocutionary force which determines what can
happen next in a discourse. Pragmatic inferences concerning
participants' rights, obligations, attitudes, abilities and
beliefs predicated in an utterance's propositional content
will be made by each participant. Conditions upon these,
taken together with constraints on the propositional content
of utterances, constitute the necessary and sufficient con¬
ditions for participation in a discourse.
Kendon (1970), Duncan and Niederehe (1974) and others
have proposed analyses of the signals by which turn-taking
between the participants in a discourse is managed. By
whatever means turn-taking is achieved, discourse character¬
istically consists in the performance of illocutionary acts
by two (or more) participants who alternate in the roles of
speaker and hearer. Searle (1969) suggests that, in the
performance of an illocutionary act a speaker, S, intends that
the hearer H, will recognise that the speaker intends some
effect, Ei; the speaker performs some (verbal) act designed
to express his communicative intention. We may represent
this as follows:
SI (HR (SI (Ei) ) ) >Sv, speaker verbalises.
When we turn to consider communication in the pragmatic mode,
however, this formulation becomes inadequate, for we are no
longer strictly tied to grammatical exchanges; in fact our
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framework is broadened to include interaction on a non-verbal
as well as a verbal level. Speech act theory in the prag¬
matic formulation suggests a means by which an addressee may
infer an addressor's communicative intention whether the
means employed to express this are verbal or non verbal or,
as is most commonly the case, some combination of the two.
Even more importantly for our purposes it suggests a way in
which the developmental shift from pre-verbal to verbal
communicativity may be studied. In comparing these two modes
of expression we are however required to assume that the
child is attempting to express similar sorts of communicative
intention in his pre-verbal and in his first verbal perfor¬
mances since it is only if this is so that we can match the
child's attempts to communicate within each system. Bates
(1976) argues that this is precisely what the child is doing;
in Piaget's terms he is exploring new means to achieve old
ends or, in the terms of our discussion, he is exploring
language as a means for expressing communicative intentions
which he can already express non-verbally. Furthermore,
Bates, Bruner (1975) and others have argued that the first
words occur as 'vocal accompaniments to action', with the
child slotting his words into previously prepared perfor¬
mative frameworks. Given this period of co-occurrence of
the verbal and non-verbal modes it seems reasonable to sup¬
pose that we may reliably trace the nature of the child's
communicative intentions through this transitional period."'"
To capture the range of the means of expression which may
be used by the child we must rewrite our formulation from
above as follows:
CI (MR (CI (Ei) ) ) >Ca
where C is the child, M is his mother - or any other inter-
actor - and Ca is the performance by the child of some act
"'"Bore, argues that linguistically expressed intentions are
not isomorphic with prelinguistic intentions, pointing out
that it would be difficult to imagine a prelinguistic form
of the assertion of a proposition. In Chapter 4 we shall
cite data which can be interpreted as precisely that.
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expressing his communicative intention. And we must abandon
our reliance upon the term speech act in favour of the com¬
municative act performed to express a communicative intention.
This brings us to a second point. It will be seen that
our notation comprises two intentions on the part of the
child; the intention of some effect (Ei), and his intention
that his mother will recognise this (MR (CI (Ei) ) ).
Of these, we take his communicative intention to be that
which is directed to his mother while his intention of some
effect represents whatever it is he hopes to achieve;
enlisting her aid, for example. The capacity for each of
these is based in his cognition of agency, the one primarily
his cognition of other persons and the other primarily his
cognition of the ways in which his world is ordered and of
his place within it. This again points up the privileged
status enjoyed by communication in our attempt to study the
child's cognition of agency. The sorts of effect (Ei) of
which the young child has been considered able to conceive
are discussed in the next section when we turn to recent
work upon the role of cognitive development and the cognitive
bases of language use in the structuring of the child's com¬
municative intentions. For the time being we may simply
state that the sorts of effect which the child will intend
or, rather, the sorts of effect about which he will attempt
to communicate, take the form that M 'should do or believe
X', where X is some action, event or state of affairs in the
world. We may now define the child's communicative intention
as :
C's intention, expressed in the performance of a com¬
municative act Ca, that M should recognise that C intends
M should do or believe X.
Returning now to a topic touched on in Section 21
we can see that the way in which a mother picks up and inter¬
prets Ca is crucial to the 'meaning potential1 of the child
(Myers, 1979) • mother detects and acts upon a putative
communicative act of the child, which act may or may not
include a vocalisation, - that is, if she recognises or,.
attributes a communicative intention and acts so as to indicate
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that she recognises or attributes such an intention - she
offers confirmation to the child that he has performed a
communicative act. If, moreover, she interprets his com¬
municative intention correctly she provides evidence for
the child that he has successfully employed a conventional
means of expression"'" and that his intended effect (Ei) is
socially meaningful. If, on the other hand, the mother
misses or chooses to ignore, refuse or divert the child's
attempt to perform a communicative act she denies in effect
both the intention itself and the means employed for its
expression. The mother's recognition, or otherwise, of the
child's communicative intentions therefore becomes crucial
to the child's developing cognition of both the possibility
and the means of communicating with others and of the sorts
of things it is possible to communicate about - it becomes
crucialto the socialisation of the child's thought. But
before we may continue to develop these ideas and the
notion of the interactive act, in Section 2.6, we must look
at some of the studies which have attempted to trace the
early development of speech acts.
Miller (1970) suggests that:
... an appreciation of the illocutionary force of a
vocalisation may be one of the first things an infant
acquires. Even the early incomprehensible utterances
of the infant can have the force of demands, protests,
greetings, etc., as they are interpreted by adults.
In such parent-child interactions, therefore, there are
many opportunities for a child to form some abstract
characterisation of his situation, of his own vocal
comment on the situation, and of his own intentions.
(1970;198)
The perspective of the pragmatic speech act approach
permits one's account to include in a systematic way attitud-
inal factors such as hostility, affection and deference;
factors of a nature which are regularly expressed by children,
but for which grammar-oriented theories are unable to account
(Ervin Tripp, 1974)• It may well be that it is through the
gradual learning of conventional means for expressing atti-
^"See footnote on page 60.
84.
tud.es and desires concerning things particularly salient to
the child (hunger and personal contact, for example) that
the child constructs the rules for linguistic expression.
This broadly, is the view of Halliday (1973), that commun¬
icative functions determine the structure of language.
Bruner (1975), in exploring the relation of pre-speech
communication with later linguistic forms of expression,
argues that aspects of the communication situation are
developmental precursors to the mastery of structure. What
begin as communicative routines in the demand mode become
modified, through the expectancy of maternal compliance, to
expressions in the request mode and subsequently, in con¬
junction with the appearance of joint action routines between
mother and child, to the exchange and reciprocal modes,
where grammar is learned as an adjunct to the management of
ongoing social situations. Edwards (1973) describes this
process in the case of prohibitions on objects for play.
Similarly Dore (1975), Halliday (1975) and Clark (1973),
among others, have shown that young children of 6-18 months
can successfully express communicative intentions in the
absence of a well-developed lexico-structural system. Hal-
liday's notions of 'topic' and 'comment', like Eve Clark's
'theme' and 'rheme', correspond roughly to the reference
and predication aspects of the propositional component of
the speech act (Searle, 1969). In contrast to Bruner's
position, in which referencing and predicating develop to¬
gether, Dore (1975) sees the ability to refer as preceding
the ability to predicate. He sees one-word speech as being
primarily referential in nature with the expression of
lexical items of predication awaiting the development of
two-word or combinatorial speech. In this Dore clearly
dissociates himself from the 'holophrastic' position which
views single words as conveying full sentential structure
(McNeill, 1970). He also disagrees with workers such as
Greenfield and Smith (1976) and Bates (1976) who argue that
many of the child's early words express a comment upon a
topic which is implicit but 'understood' in the context of
utterance; that is, they express a predicate whose Subject
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(reference) is understood by the participants as the focus
of their interaction. We shall discuss the implications for
our framework of this disagreement in Section 2.5. For the
present we shall concentrate on those writers who explicitly
follow a speech act line.
Dore's approach (1973, 1974, 1975, 1977) centres on the
notion of the 'primitive speech act' which, at the one-word
stage, consists of a rudimentary referring expression and a
primitive force indicating device. At this early stage,
when intentions are beginning to 'emerge'^ and are combined
by the child with newly acquired single words, their words
are, Dore argues, used exclusively to refer; and the device
used to indicate the associated illocutionary force is
2
typically an intonation pattern. Thus he identifies three
uses of the word mama by one child, constituting performance
of three distinct primitive speech acts, 'labelling', 're¬
questing (answer)' and 'calling'. There are a further six
PSA types performed during the one-word stage, all of which
are qualitatively different to adult speech acts; they
express the child's intention with respect to a concept
without having a propositional structure. They contain a
referring expression but no predicating expression, and
that referring expression is simply the,linguistic repre¬
sentation of a single concept. This approach, Dore argues,
commits one to no claims about underlying 'knowledge' of
sentence structure, semantic transitivity nor case relations
in describing the child's utterances since only the two
'Emergence' is to be defined as the appearance at a partic¬
ular stage of an entity or ability which cannot be explained
by reference to or in the terms of an earlier stage. In
speech act theory the referring expression is an emergent
entity, which is not determinec by the child's prior ex¬
perience (1975;37). There are grounds for doubting such
a viewpoint. (Lyons, Wll).
2
In passing we may note that Bloom (1970) explicitly denies
the child the ability reliably to use phonological contrasts
and that the utterance of words with varying intonation con-»
tours cannot therefore be taken as evidence of different
underlying structures.
86
actual manifestations of language at this stage, namely-
single words and minimal prosodic patterns, are assigned
linguistic status. The price which Dore pays for this
independence is, however, the need to rewly on the notions
of emergence and 1grammaticalisation1 to account for the
transition to two-word or combinatorial speech and the
appearance of predicating expressions. Figure Two shows
the progression through which the components of the PSA
are presumed to pass in the development of the speech act.
But although Dore identifies the problem of how the PSA
components become grammaticalised as the central one for
his approach .he offers only the general hypothesis that
these components, themselves innately programmed to emerge
at a certain point, become grammaticalised through the
application by the child of inductive principles. That is
to say,'while referring and predicating expressions are
emergent they become grammaticalised in syntactic and seman¬
tic categories according to the convention of the language
community in which the child develops, through learning.
While admitting that Bruner may be justified in fearing that
the notions emergence and grammaticalisation 'may do no more
than paper over the discontinuous course of language acqui¬
sition with some new words' (1975;284) it is worth our noting
Figure Two
The development of the speech act. From Dore (1975).









two ways in which these relate with our previous discussions.
First, the possibility that certain linguistic structures,
such as referring and predicating expressions, are 'emergent'
is not contradicted by our contention that the ability to
communicate through language depends upon the existence of,
or potential for, neural structures adequate for the learn¬
ing of the rules for linguistic communication. It may be
that such adequacy relies on the innately determined pro¬
vision of building blocks such as these. On the other hand,
we may find it possible to trace the derivation of reference
from prelinguistic gestures in a theoretically satisfying
way, as many cognitive theorists have claimed to do, and
thereby avoid an appeal to maturational factors (see, e.g.
Ingram, 1971? E. Clark, 1977). If this were so parsimony
would require us to adopt such a view in favour of one
relying upon emergence. But further consideration of this
point must await Chapter 4 when we begin to look at our
data. Second, Dore's view that grammaticalisation is a
learning process, such that the linguistic system (grammar)
that the child acquires is a result of a general cognitive
faculty to abstract out the regularities in the language of
his community, is entirely consistent with our argument
that the child's cognition depends upon the possession of a
rule-governed discursive system through which the process
of abstraction may occur. But again we must defer until
Chapter 4 any attempts to answer the question of quite how
grammaticalisation may occur. It is not for us a central
concern.
A more traditional approach is adopted by Reeder (1980)
in his attempt to assess the ability of young children to
discriminate the illocutionary intent of (adult) speech acts.
He argues that studies such as those of Dore (1977) and
Garvey (1977) rely upon the experimenter's use of linguistic-
pragmatic intuitions in assessing the child's competence,
rather than upon the setting up of more rigorously controlled
experimental situations which will provide clear evidence





(a) Do you want to do A?
(b) I want you to do A - +
(c) I'll let you do A - +
I
The experimental hypothesis predicted that children would use
contextual cues differentially to discriminate the illocutionary
force of stimulus item, (a). Thus, sentence (a) would be taken
as equivalent to (b) when P was adjacent to S, but as equivalent
to (c) when P was adjacent to H.
Constructed context, appropriate for Request
12-15cms




The stimulus item was presented by tape-recorder. The two
response alternatives were on tape-loops, each controlled by a
separate button. The subject was asked 'Find which button says
what the teacher said'. Pointing and/or verbal indications by
the child served as raw responses.
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ination of illocutionary intent depends should be explicated
by the study rather than employed in its methodology.
Reeder sought to avoid this problem by devising triads
of 'illocutionary paraphrases' - sentences which are syntac¬
tically and serriantically dissimilar but which are equivalent
in illocutionary force within a given context. Context can
then be treated as the independent variable. By offering
one of the sentences in a particular context as a stimulus
item you can develop pragmatic hypotheses as to which of
the other two, as response alternatives, will be chosen as
having the same meaning as the stimulus sentence in that
context.
The experiment set out to discover whether children of
2j-3 years of age can employ contextual cues in order to
distinguish requests from offers and whether this ability
improves with age. The materials used were playthings (P)
and figures representing a teacher (S) and boys and girls -
(H); only one boy or girl figure was presented at each trial.
The context was varied only in the relative positions of S,
H and P; for the offer context P was placed next to H and
for the request context P was placed next to S. The triads
of sentences were of the form: 'would you like to do A?' as
stimulus sentence, with response alternatives 'I want you
to do A' - appropriate in the Request condition - and 'I'll
let you do A' - appropriate in the Offer condition. These
sentences were presented to the fourteen children (7 at 2|-
years and 7 at 3 years old) over a tape-recorder, and the
children selected the response alternative which they thought
to be appropriate, See. opposite. results showed
that these children were able to distinguish requests and
offers, but while the 3 year olds could discriminate requests
better than could the younger children there was no differ¬
ence in their ability to discriminate offers. Scores for
both age-groups were higher in the offer condition than in
the request condition.
Reeder's approach to what we might call the development
of illocutionary competence differs with that of Dore in more
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than straight-forwardly methodological ways. For while Dore
sets out to trace the development and conventionalisation of
the child's repertoire of (primitive) speech act types in
the child's own terms, Reeder has demonstrated the child's
ability to discriminate the illocutionary force of two con¬
ventional speech act types. Both of these approaches are
valuable since both aspects are involved in the child's
becoming an accomplished user of a language. My reasons for
describing Reeder's experiment in some detail lie elsewhere;
I want to argue that methodologically it has several short¬
comings .
Reeder's experiment, as he describes it, takes no
account of the possibility of the child's egocentrism.
Piaget has claimed that children under the age of 6 or 7
years are very bad at communicating because they are unable
to 'decentre1, or to see things from the point of view of
another. This claim is to be taken as meaning that children
are 'egocentric' both in the literal sense of only being able
to see things from their own perspective and in the cognitive
or conceptual sense of being unable- to appreciate that the
knowledge or experience of others may differ from their own.
Piaget bases these claims upon data derived from many
observations and tasks devised for children, of which one
of the best known is the 'three mountains' task (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1956). A model of three mountains is placed
before the child, with a doll which is set at various points
around the base of the model and a set of pictures of the
model. The child is then asked to pick out that picture of
the model which corresponds with the view the -doll would see
from a given point. Up to the ages of 6 or 7 the children
have a strong tendency to choose the picture which shows
what they themselves can see, and it is not until they are
eight or nine years old that they can perform the task
successfully. Piaget takes this as indicating that the
child is unable to treat his own (temporary) perspective
as just one among a set of different possibilities which can
be related to one another within a coherent system.
Martin Hughes (1975) doubted Piaget's conclusions. He
felt that the problem for children who make egocentric
responses lies less in their inability to decentre than in
fully understanding what they are required to do. He very
carefully introduced a simplified version of the mountains
task and found that pre-schooi children were able to give a
high proportion of correct responses. He accordingly devised
a task involving a little boy doll, with one or more (up to
three) policeman dolls and a series of walls. The child's
task was to 'hide the doll so that the policeman can't see
him'. Hughes argued that this was a task in which the inten¬
tions .and motives of the little boy doll were clearly acces¬
sible to children, and as such would maximise the chances of
the task making sense to children. Furthermore the child's
problem was only to decide what the policeman would be able
to see and not how it would appear, as for the doll in piaget's
task. The task was presented very carefully, making sure
that the child understood at each stage exactly what was re¬
quired of him, and the thirty children in the study (aged
between 3■§■ and 5 years) achieved a correct response rate of
90%. Even the 3 year old group in the most complex version
of the task got over 60% of the trials correct.
In Reader's (19S0) experiment there is no mention made
of the possible confabulating effects of the child's position
relative to the positions of S, H and P. Whether or not the
child is as egocentric as Piaget suggests, the series of
experiments conducted by Hughes demonstrates that this aspect
of the child's grasping what is required of him in the ex¬
perimental situation is too important ever to be ignored.
We would require to know how the relative positions of the
child and the experimental materials may have been varied
before accepting Reeder's results at face value; partic¬
ularly the rather surprising finding that children are better
able to identify offers than requests, when most workers
have picked out requests as one of the speech act types
which children can comprehend and use at an early age
(shatz, 1974; Halliday, 1973; Bruner, 1975; Ervin-Tripp,
.
1974; Dore, 1973; Garvey, 1975).
But a more cogent criticism can be made of Reeder's
experiment on general methodological grounds. With the pos¬
sible exception of differential psychology, procedures in
psychology represent the experimenter's attempt to assess
the competence of his subjects from an analysis of their
performance on various tasks seen by the experimenter as
tapping that competence in which he is interested. When
one's subjects are pre-linguistic, or minimally linguistic,
young children, about whose level of reflective awareness
we know very little except that it is probably very differ¬
ent to that of adults, the problems of assessing competence
become even harder. One cannot, for example, credit the
child with any appreciation of the role of an experimenter
who has certain expectations of the ways in which the child
will behave; one cannot, therefore, assume any co-operation
of an informed kind on the part of the child. What the
child does on being confronted with an experimental situation
which we have arranged may correspond only poorly with our
expectations of him. To put this another way, his perfor¬
mance may not in any reliable way reflect the competence in
which we are interested. Our only solution to this problem
is to keep the framework of our experimental paradigms
flexible, to allow the child's actual behaviour to inform
us of the kinds of things of which he is capable, rather
than to prescribe certain kinds of behaviour as correct and
others as wrong. On page 31 we discussed the importance of
posing a problem to the child under conditions of mutual
and goal-directed action and in terms which are meaningful
and salient for him. These criteria are not satisfied in
a forced choice paradigm. But not only are the children in
Reeder's experiment required to make judgements of a rather
artificial kind, they are required to do so in the absence
of almost all the normally available cues on which such a
judgement might be based. These include preceding inter¬
action, prosody and other paralinguistic and extralinguistic
accompaniments to verbalisation such as gestures, facial
92.
expression and body movements (Lyons, 1970), and the child's
shared (intersubjective) cognition of the person with whom
he is interacting. Under these conditions, when the only
cues available to the child are the relative positions of
the experimental materials themselves, it would indeed be
surprising if Reeder's results did not seriously under¬
estimate the child's competence at discriminating illocution-
ary force. And while Reeder's stated aim was to discover
whether children are able to use only 'contextual' cues to
discriminate requests from offers, our arguments about the
ways in which the young child's cognition and use of language
develop entitle us seriously to question whether data on the
basis of such impoverished cues can tell us anything useful
or interesting about the child's abilities.
In assessing the value of speech act theory for our
approach we may pick out three main points. We shall discuss
these in turn.
In the Introduction we identified our purpose as being
a study of action (doing rather than thinking) and, more
particularly, the study of selves acting in relation with
One another. And such an approach, we argued, must assign
central roles to Agency and to communication. We later
explored the inter-relation of these ideas, attempting to
show that each is logically implicated in the other; just
as the child's cognition of agency is an essential part of
his developing ability to communicate, so a study of the
child's communicative abilities affords our best evidence
as to the level of the child's cognition of agency, as we
have seen in this section, a pragmatic speech act approach
permits us to study the young child as communicator from
the time when he first begins to express (identifiable)
communicative intentions. Although the performance of
communicative acts may have little to do with language in
the initial stages, this approach permits us to order the
kinds of communicative intentions which a young child may
express, as Dore (1973) has done. On that basis we should
be able to examine his developing cognition of other persons.
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Given that the child's cognition of what others can do
develops as part of his initially 'intersubjective' (ritual¬
ised) communicative routines with his mother, we may observe
how this becomes more generalised as the mother requires that
his communicative acts come progressively to approximate
more closely with the adult or conventional form (see
Richards, 1974). In the process of learning how to commun¬
icate the child is also, necessarily, learning about other
persons. A speech act approach emphasises the importance
of the other person, the purpose of a communicative act
being to cause some effect in the other, or achieve 'a
certain correspondence between the mental states of the
speaker and the hearer' (Fodor, 1976). As such it appears
for us a promising method of inquiry.
We have already mentioned (page 81) that speech act
theory in its pragmatic formulation suggests a way in which
the shift from pre-verbal to verbal communicativity may be
studied. This is because it allows of the inclusion on a
systematic basis of factors extrinsic to language in the
inference by a receiver of a sender's communicative inten¬
tion. There are no restrictions as to the information
channel by which a message may be sent (MacKay, 1972),
provided only that whatever means are adopted obey the rules
of a convention shared by the participants. If this is so
we can treat pre-verbal communicativity as a real phenomenon
insofar as it satisfies the criterion of the mutually succes¬
sful performance of communicative acts. This raises a
methodological problem, to be discussed in Section 3.1, of
how we may determine whether this criterion is indeed satis¬
fied, but the argument appears to me to be in principle a
good one. in this way speech act theory should allow us to
see more clearly the factors constituting what counts as a
conventional system for the mother and child, and the rules
by which this system works, as the child begins to use words
in the expression of his communicative intentions.
Our third point relates to Dore's appeal to 'emergence'
in order to account for the appearance in the child's
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repertoire of referring and predicating expressions. Refer¬
ring expressions are emergent entities because at the time
when intentions begin to emerge they are combined with newly
acquired (single) words to form primitive speech acts (Dore,
1973) , and the PSA consists of a rudimentary referring expres¬
sion under a primitive force indicating device (an intonation
contour). We have already argued (page 53) for a view of
intentionality as something which does not emerge nor develop
but which achieves expression through the discovery by the
child of the means of causing some effect upon his environ¬
ment. This, taken together with the claims of many cognitive
theorists that referencing is derivable from prelinguistic
gestures, would constitute an argument that referring ex¬
pressions are not emergent but are wholly explicable in
terms of the child's prior experience. 'The question which
now concerns us is: Does a view that the referring expres¬
sion is not a language universal, in the sense of being a
maturationally controlled structure of language, in any way
prejudice the legitimacy of our following the guidelines of
a speech act approach? I would like to argue that it does
not. For if our remarks concerning the nature of intention¬
ality are reasonable, and if communicative intentions develop
in the way in which we have suggested they may (on page
then an argument that referring expressions are explicable
in terms of the child's experience does not constitute an
argument that referring expressions are not 'universals of
language'. The mechanisms to which we have appealed, inso¬
far as they are real at all, are real for any child learning
any language. For speech act theory it matters not at all
how the components of the speech act come to form part of
the cognition of language structure of all users of a nat¬
ural language, provided only that they do so. Seeking the
prelinguistic equivalents of referring expressions may
commit us to positing semantic structures of the kind which
Dore was anxious to avoid but this seems to me more satis¬
factory than assigning a greater role to maturational fac¬
tors which can only ever be hypothetical.
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2.4 The Cognitive Underpinnings for Communicative Acts (1)
We have identified two components within a communicative
act by a child; his intention of some effect (Ei) and his
intention that his mother will recognise his intention of
this effect. We said also that the sorts of effect which a
young child will attempt to communicate take the form that
'M should do or believe X'. We shall examine more closely
the basis for this claim in Section 2.5. There is, however,
a set of (Ei)s which are not predicated in the action of
another person and which do not, therefore, constitute part
of a message addressed to another person. This set is com¬
posed of those effects which the child attempts to achieve
in the course of his solitary (non-communicative) playing.
Two questions arise here. First, in what sense are intentions
of this sort equivalent to those kinds of intentions which
are addressed to Mother? That is, can we justifiably label
both '(Ei)1? And second, even if they are in some sense
equivalent what relevance or usefulness can an investigation
of the child during solitary play have to an assessment of
his communicative abilities?
At the beginning of this chapter we argued that the
child's ability to have and to express communicative inten¬
tions depends, in the same way as it does for any other class
of intentions he may entertain, upon the level of his cogni¬
tion (page 40 ff). And the source of the child's cognition,
we had claimed, lies in perceptuo-motor schemas organised
within a discursive system through which a process of abstrac¬
tion may occur. The child generates hypotheses on the basis
of his existing schemas, which hypotheses are then tested
through action. In acting the child intends (attempts to
achieve) some effect, and his perception of the results of
his activity provide the data for the formation and elabor¬
ation of schemata."'" By this argument, then, a communicative
This description, though idealised, should not conceal the
fact that the reasons for success or failure in achieving
some effect may be complex. The child may fail in some
activity not because he is attempting the impossible but
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intention and a non-communicative intention which the child
may entertain at any time are equivalent to the important
extent that both depend upon the level of the child's cog¬
nition at that time. There are doubts concerning the homo¬
geneity of the child's cognition at any stage, which are in¬
corporated in Piaget's notions of equilibration and horizon¬
tal decalage, but these do not prejudice our case. For
there is no reason to suppose that the cognitive bases for
two communicative intentions need necessarily be any less
dissimilar than the bases of a communicative and a non-
communicative intention. In any case, the notion of 'the
intention of some effect (Ei)' in itself carries no implica¬
tions for the logical, or cognitive complexity of the basis
upon which it is constructed. Thus we may take it that the
child's intention of some effect, which he attempts to com¬
municate to another, and his intention of some effect con¬
structed in the course of his solitary play are essentially
equivalent. But why should instances of the latter kind be
interesting to us?
In our analysis of agency we made a distinction in
principle between the child's cognition of self-as-agent and
of other-as-agent. While learning pertaining to each of
these is probably inter-related and mutually beneficial we
can to some extent deal separately with them, since children
engage both in solitary activity and in mutual, co-operative
activity with others (page 43). Our discussion of represent¬
ation commits us to the view that hypotheses (about entities
themselves or about the relation of entities) must exist
independently of and prior to action. Actions are the ex¬
pression of intentions and not the intentions themselves as
Piaget and Bruner maintain."'" Now if communicative intentions
are equivalent to other kinds of (specific) intentions, the
because he lacks the necessary skill. Or again, he may
succeed 'by accident'. Situations such as these may still
be occasions for learning.
"'"On the other hand, we pointed out (page 54) that the child's
actions constitute our only evidence as to his intentions.
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claim is entailed that the child cannot express communicat¬
ively something which is not cognitively represented. The
meanings of which the young child can conceive ultimately
depend upon his cognition. Cromer (1974), at the end of
a short but thorough review of the evidence concerning the
relation of thinking and language, offers the weak form of
a cognitive hypothesis that:
We are able to understand and productively to use par¬
ticular linguistic structures only when our cognitive
abilities enable us to do so. Our cognitive abilities
at different stages of development make certain meanings
available for expression. (Cromer, 1974;246)
Other writers have argued that understanding a verbal
expression depends upon the mastery of the underlying con¬
cept (Piaget, 1970? Sinclair de Zwart, 1969? Slobin, 1973).
As regards the child's communicative abilities, a study of
his solitary activity may provide us with clues as to the
nature of his cognition at any time, which in turn may be
helpful in deciding whether our claims about the communica¬
tive intentions he is attempting to express at that time are
reasonable. For example, if we observe a child.apparently
enlisting his mother's aid to achieve some goal, complemen¬
tary evidence might be provided by our observation of a
previous (or successive) attempt to achieve it on his own.
Both solitary activity and communicative activity can serve
to indicate what the child already knows and/or what he is
attempting to discover, and they can illustrate the grasp
the child has of the rules for thinking upon which the com¬
petent use of a language depends. Wells (1974) discusses
the ways in which the form of language is related by the child
with the categories he is establishing in the organisation
of his non-linguistic experience, and Macnamara (1972) and
Nelson (1974) both argue that children are able to begin to
learn language because - and to the extent that - they are
This is in direct contrast to Bates (1976) who maintains
that before the child has a representation of the relation
of the entities in a proposition (prior to s-m stage VI)
the child is able to perform 'pure performative' requests.
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able to organise and to interpet situations. When we begin
to look at our data (in Chapter 4), evidence as to the nature
of the child's conceptualisation of his world and of his
role within it as witnessed by his solitary activity will
therefore constitute one class of those of his abilities in
which we shall be interested.
There is already an enormous body of literature relating
to the young child's conceptualisations (notably, though by
no means exclusively, from the Piagetian school) and to the
forms of exploratory activity by which these are arrived
at (reviewed by Ross, 1974) . It would be beyond the scope
of this thesis to examine this literature here; we shall
have occasion, in the course of Chapter 4, to compare certain
of our findings with those of other writers. But one question
with which we must contend is: At what level of abstraction
should we attempt to characterise the infant's cognition?
Or, to put the problem in terms more conducive to a discus¬
sion of his communicative abilities, of what kinds of prop¬
ositions (meanings, intended effects (Ei)) should we regard
the infant as being able to conceive? We could follow
Greenfield and Smith and make statements of a rather general
nature:
At Stage IV (8 months), the child is able to set aside
a barrier in order to reach a more distant goal. (This
demonstrates) the awareness of distant goals in relation
to immediate objects ... (1976;171)
And,
When a child begins to express volitional objects, he
necessarily makes reference to a potential situation
that is different from the existing one. (ibid.;172)
Or we could make more particular statements like Piaget's
(1952) observation that the child, in organising a sensor-
motor schema, will first go through a phase of dealing sep¬
arately with particular objects before he is able to subor¬
dinate the use of one object to the other, as in .using one
as a tool for getting the other.. Or, at the lowest level
of abstraction, we could attempt an analysis of the child's
cognition of agency in line with Bower's (1976) definitive
account of the development of the obje ct-concept. What is
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at issue here is not the question of the actions which an
infant or young child is able to perform but of the level
at which these are described and of the sorts of attribu¬
tions which can reasonably be made on the basis of them.
Piaget argues that the young child's inability to deal
with the three mountains task is evidence of his profound
early egocentricity. This egocentricity is itself a partic¬
ular example of a more general characteristic of 'preoper¬
ational' thinking - the inability to consider two aspects
of a situation at once. And the evidence for this claim
comes principally from observations of the child's inability
to 'conserve' the physical properties (such as weight,
volume, size and number) of entities undergoing transforma¬
tions. (See Piaget, 1954-; Piaget and Inhelder, 1969.) We
have already seen how Hughes' (1975) work must modify
Piaget's view of the child's early egocentrism. Other counter-
evidence comes from Bruner's (1975) discussion of the sharing
of attention and the communication of intentions between the
mother and infant, from Trevarthen (1974) and Trevarthen
and Hubley (1979) on early intersubjectivity, and from
Bower's (1976) account of the development of the object-
concept. Similarly, Sinha and walkerdine (1975) argue that
the child's failure to conserve is not wholly explicable in
terms of 'preoperational thinking' (the gradual development
of the logico-mathematical structures of thought; reversi¬
bility, associativity, identity and closure) but is at least
partly due to the limitations of his linguistic competence.
They quote a number of studies which demonstrate that vary¬
ing the experimental arrangements and simplifying the require¬
ments made of the child can lead to significantly more cor¬
rect responses than do the standard experimental procedures
(Bryant and Trabasso, 1971; Gelman, 1972; Rose and Blank,
1974; McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1974). as Donaldson (1978)
points out, it is not Piaget's findings which are in doubt
(the performance of children on tasks he has devised) but
the claims (egocentrism, non-conservation) made on the basis
of them, and the explanations (his theory of intellectual
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development) offered for them.
Likewise, when we turn to look at language acquisition
studies we can witness the need for caution in extrapolating
from evidence to more abstract theory. Nelson (1974), for
example, advises:
... while it can be stated that naming is dependent
upon the existence of concepts, the existence of con¬
cepts need not lead directly and easily to naming them.
The non-occurrence of a structure or concept in the
child's linguistic output should not necessarily be taken
to indicate the 'lack' of that concept in underlying cogni¬
tion. McGarrigle and Donaldson (1974) argue that children
in the early stages of language acquisition interpret the
behavioural aspect of a communicative event to arrive at a
notion of the speaker's meaning and use this knowledge to
make sense of the language, to 'crack the linguistic code'
(Macnamara, 1972). Thus Strohner and Nelson (1974) found
that 2-3 year olds act in accordance with a 'probable event
strategy', even to the extent of performing incorrectly on
simple active voice sentences about improbable events -
sentences they can easily comprehend in other situations.
Findings such as these do not contradict an argument that:
... a child may need to have the cognitive underpinnings
which make him capable of carrying out certain types of
operations before they are observed in either action or
language. (Cromer, 1976;342)
But they raise the questions of why the necessary cog¬
nitive underpinnings should be evidenced earlier in manip¬
ulative play than in language (Slobin, 1973), and why should
not linguistic interpretations be relied upon? More problem¬
atically, how are we to decide whether 'wrong' performance
is due to non-comprehension of a particular linguistic struc¬
ture, or to reliance upon behavioural cues which conflict
with linguistic cues, or to the conflict of two 'language-
comprehension strategies' (Dulay and Burt, 1974)?
Spurious claims made on the basis of a well established
but incorrectly interpreted findings can seriously mislead
theories of any sort.
Our dilemma is that of striking a balance between claims
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based upon the child's action which do not seriously under¬
estimate his cognition of the conventions and structures
necessary for communication (as we have suggested many
laboratory studies do) and claims which do not more reflect
an unjustifiable adult-like analysis of a situation than they
capture the child's perception of it (see page 4-3). Compe¬
tence and comprehension have both been claimed to precede
performance but there is no way of establishing how far this
is generally true. As noted on page 55, we cannot know to
what extent any concept the child has may be integrated and
coherent (adult-like) and we should therefore restrict our
claims about his cognition to just those which are required
for a full description of his identifiably intentional
actions, be they communicative or otherwise.
2.5 The Cognitive Underpinnings for Communicative Acts (11)
If the child's solitary activity constitutes one source
of evidence as to his cognition of the ways in which his
world is ordered and of his place within it, a potentially
much richer source lies in his communicative activity.
Here, the child's (communicative) acts display not only the
goals of which he is able to conceive but also his cognition
of other persons (as agents like himself) and of the conven¬
tions governing the expression of communicative intentions.
Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974) deny that this is so. That
is to say, they deny that inferences about underlying cog¬
nition can be drawn from observable (linguistic) behaviour:
. .. It does not follow from the fact that language
development is contingent upon cognitive development
.. . that we can infer the order of the child's acquis¬
ition of concepts from the order of his employment of
the forms which express these concepts. (1974;463)
They argue that other factors, such as the relative
grammatical complexity of these forms, could determine the
order of their expression. Then, taking an issue that is
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directly relevant for us, they ask:
What do the available data (on the acquisition of such
concepts as 'agent of an action') tell us about the
mastery of the relational concept actor-action and of
the grammatical relation subject-verb which English
uses to express this concept? (ibid.;464)
And they conclude that these data do not allow us to
choose between four possible hypotheses:
1. That the syntactic definition of the grammatical rela- •
tions form part of the child's innate linguistic endow¬
ment, and are the basis of his mastery (e.g. McNeill,
1970).
2. That the child first has to master the concept actor-
action, through sensory-motor engagements with his
environment, and then learn that this concept is expres¬
sed in English by the relation.between subject and verb
(Bloom, 1973).
3. That the actor-action notion is innate and the corres¬
ponding grammatical relation must be learned.
4. That both grammatical relations and the concepts they
express are specified in the child's innate endowment,
and that the observed ontogenetic sequence is a purely
maturational phenomenon.
These hypotheses raise in a different form a dispute
which we have already touched on, and correspond roughly to
the claims that single words i) convey full sentential
structure/are holophrases (McNeill, 1970; Rodgon, 1976),
ii) express a comment upon an implicit topic, the restriction
to one word being a cognitively-based limitation on encoding
capacity (Bloom, 1973; Greenfield and Smith, 1976; Bates,
1976) and iii) are rudimentary referring expressions which
are the first to 'emerge' of a number of innate structures
which become grammaticalised through learning (Dore, 1975) .
No-one appears to have adopted a position based on the extreme
nativism of hypothesis 4- . whether or not Fodor, Bever and
Garrett are correct in claiming that the available data pre¬
clude none of the hypotheses they outline we must examine
the extent to which our previous discussion commits us to
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one or another of these views of the one-word stage.
The 'holophrase' view supposes that one-word utterances
are analogous to adult speech, and that single words are
predicate adjectives and predicate nominals. These are
representations of deep syntactic structures (McNeill, 1970)
and the child's experience with language, together with the
maturation of his memory and vocal apparatus (Lenneberg,
1967), allow the learning of the appropriate surface struc¬
tures of his language community. Rodgon's (1976) use of
the term holophrase differs with McNeill's (1970) view in
that she considers a holophrase to represent a consistent
relation rather than an entire sentence. This has the advan¬
tage that an observer need not attempt to decide which (of
all possible) whole sentence(s) the child actually intended.
In this view the expression of consistent relations is
allowed by, and indicates, the child's preliminary awareness
of the linguistic relations and structure of adult speech.
Rodgon does not appear to think that this awareness is based
on innate syntactic definitions, and as such allies herself
more closely with McNeill's (1974) position, which posits
the 'syntagma' as a meaning-unit which expresses linguistic
content and which is the direct product of previous cognitive
development. She further disagrees with McNeill's earlier
claims in identifying a proportion of single word speech as
labelling (Naming); that is, (just) the association of the
arbitrary symbols used in language - words - with objects,
events, actions and relations in the world. The 'innate
syntax' view does not allow of this possibility:
The referential function is always used for predication.
Children never utter mere labels (McNeill, 1970;23).
Such an account leans heavily on the theory of transfor¬
mational grammar but can offer no justification for supposing
that young children have intuitions of grammaticality and can
make judgements of acceptability, both of which are crucial
to that theory.
We have already suggested that focusing on the child's
developing ability to express communicative intentions pre-
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sents a way of studying the shift from pre-verbal to verbal
communicativity. And we have tried to argue that the child's
intentions, of whatever kind, must at the relevant age be
essentially equivalent and are therefore comparable (see
pages 81 and 97). 3y this line of argument, which views
the earliest single words as constituting accompaniments to
action rather than independent acts of a purely linguistic
nature, one-word utterances may be described as predicative
(holophrastic, in Hodgon's sense of that term) - or indeed
as referential or imitative - but such a description should
not be taken to imply that the child is considered to have
(innate) knowledge of deep syntactic structure. Such a
description does however imply that the child must be able
to entertain and express propositions which may be not at
all, or only partially, linguistically encoded.
In linguistic theory, the term proposition is used to
refer to the objects, states and events that make up the
core ideas behind a sentence, but the requirement that a
proposition be linguistically expressed appears to be
entirely arbitrary (Myers, 1979). Propositions are units
of meaning, combinable in various ways, whose expression
'denotes states or events, denotes facts about states or
events, or qualifies parts of other propositions' (Vendler,
1967). The expression of a proposition is, then, an act of
meaning, and such acts can be performed either verbally or
non-verbally. Austin (1962) pointed out that his definition
of the illocutionary act does not rule out non-verbal expres¬
sions - an illocutionary act can satisfactorily be performed
non-verbally. We have described as communicative acts those
acts in which a child intends his mother will recognise his
intention of some effect (Ei). Now, if a proposition refers
to the objects, states or events that make up the core ideas
behind s communicative act, we are arguing that in the
performance of a communicative act the child expresses a
proposition; any act which is or could be communicative must
have associated with it an underlying proposition. That
proposition is, precisely, the effect with respect to which
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the child has some intention (Ei). It follows that, for us,
the limitations upon the kinds of proposition of which the
child is able to conceive and which he can express are
cognitive limitations, and that propositional development
should be traceable through pre-verbal and verbal communicativit
Our view therefore consists broadly with Fodor, Sever
and Garrett's second hypothesis, It supposes that empiri¬
cally discoverable factors other than grammatical complexity
of form govern the expression of concepts (in propositions)
by admitting of other than linguistic data. It bypasses the
need to posit deep syntactic structures. And it considers
a single word to be the (partial) expression of an entire
proposition based in cognition rather than an emergent -
innately based - referential structure. At this point two
questions present themselves. The first is methodological:
How is one to assess the child's ability to express propos¬
itions in his communicative - or solitary - activity? I
propose to defer treatment of this question until Section
3.1. The second is a theoretical one we have already en¬
countered: At what level should the child's cognition of
other persons and the propositions he attempts to express
through the performance of communicative acts be described?
There are many studies which suggest that even very young
infants are able to take account, to an extent, of the inten¬
tion structure of a co-interactant and several which claim
that, prior to language, children 'understand' agency as
defined under case-grammar. Let us look at some of these.
Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright and Jarvis (1968) have
claimed that children's role-taking abilities - 'the attempt¬
ed discrimination of another person's role attributes' - are
^"The view expressed here contradicts Searle (1969), who
allowed that there could be illocutionary acts with no prop¬
ositional content, and also Myers (1979)» who argues that in
the case of 'indexical acts' - which convey no proposition -
communication depends upon a pragmatic inference by the
addressee based upon shared knowledge. We shall reconsider
this disagreement in Chapter Six.
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quite primitive, and that children 'are markedly insensitive
to the hidden role taking requirements of communication1,
even by school age. I think there is now overwhelming
evidence that they are wrong, evidence of both a general
and a particular kind.
Bruner (1974) provides evidence for the establishment
of 'intuitions' about participants' reciprocal intentionality.
Other writers have noted that the components of the infant's
activity are synchronised with, and mesh with, those of his
caretaker (Condon and Sanders, 1974; Schaffer, 1977; Trevar-
then, 1974; Newson and Newson, 1976). Flavell was a co¬
author of a study (Masangsky et al., 1974) which reassessed
role-taking and the early development of inferences about
others, and Newson and Pawlby (1973) have studied the ways
in which imitation permits the child to participate in new
ways with another. Infants, they say, soon grasp the pos¬
sibility of back-and-forth sequences of acts. This is not
simply a matter of the temporal synchronisation of action,
but requires a mutual understanding and appreciation of the
other person. Newson and Newson (1976) argue that dialogues
of this kind come about through the mother's treatment of
certain of the child's acts as communicative. Such acts
achieve privileged status by incorporation in the dialogue
and they 'punctuate' the child's contribution. Trevarthen
(1974) talks, of the mother 'marking' particular gestures by
imitating them; around six months of age the child begins
to imitate some of his mother's actions. Macfarlane (1974)
suggests that the process begins at birth; children whose
mothers greet them on delivery, and who are treated as
^partners in a personal relationship', are more interested
in other persons. In similar vein, Hess and Shipman (1965)
and Tulkin and Kagan (1972) provide evidence which supports
the view that styles of mothering are crucial in determining
the complexity of the intentions and goals which a child
will himself spontaneously construct.
Turning to studies of a more particular kind, there is
evidence that both mothers (Collis and Schaffer, 1977) and
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infants (Scaife and Bruner, 1975) are able to use the other's
line of regard to identify an object of attention. Shotter
and Gregory (1976) have identified eye-contact as a means
by which mothers mark a comment on the child's action and
ensure that the episode is salient for him. As regards com¬
munication through language, Shatz (1974) claims that two-
year-olds respond to intended requests for action whether or
not a conventional form is used, and Garvey and Hogan (1973)
and Keenan (1974) support the idea that from an early age
children treat speech addressed to them as meaningful.
Donaldson (1978) tells the story of a little Arab girl of 13
months who apparently understands the sense of a sentence
addressed to her by an English woman; this understanding is
based in the actions of the woman and of the little girl's
brother, aged 7, who like her speaks no English. Donaldson
claims that in order to interpret situations of this sort,
and arrive at a notion of speaker's meaning and thus a know¬
ledge of language, 'the child must in a general way be
capable of inference' (1978;30). It is at this point, when
we begin to consider the implications which such interper¬
sonal skills and abilities have for the child's cognition,
that difficulties arise. The development of the concept of
agency provides a good illustration.
(In Section 2.2 we described the case-grammar analysis
of language presented by Fillmore (1966, 1968, 1971) as an
alternative to standard theory, and we discussed in general
terms the problems involved in trying to apply this analysis
to the first utterances of young children. The following
remarks rest upon and elaborate the points raised in that
discussion.)
Miller (1975) claims that at 21 months children use only
surface structures which express non -redundant semantic inten¬
tions. Because a child of this age is communicatively ego¬
centric, his own point of view will be the deictic centre of
any utterance he makes. Any reference to himself is there¬
fore redundant and the child will characteristically produce
utterances like '(I) want' and 'Give it (to me)'. Leaving
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aside the question of egocentricity, I take it that the ex¬
pansions Miller cites amount to a claim that a child of 21
months has some awareness of himself as agent and of the
abilities of an addressee to comply with mands like these
mentioned. More explicitly, Bates (1976) argues that 'expec¬
tant looking' indicates understanding by the child of the
adult as agent at around 11 months of age:
A confirmation of this new understanding of agency
... rests in the fact that both subjects, in certain
conditions where a need or desire can be inferred, will
look at the adult and wait until that adult begins some
appropriate activity. (1976;54)
The closest Bates comes to a definition of this concept
of agency is to identify schemes in which the child involves
the adult 'as an agent or tool' or 'as a source of causality',
(ibid.) In this she follows Sugarman (1973) who likens Bruner's
(1973) account of early skill development - the combining of
skilled routines that have first developed separately - with
Piaget's (1952) account of the organisation of sensori-motor
schemas and postulates that the child will first go through
a stage of treating persons and objects independently but
will finally combine them into a unified schema: Person-as-
agent-to-help-obtain-object. Sugarman's data indicate just
such a progression, as judged by the signalling techniques
the child uses, in neither of these accounts is there any
serious attempt to analyse the concept Agency attributed to
the child on the basis of that child's involvement of an
adult - at sensori-motor stage V - nor indeed is there any
indication of the status such a concept enjoys. We are not
told, for example, how the 'understanding' of agency of a
child of this age might compare with that of an older child.
Some of the relevant questions we should want to ask are,
'Does the child perceive all adults as agents or only those
to whom he addresses a mand?' and 'Does the child's under¬
standing of the adult as agent encompass a full range of
adult abilities or only those abilities implicit in the prop¬
ositions underlying the communicative acts which the child
performs?' 'If, as Bates' allegiance to Piagetian theory
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would suggest, she sees the 11 month old child's cognitive
functioning as of a strictly sensori-motor kind - that is non-
representational - in what sense is it reasonable to attribute
that child with an 'understanding' of something as abstract
as 'agency'?'.
A similar kind of criticism can be levelled at Green¬
field and Smith's (1976) attempt to categorise early language
development in terms of the acquisition of more and more com¬
plex meaning relations. They distinguished fourteen semantic
functions - adapted from Fillmore's cases - and discovered
a developmental sequence in the expression by the child of
one-word utterances fulfilling these functions. Of these,
the Volitional function is claimed first to appear at 11?24
(Matthew) and 11;28 (Nicky) while the Agentive function first
appears at 13?03 - though it does not do so reliably until
around 18 months - and Action or State of Agent appears at
14 months. Volition is described as 'a particular kind of
performative (whose) basic function is to obtain some desired
response from the person addressed' (1976,*51). To employ
the volitional function the child must, then, have some repre¬
sentation of the fact that a person so addressed can comply
with his wishes; he must have some notion of agency, as
Greenfield and Smith tacitly admit later in the discussion
of Volition:
More careful analysis of gestures and intonation along
with experimental work on the child's awareness of the
role of agents in satisfying his demands might allow a
better definition of the uses of this word.(mama) (ibid.;92)
Yet at the same time Greenfield and Smith want to tie-in
the expression of the semantic functions with underlying cog¬
nition. Serious problems exist when a function is itself
not expressed until long after aspects of the cognition on
which it depends must be assumed to be present."'" While we
may accept the proposal that regarding the linguistically
In terms of its expression the Agentive function is partic¬
ularly awkward as the agent of action is often self-evident
and is therefore 'assumed' or 'presupposed' and not linguis¬
tically encoded.
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expressed item as one part of a whole semantic relation
which resides in a word+situation cornbin_ation informs us
of the ways in which adults arrive at an interpretation of
a one word utterance, this procedure tells us little about
the child's grasp of semantic relations, about the ways in
which (parts of) these come to be linguistically expressed
and about the comparability of the younger child's grasp of
a relation with that of an older child; in short, about
whether case relations are a useful way of describing the
meanings or propositions which a young child attempts to
express.
There seem to me to be good reasons for supposing that
the propositions which a young child expresses before and in
the early days of his use of language exist at a level rather
more basic - less complex - than that suggested by a descrip¬
tion in terms of (some adaptation of) case grammar, positing
cases like Agent and Instrument which denote concepts of a
high level of abstraction. Although much work has been done
upon the processes of concept-formation in general (for
example, Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956; Kenaler and Kendler
1961; Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972) and upon the stages
through which children are presumed to pass in the attainment
of conceptual thought (Piaget, 195"I , 1953L 1954; Vygotsky,
1962), this work is unlikely to be relevant here; as. Judith
Greene points out:
... the kinds of tasks used in concept-attainment exper¬
iments, which normally require the sxibject to discover
some arbitrary concept the experimenter has in mind,
have more in common with problem-solving than with the
acquisition, storage and utilisation of concepts as they
represent our knowledge of the real world. (1975;42)
What we are attempting to describe is not the child's
ability to justify or explain his view of the world in terms
of some criterion of rationality or coherence but rather the
schemas and constructs which constitute that view. More per¬
tinent to our discussion is the work of Bower (1976). He
found that the development of the 'object-concept' does not
depend upon a simple, uni-dimensional progression but involves
the appreciation by the child of a number of facts about ob-
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jects; facts such as that objects which are stationary do
not cease to exist when they move, that two objects cannot
be in the same place at one and the same time, that an iden¬
tical object cannot be in two places at once and, later,
that two objects can be in the same place if one is inside
the other. Facts of this kind together constitute what is
known as the object-concept and its development seems to
reach completion at around 18 months. While we might wish
to say that the object-concept only becomes a unified part
of the child's cognitive structures at that age this does
not mean that the child knows nothing about objects prior
to 18 months. His cognition of objects is, however, in some
sense less complete than that connoted by the term concept.
Nelson (1974) identifies three levels of infant conceptual¬
isation, Instances, Attributes and Concepts. Of these, only
instances occur as perceptual wholes and provide the child
with data for learning. The identification of attributes,
she claims, depends upon the analysis of instances, and con¬
cepts are the product of the synthesis of attributes. In
Nelson's view the perception of instances allows the child
to develop constructs or concepts which take these instances
as their functional core, and the child's early words - for
example, the names of objects - represent for him these func¬
tional core concepts. This kind of approach appears to be
consistent with our previous discussion in which we identi¬
fied the source of the child's cognition as his perception
of the effects of his activity in the world and the construc¬
tion of schemata capturing these data. Since the child's
experience is limited his schemas will be correspondingly
restricted in range. This, I think, clarifies the claim that
the principle difference between the understanding of adults
and infants resides in the complexity of their 'concepts' and
the form in which these are available for inspection, manip¬
ulation and abstraction (Fodor, 1976). If concepts are con¬
structed by means of the perception of instances (schema-
formation) and the identification of attributes (contruct-
formation) then we must try to chart the progression in the
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child's cognition of others as agents rather than grant him
an understanding of agency as soon as he demonstrates some
awareness of the role of other persons. Like Bates and
Sugarman we shall want to use non-linguistic behavioural
indicators as our basis for attributing constructs (and con¬
cepts) to the pre-linguistic child but we shall try to make
explicit the implicature of these attributions.
Though we have identified the communicative act as a
rich source of evidence about the child's cognition, we have
yet to specify the particular kinds of communicative inten¬
tion at which we shall be looking. It will be recalled that
in defining a communicative intention we maintained that
the sorts of effect (Ei) which the child will attempt to
communicate take the form that 'M should do or believe X'.
Searle (1975) identified five classes of speech acts as
follows:
1. Representatives: e.g. statements or assertions, which
covey to the receiver the sender's
belief in the truth of a proposition,,
2. Directives: e.g. requests and commands, which get the
receiver to act in response to the sender's
request for action or information,
3. Commissives: e.g. promises,
4. Expressives: e.g. congratulations, and
5. Declarations: e.g. bequests.
Most writers seem to support the idea that the earliest
speech acts children perform are assertions and requests,
acts belonging to the first two of Searle's classes (Bruner,
1974; Dore, 1973, 1975? Halliday, 1975; Greenfield and Smith,
1976; Clark and Clark, 1977), though Myers (1979) thinks that
15 month olds may also be able to perform Expressives by means
of indexical acts. It is this, reported, early ability of the
child to perform requests and assertions respectively which
lead to the contention that his earliest communicative inten¬
tions will be that his mother should recognise his intention
that 'M should do or believe X'. If requests and assertions
do indeed appear earlier than other communicative act types
113.
they will be the best source of data on the development of
pre-verbal communicativity and the transition into the use
of language. We shall therefore concentrate upon these com¬
municative act types when examining our data.
We have so far identified the child's solitary activity
and his (putative) ability to perform requests and assertions
as offering evidence about the kinds of goals of which he
is able to conceive, his cognition of others as agents and
of the conventions governing the expression of communicative
intentions. There is a further kind of activity in which
the child partakes which may be useful to us and which is
not solitary nor is it strictly communicative as we have
defined that term, requiring the recognition of an underlying
proposition. I refer to such things as peek-a-boo games and
the early back-and-forth and imitative sequences identified
by, for example, Newson and Pawlby (1973) and Trevarthen
(1974, 1977). I take it that these sorts of activity are
indicators of the infant's growing appreciation of what other
persons are like, which is crucial to the development of his
ability to communicate with them. We shall characterise





3.1 The Operationalisation of the Indicators of Cognition
Having identified three kinds of activity in the young
child's repertoire as being the sources of our evidence as
to his cognition of agency, we must now tackle the problem
of how these indicators may be operationalised. Since our
method will vary for each we shall deal separately with
communicative activity, with solitary activity and, last,
with interpersonal routines.
We have argued that any act which is or could be com¬
municative must have associated with it an underlying prop¬
osition, and that in the performance of a communicative act
the child expresses his intention with respect to a propos¬
ition. One way of tracing the development of the child's
cognition of agency would consist in assessing his ability
to convey such propositions in any given modality and in des¬
cribing the complexity of these propositions, since the
proposition exists as part of a communicative intention,
what we require is a method by which to identify, precisely
and in a verifiable way, any communicative intention on the
part of the child. I take it that the straightforward attri¬
bution of such intention by an observer is an inadequate
basis for data because the details of the convention existing
between a child and his mother need not be accessible to the
observer and because such judgements, although they might
be correct, are not verifiably so.
A more reliable procedure would be to make use of the
mother's knowledge of the private convention which she and
her child are constructing. During communicative exchanges
with her child a mother acts as if she attributes communica¬
tive intentions to him and in turn performs acts which take
account of the child's preceding act. It seems reasonable
to assume that we, as observers, will recognise within such
exchanges those of the mother's communicative intentions
which are conventionally realised. However, those ccmmuni-
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cative intentions of the mother which we can recognise can
only provide part of a clue to the child's preceding inten¬
tion if the mother's communicative intention is in some
sense contingent upon the meaning of the child's act. Not
all communicative acts convey a communicative intention
which exists as part of a two-way exchange of meanings be¬
tween interactants. We shall use the term Interactive Act
to refer to those which do so. A communicative act by a
sender (S) counts as an interactive act if the communicative
intention expressed in its performance either takes account
of the communicative intention conveyed to S by the receiver
(R) during R's preceding act or is acknowledged within a
similarly contingent intention conveyed by R during R's
succeeding act. To put this more simply, an interactive act
is a communicative act which is contingent upon the recog¬
nition of the interactor's preceding communicative intention
and/or which is similarly reciprocated within a communicative
act by him. An interactive act can therefore occur at the
beginning, in the middle or at the end of a sequence but it
cannot occur in isolation. In the terms of the method we
are presently outlining, in which the mother's understanding
of her child is to be used as a clue, only those communicative
acts of the child which are also interactive acts will qualify
as evidence.
We must entertain the possibility that the mother (M)
as well as the child (C) may perform an interactive act which
we, as non-participant observers, do not recognise, by virtue
of some private agreement between M and C about the relation¬
ship between the form of some act and the meaning it expres¬
ses. Such private exchanges cannot constitute part of our
data. Even in cases where we can recognise a (sufficiently)
conventionally expressed communicative intention by M which
is apparently contingent upon a prior communicative intention
she has attributed to C, we should not take this alone to be
precise evidence as to C's intention. M could have interpre¬
ted C's intention inappropriately or elSe she could be refus¬
ing or diverting an intention which is unacceptable to her.
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At this stage of the sequence we have no way of judging
whether or not the communicative intention M attributed to
C corresponds with that which he attempted to convey, nor
whether M's response is acceptable to C.
A possible solution presents itself on those occasions
when the child performs an act which appears to re-express
his original intention - or a modification of it - following
his mother's response. Since any given intention may be
expressed in an indefinite number of different ways, one
criterion for such a repeat by C would be that it is similar
to the original act in terms of the behavioural medium of
expression. Let us summarise the moves in an exchange as
follows: is the child's initiating interactive act,
is his mother's response which identifies C-^ for us but does
not establish its meaning and is the child's reaction to
M . If C2 is a (modified) repeat of there are several
possible interpretations; five of them might be as follows:
1. C is trying to initiate a repeat of which was appro¬
priate to C^.
2. C is reinstating his attempt to achieve a co-operative
response from M; was not appropriate.
3. C is trying to initiate a repeat of even though
was not appropriate to C^.
4. C is trying to initiate a repeat of even though he
had no original intention; G-j_ was not an interactive act.
5. C is repeating C-^ regardless of H-^; neither nor is
properly described as an interactive act.
Our strategy for choosing between all possible interpretations
of C£ must hinge upon two further factors which we take it
are accessible to us as observers. The first of these
relates to the physical locations of M and G and of the
objects or events on which their interaction is focussed,
and to the physical movements associated with the acts C^»
^"Examples of such tactics by mothers can be identified in
the case of mands, for example, when she attempts to re¬
direct the child's attention to some alternative object
or topic.
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and C^. We may call these situational clues. The second
factor is the association with G^ o:£ seme affective index;
for example the expression of pleasure or displeasure, tonal
emphasis, excitement or rage. A way in which the expression
of what we take to be an affective index could be formally
identified as contingent upon at present eludes me. At
this stage we must simply say that the expression of affect
is transparent to us by virtue of our being human, and that
the temporal contiguity with of such an expression is a
sufficient basis on which to claim that the child's reaction
was occasioned by M^. (See Feijman and Reldman, 1982). In
commonsense terms we might expect the expression of pleasure
to be consistent with interpretations 1, 3 and 4 above,
neutral affect to indicate interpretation 5 and negative
affect - frustration or displeasure - to be associated with
interpretation 2. But these are only some of the possible
interpretations. Let us try to present more formally the
possible courses which a putative exchange may follow. We
are interested in the moves which might lead to the child's
performance of an act, C2» which appears to re-express his
original intention and which has associated with it an
expression of positive (+), negative (-) or neutral (0)
affect.
Rationale
Our decision as to whether any particular action by
C was performed with a communicative intention recognizable
by M rests upon our finding answers to three fundamental
questions: Did M attribute a communicative intention to
C^? Was M's attribution (or non-attribution) correct?
And hence, Was G's action performed with a communicative
intention? (Was an interactive act?)
Our answers must be inferred from the physical
characteristics of the behaviour we observe; I have argued
that those aspects which are accessible to us as observers
and which are likely to be most useful are situational
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clues and affective indices. We can attempt a formal
statement of the steps to the identification of a comm¬
unicative intention by means of the following algorithmic
table:
Table Two
Possible Bases for a Putative Exchange,
from Myers, 1980) j
(Adapted
(A) 1. Was C's action perform¬
ed with a communicative
intention?
2. Did M attribute a comm¬
unicative intention to
°i?
3. Was M's attribution
(or non-attribution)
correct?
4. Did M's response accord
with her attribution
(was it co-operative
from her point of
view)?




from his point of
view)?
(B) 6. Did C repeat his act
with positive, neg¬
ative or neutral affect?
N N
(H)









Interpretation: I II III IV V VI VII VIII
(Note: Answers in part (B) are obtained by observation
while answers in part (A) must rely upon inference.
$ means that the question is inapplicable.)
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As will be described in Chapter Pour we may obtain
pointers to questions 2 and 4 directly from M herself, but
there are two reasons for our being unable to rely solely
upon her direct reports. First, in order always to be
able to ask the right questions of her we must immediately
recognize the occurrence of a putative exchange. We cannot
presume to be able to do this; in fact we are assuming that
the detailed analysis of video-tape recordings will reveal
far more than is casually observable. Second, the poss¬
ibility that M may be wrong is intrinsic to our rationale.
Thus while we may discover M's interpretation of some acts
C^, and her reasons for responding in a particular way, we
cannot discover whether her interpretation was correct.
Only C knows whether was consistent with his
intention; hence question 5 is an important link in the
rationale. Since only C knows the answer it is to his
subsequent behaviour (Cthat we must look. In particular
we can observe whether has associated with it a positive
(+), negative (-) or neutral (0) affective index.
Negative instances
From an observer's standpoint a negative instance
indicates both that C had some communicative intention and
that M's response did not accord with that intention; thus
it provides answers to questions 1 and 5. From M's stand¬
point it is potentially more informative because she also
knows the answers to 2 and 4. Provided that she has tried
to co-operate, a negative instance will tell her the answer
to question 3; she has not attributed the correct intention
(Interpretation III). If, on the other hand, she has not
responded co-operatively, a negative instance could indicate
either Interpretation II or Interpretation IV; M does not
know whether or not her attribution was correct. Whether or
not M responds co-operatively it is clear that a negative
instance cannot specify C's original communicative intention
for her. (We must assume that a mother will respond co-oper-
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atively in most instances, at least partly because non-co-
operativity would impede the development of communication
with her child.)
The observer only achieves clear indications to
question 4 (and then to questions 3 and 2) if is followed
by a second response, If her response to a negative
instance is not a repeat of M^, then either Interpretation
III or Interpretation Y is indicated; further inquiry is
now unnecessary since, in either case, in performing
the child did not succeed in performing an interactive act.
If Mj is a repeat of we may assume that M was not attempt¬
ing to co-operate. But this rationale is unable to tell us
whether or not M's attribution was correct (question 3)> and
thus whether or not C successfully performed an interactive
act.
Positive instances
While the performance of an act G^ with positive
affect points uniquely to Interpretation I in the rationale,
we must allow for the possibility that was not strictly
an interactive act. If M often responds to any action by
C with an act which customarily elicits positive affect,
then C2 may indeed be a signal that should be repeated
without having conveyed any communicative intention.
Evaluation
This rationale rests upon the assumption that the
child will behave in ways which appear logical to us. Eor
example, we assume that occasions when the child's intention
is not met will give rise to negative affect. It rests also
upon the assumption that, given the preceding sequence, there
should only be one answer to each question. The rationale
is flawed to the extent that in some cases the validity of
both assumptions may be questioned. We can illustrate this
by means of the following putative exchange:
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1. C performs an act with a communicative intention,
2. M attributes a communicative intention.
3. M's attribution is not correct.
4. M does not intend a co-operative response but, because
her attribution was incorrect, she inadvertently
fulfills C's intention.
In Table Two, question 5 column 4 must be labelled 'query'
to allow for the above possibility, although the most
likely outcome is that was not co-operative from C's
point of view (N). Similarly there may be occasions
when M misconstrues or intends an unco-operative
response which C, although his original intention is not
fulfilled, enjoys enough to perform a repetition with
positive affect with the (new) intention that should
be repeated. Non-paradigmatic cases are represented in
columns 2, 3 and 4 for question 6. Or again, it is
conceivable that may be a negative instance, even
though M interpreted correctly and responded co-operat¬
ively, if G did not enjoy the outcome. While C is perhaps
more likely to perform a different act at the possibility
of a repetition with negative affect cannot be excluded.
What then is the value of the rationale?
While it leaves us unable, solely on the basis of
the expression of positive or negative affect, to determine
the nature of the communicative intention conveyed in
any interactive act by C it does provide a framework for
the examination of situational clues. These may reveal
the existence of a shared focus of attention, or co-operative
action with some task, and so on. M's reports as to her
shared knowledge with C may also be applied in specific
cases.
When affective clues leave open more than one
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interpretation of C^, or when the expression of affect is
such as to prejudice the behavioural similarity of C2 with
C^, an appeal to situational clues may clarify the meanings
of the child's acts. For example, some modification of
posture or line of regard may allow us to choose between
Interpretations II, III and IY in the anomalous cases
outlined above.
While this rationale would be justified if it
allowed us to identify just one instance of the child's
expression of a communicative intention, we must accept
that for some - perhaps many - triad sequences it will
leave us uncertain as to whether the behaviour we puta-
tively identify as was in fact an interactive act and,
even if it was, as to the precise nature of the child's
communicative intention. In practice our method may
reject a substantial amount of potential data. A further
problem for the method is that it can only be successful
if a mother attributes communicative intentions to a
substantial proportion of her child's behaviour and
credits him with some ability to recognise her own intentions.
From work on styles of mothering (for example, Tulkin and
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Kagan, 1972) we already know that there are differences in
the willingness of mothers to do these things (see also
Nelson, 1973). In the extreme case we could be left in the
position of basing our procedure upon a mother whose behaviour
denies the possibility of the communicative exchanges we are
looking for. Fortunately the likelihood of this extreme case
seems remote and variations in mothering style are more likely
to lead to differences in the ways in which children commun¬
icate - as described by Nelson (1973) - than to the presence
or absence of communicative behaviour. We do, however, need
to develop some strategy by which to reduce the unnecessary
rejection of potential data referred to above.
In a triad sequence of the kind we have described the
child performs an interactive act, C^, to which his mother
responds, M^. In performing the mother may either attempt
to co-operate with the intention she takes as conveying,
and succeed, or she may attempt to co-operate but fail because
she has misinterpreted C^, or else she may interpret ap¬
propriately but act so as to refuse or divert the intention
conveyed by C-^. Given that we are regarding the child as
capable of goal-directed behaviour involving the derivation
and testing of hypotheses, there are, broadly, three kinds of
reaction we might expect of the child. First, the child may
'change the subject', either because his original intention
has been satisfied or because he accepts its refusal. On the
other hand, if the intention conveyed by is neither satis¬
fied nor refused by M, the child may either perform an act C2
which is similar to - if, for example, M may not have been
properly attending to - or else he may perform an act
which is different to but which conveys the same commun¬
icative intention. This last would be appropriate behaviour
if C^ may have been ambiguous, or if the child is experiment¬
ing with different expressive forms, or if he is unsure of
the conventions governing the expression of his original in¬
tention. Clearly on those sorts of occasions when the child
might perform an interactive act C2 which is similar to his
previous act C-^ in terms of the behavioural medium of expres¬
sion he could just as reasonably'be expected to perform an
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act which is different to but which is nonetheless designed
to convey the same intention.
We can include in our programme those interactive se¬
quences in which C^ is behaviourally dissimilar to only
if we relax the criterion that to qualify as a repeat of
the original communicative intention must be similar to
The relaxation of this criterion leads directly to the
placing of greater emphasis upon situational clues and affec¬
tive indices in our interpretation of the child's communi¬
cative intentions. While this increases the range of inter¬
active behaviour falling within the scope of our procedure it
may reduce the certainty of our interpretation of that behav¬
iour. However, it should be stressed that we are still
focussing upon triad sequences of interactive acts, and that
the mother's responses (and perhaps lb,) remain as the
principal identifiers of the child's communicative acts.
Whereas in studying communicative behaviour it is pos¬
sible to identify sequences of interactive acts and to use
the interpolated acts of the mother as a clue to the com¬
municative intentions expressed by the child, the investi¬
gation of the child's solitary activity involves no conven¬
ient accomplice. There are, however, certain formal
similarities between the events occurring in the course of
communicative and solitary activity, which we can apply to
the development of a procedure for studying solitary activity.
First, it would in principle be possible to identify triad
sequences of events during the child's solitary activity,
consisting of exchanges between the child and his environ¬
ment, formally analogous to the exchanges occurring between
the child and his mother. In the course of such an exchange
the child might perform some act designed to produce a cer¬
tain effect in the world. We may again call this C^. There
would follow some event in the world which may or may not
coincide with the effect the child intended. Let us call
this event E^. Depending upon the form of the child may
then perform a second act, C^, which, as in the case of com¬
municative exchanges, may be behaviourally similar to or
1Zb.
dissimilar with his prior act C . Specifically, C2 may be
similar to if E-^ conformed with the effect the child in¬
tended and he wishes to repeat it, or if did not so con¬
form but the child considers Cj_ was an appropriate form of
act. On the other hand G^ dissimilar with if the
child now intends a different effect, or if he is experi¬
menting with different forms as alternative means to achieve
the same effect.
Second, those clues which we have called situational
clues, relating to the physical locations of the child and
the objects or events on which his action is focussed,
together with the physical movements and motions associated
with the acts C-^, C^ and the events E-^, E2 are still acces¬
sible to us.
Third, we may again use the association with C2 of some
affective index as an indication of whether or not E-^ con¬
formed with that effect intended by the child in the per¬
formance of C-^. In parallel with the case of communicative
activity, we must assume that the expression of affect is
transparent to us by virtue of our being human and that the
temporal contiguity with E^ of such an expression by the
child is a sufficient basis on which to claim that the child's
reaction was occasioned by E^.
It is to the expression of affect that we must look,
in the case of solitary activity, for our principal means
of identifying the child's acts, C-^, and of establishing
the effects they were intended to achieve, in the absence
of any other participant with a privileged understanding of
the child's behaviour, his behaviour alone can inform us
of the child's intentions. The proposed procedure rests
upon the assumption that the association of an affective
index with C2 reveals to us the child's pleasure or dis¬
pleasure at the perceived outcome of his preceding act, C^.
While it is entirely possible that the child could express
pleasure upon perceiving E^ even though E^ did not corres¬
pond with the effect C originally intended, such an outcome
is more likely to evoke surprise or curiosity if not actual
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displeasure, in general we are assuming that we may take
the expression of positive or negative affect in association
with C9 as evidence of the child's recognition of the success
1
or failure, respectively, of his preceding act, C^. If
this assumption is reasonable we should be able to identify
the child's original intention in almost all cases where
C2 has a positive affective index associated with it. We
may or may not be able to identify the original intention
where the subsequent affective index is negative depending
upon the evidence afforded by situational clues, our general
understanding of the child's cognition from other data,
whether or not the child perseveres in his attempts and so
on.
The third kind of activity which we identified as being
of potential value to us is that involved in interpersonal
routines. We noted that this activity is neither solitary
nor strictly communicative as it does not require the recog¬
nition of an underlying proposition by either participant,
beyond that of wishing to engage in a mutual activity. Given
that these routines appear very early, at around 4 months of
age (Trevarthen, 1974), it seems likely that they are the
fore-runners of communicative activity, during which the
child is learning skills basic to the establishment of dia¬
logue such as methods of gaining and directing the attention
of others and the rules of turn-taking. Our interest in
interpersonal routines lies, then, in the information they
can provide as to the infant's cognition of other persons
and his grasp of certain skills basic to communication.
Given that the propositional content of these routines
is not our focus — for there may indeed be none other than
the pleasure of interaction - it will be sufficient for us
simply to record a number of features of each routine as it
occurs. Those which appear to be most relevant to our pur¬
poses are:
1. Who was the initiator of the sequence and how was the
"'"See Watson, (1973) and page 55.
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the initiation achieved?
2. Of how many 'turns' did the sequence consist? Was there
a progression of form or style as the sequence proceeded
or was it uniform throughout? Who was responsible for
any progression that occurred?
3. Who terminated the sequence and how? More interestingly,
is it possible to establish a reason for the termination?
A mother is unlikely to simply stop interacting with her
child, unless to attend to some emergency, but a child
may have a variety of reasons for terminating a routine.
He may do so if, for example, he is distracted by some
other movement or noise, or through boredom (non-progres¬
sion) , or because his mother's turn is markedly different
from her preceding one or is simply unfamiliar (too great
a progression). Although it will depend partly upon sur¬
mise, information of this last kind could tell us how
confident the child is in the routines being established
and how much variation or unfamiliarity he will tolerate
dn the other's behaviour.
3.2 The Subjects and Methodology-
The detailed longitudinal examination of a small number
of children - often single cases - has long been a popular
and productive strategy in developmental studies. One could
point to any number of workers who have used this technique,
from Leopold's (193^-4fl) classic study to those who have construc¬
ted particular and detailed accounts of one aspect of devel¬
opment (for example, Halliday, 1975). But the greatest
strength of this strategy is also its weakness in that the
detail afforded concerning individual children admits of the
criticism of non-generalisability.
On the other hand, the practice of deriving statistical
generalisations from the cross-sectional observation of large
numbers of subjects at a similar age or presumed level of
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development does not readily lend itself to the investiga¬
tion of very early communicative abilities. We have already
noted that any particular communicative intention may be
expressed in an indefinite number of ways. It follows that
while we may want to describe the meanings of the inter¬
actions of two mother-child dyads in similar terms, the
behaviour which expresses these meanings may be entirely
different in each case; especially the behaviour of the
children - in whom we are primarily interested - since they
are not so constrained as are adults by convention. Obser¬
vations of this kind led Gauld and Shotter (1977) to claim
that:
No general understanding of the processes of infant
development can emerge from the quantification (and
statistical correlation) of gross and physically iden¬
tifiable pieces of behaviour in highly impoverished
environments. (ibid.,212)
The strategy adopted in the present study aimed to
gain the detail of a longitudinal study but to combine this
with a validation technique. It involved observing one
child at fortnightly intervals over a period of 15 months,
from 8 months to Z2. months of age, and deriving a
model based on these observations of that child's developing
cognition of agency into the two-word stage of language use.
This model was then checked against observations made of a
further five children over a period of approximately 3 months
each who together spanned the age range 7-22 months. The
children observed were Anna (8-22 months) - whom we may call
the primary subject - and secondary subjects Daniel (7-10
months), Sarah (10-13 months), David (12-15 months), Victoria
(15-18 months) and Leon (18-22 months). While no attempt
was made to control for place in the family or number of
siblings, four of the children were in fact singletons and
a fifth had two very much older sisters. Only Leon had close
siblings and these were a sister and a brother aged three and
five years respectively.
For the five secondary subjects the observation sessions
were recorded using standard video-tape equipment in a room
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in the Department of Psychology. This room contained one
arm-chair and two smaller chairs, and a large cardboard hoc
containing an assortment of suitable toys. The camera was
sited at one end of the rectangular room and commanded a
full view of the play area through a wide angle lens. There
were pictures, posters and children's drawings in the walls.
The mother and her child were shown into the room and after
a few minutes for relaxation and adjustment the experimenter
retired to an adjoining room, switched on the recording
equipment and watched the entire session of 30 minutes on a
TV monitor. The only explicit instruction given to mothers
was to 'play with (your child) as you would at home, or if
he seems to prefer it allow him to play on his own'. These
observation sessions were therefore completely non-intrusive,
with just one exception to which we shall return in a moment.
The method of non-intrusive observation was adopted because,
as argued on pages 31 and 91 , it appears to be the best means
we have of encouraging children spontaneously to demonstrate
what they are able to do. While watching the session on the
monitor the experimenter noted down episodes which seemed
to be of particular interest to aid in the later analysis
of the tape.
In view of the large number of sessions involved and
for reasons of general convenience the sessions with Anna,
the primary subject, were recorded at her home using portable
equipment. The regular intrusions into her living-room
appeared to disturb her not at all, perhaps partly because
she was only 8 months old when they commenced, and certainly
because her mother was adept at behaving as if things were
entirely as usual. Anna's toys were similar to those in the
Department and in several instances identical ones were pro¬
vided for both situations to permit closer comparison of the
different children's behaviour. The one exception to the
non-intrusive nature of the observations of the secondary
subjects consisted in the experimenter from time to time
requesting a mother to try to interest her child in a partic¬
ular toy or game in which Anna had at the equivalent age
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shown a special or unusual interest. This again was done
for the purposes of closer comparison.
As soon as was practicable after the end of an obser¬
vation session the tape underwent a preliminary analysis.
This involved transcribing those sequences which appeared to
be important and significant and editing these onto a master
tape for full analysis later. Typically between 10 and 20
minutes worth of material was retained from a 30 minute tape,
consisting of sequences of just a few seconds up to five -
minutes or more. For the full analysis of the master tapes
the activity of each child was tabulated individually on
large sheets of card (size Al). These tables recorded the
child's age and a code number for the observation session
along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis was divided
into three sections, namely 'Focus of Activity', 'Solitary
Activity' and 'Mutual Activity'. Within each of these sec¬
tions further sub-divisions were made, as shown in Table 3.
Those sub-divisions which were relevant varied slightly for
each child and varied strikingly with age; hence some relate
to specific items and activities while others are more gen¬
eral. It was found useful to include a division 'marginally
involving mother' under the solitary mode of activity to
cover these sequences in which a child playing on his own
turns briefly to his mother for help or for comment before
resuming play on his own. Such cases received an entry
under solitary play and under 'Directives' or 'Representa¬
tives' as appropriate. In general, for any sequence separate
entries were made under 'Focus of Activity' and under 'Mode
of Activity', and these were cross-referenced, so that the
trends in any particular aspect of the child's activity could
more easily be followed through.
Appendix K (page 277a) provides protocols showing theapplication of the procedures described in Section 3.1; one
example is given for each of the three kinds of activity.The data table for each child - see Table Three - is composedof entries such as these.
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Table Three
Showing the way in which data for each child were tab¬
ulated during analysis.
Session (Age)





Focus of _ ,,„






















3.3 The Presentation of Data and Derivation of a Model for
the Cognition of Agency
In view of the kinds of indicators of cognition which
are being used in this study it would in principle be possible
to present the data from which the model of the developing
cognition of agency is to be derived in two quite different
ways. One strategy would involve dividing the whole 15-month
period of observation into segments of, say, four or six
months. The evidence from each of our indicators could then
be considered, and a model of agency sketched out, within
each period in turn. This procedure would have the advantage
that the child's activities and abilities within each period
could be considered as a whole. It would lead to a stage¬
like model. Another strategy would involve individually
tracing the child's development over the whole 15 months in
each of the three kinds of activity which we have identified.
These would then be summarised and a dynamic model of the
developing cognition of agency drawn for the whole period.
In this study it was originally intended that the first
of these courses would be followed, and this for two principal
reasons; first, because it seems likely that experience of
self-as-agent and of other-as-agent - that is, experience
gained during solitary and mutual activity - are mutually
beneficial in the development of cognition, a wholistic ap¬
proach segmented over time seemed the more appropriate pro¬
cedure; second, the data for the five secondary subjects are
intrinsically of a segmented nature and could therefore most
easily be related to a model of Anna's cognition which was
similarly segmented. However, during the analysis of the tapes
of Anna it became apparent that it would not be possible sat¬
isfactorily to divide her observation period into segments
without masking interesting phenomena. For example, whereas
distinct progressions could be identified in the form and
nature of Anna's requests these did not coincide with the pro¬
gressions in her solitary activity. The appropriate seg~>
mentation would have been different in each case and to
rely upon one mode of activity as a basis for
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segmentation would have been to place undue emphasis upon
one indicator at the expense of the others in the derivation
of our model. In the following chapter the second of the
two strategies outlined above has been adopted, the evidence
from each of our indicators being presented independently
before an attempt is made to draw up a model of-Anna's
developing cognition of agency.
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Chapter Four; Anna
4.1 Introduction and Summary
The stated aim of this chapter is to draw up, on the
basis of three different kinds of activity, a model for the
development of the cognition of agency. The following
three sections are devoted to a rather detailed account of
the sequences and episodes occurring during filming which
demonstrate significant advances in Anna's cognition. We
deal with interpersonal routines in Section 4.2, with com¬
municative activity in Section 4.3 and with solitary activity
in Section 4.4. In each case a story is told about the
development we can observe, with descriptions of the episodes
supporting this story included at the appropriate points.'
Except in the case of interpersonal routines, no attempt is
made to summarise the evidence which emerges, within each
section. Section 4.2 includes a summary, in the form of
the examination of six explicit hypotheses, because our
methodology for gathering data on interpersonal routines
was different to that for communicative and solitary activity.
The summary renders these data in a form in which they may
be collated with our other evidence.
Section 4.5 opens with a table (Table 4.i) presenting a
skeleton summary of the principal findings from each source.
It may be used as a key for easy reference in reading these
three sections of detailed evidence. It serves in the same
way for the discussion of the inter-relation of the evidence
which follows it. There are then two further tables. Table
4.2 draws out what is revealed to us of Anna's cognition of
self-as-agent and of other-as-agent. Table 4.3 offers a
model for the development of the cognition of agency in the
form of a flow-diagram. This shows the child's abilities
and accomplishments, which should be seen not as stages
reached but as unfolding processes which are mutually inter¬
dependent.
The discussion of the model draws out five conditions
^The episodes described in the text are keyed to the Appendices
by the figures in the left-hand margin.
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for the normal development of agency, variations within
which would affect the child's progress through the model.
These are:
1. Opportunities for the creation of structure for action.
2. The active and regular participation of another person.
3. The ability and willingness of that other person to
interpret and support the child's activity and to allow
him to direct their interaction.
4. The consistent application of rules relating act and
meaning.
5. The consistent application of limits within which inter¬
action may proceed.
In examining the data for the five secondary subjects,
in Chapter Five, we shall be testing our model of cognition
against them. It is to variability within the factors listed




It is our contention that interpersonal routines are
the fore-runners of communicative activity; that they are
part of a process through which the young child learns
skills basic to the establishment of dialogue such as gain¬
ing and directing the attention of others and the rules of
turn-taking. We have suggested that within such routines
we may observe the development of the child's nascent
abilities to intend, to act and to communicate. In present¬
ing the data for Anna we shall therefore deal first-with
those activities we have grouped under the heading Inter¬
personal Routines.
In Section 3.1 we identified a number of features of
interpersonal routines which seemed most relevant for our
purposes. This identification rested upon a set of largely
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commonsense assumptions which we can now make explicit in
the form of a set of hypotheses:
H-, : Since we presume the very young child to know little
x
about either the possibility of 'interaction' or the
mechanics of initiating and sustaining such interaction,
his mother will be the predominant initiator of early
interpersonal routines.
H~: As a number of routines become established the child
will begin to initiate them.
: Over time the child will begin to use established
techniques to initiate new routines.
H^: Routines generally will become more complex, with more
flexibility, and innovations (that is departures from
the normal routine) being permitted.
H4a: Routine length will increase.
H^: In conjunction with increasing general activity and
mobility the frequency of these occasions when the
child terminates the routine in favour of some other
activity will increase.
During the latter part of the period during which Anna
was observed it became increasingly difficult to distinguish
behaviour which was simply interpersonal from that which
shaded into the communicative mode, as a general rule,
interpersonal behaviour of hers which could not be clearly
identified as the performance of an expressive or a directive
or a representative communicative act type, but which was
ordered, was assigned the status of interpersonal routine.
More specifically, this grouping includes behaviour class¬
ified under the descriptors Rehearsal of Expectation (which
includes 'expectant looking1 and peek-a-boo games), Turn-
taking, Giving, Giving-Exchange, Joint Action and Reciprocity.
These categories were not exclusively defined - and indeed
they all inter-relate to some degree - but constituted an
expedient to the management of data. In fact, as we shall
see, they represent a developmental shift in the form and
nature of the behaviour they describe. A summary of all
the interpersonal routines identified in the tapes of Anna
is given in Appendix A.
The Evidence
In the earliest recorded instance of an interpersonal
routine we already find Anna, aged 8 months 11 days, perfor-
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ming in a way which Trevarthen and Hubley (1979) would
classify as belonging to the stage of secondary intersubjec-
tivity. In conformity with their system we might represent
this routine as shown in Figure Three.^
Figure Three
The routine is centred around a digital watch of the
kind having a display which illuminates for four seconds at
the press of a button. The watch is lying on a low table
against which Anna is supporting herself standing. M
presses the button on the side of the watch (1) and the
display lights up (2). M watches C (3) to observe her reac¬
tion. C observes the display during the whole of the time
it is illuminated (4) then, when it goes out, she looks at
M (5). At this M repeats the initial action (1). This
sequence continues through seven complete cycles, the only
development being that M marks the act of pressing the button
(or equally the event of the display illuminating) by utter¬
ing the word "Pop". The routine is terminated by M who with¬
draws while the display is still illuminated. By this tech¬
nique M avoids denying or rejecting the expectancy conveyed
by the child's subsequent look (5). Seeing that M has moved
away C looks back at the watch for several seconds and then
herself turns away.
In this routine the co-interactant is in fact Anna's father
who takes a considerable share in the care and amusement of
his daughter. The father was not present during the record¬
ing of any other subject and for convenience C's co-inter¬
actant is always designated M.
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Anna clearly shows some appreciation of the relation¬
ship between M and 0 in this example, but her behaviour at
the end of the sequence belies the claim that she perceives
M's action to be the cause of the event (2). The number of
times the routine is exactly repeated suggests, however, that
C perceives some relationship and, in looking at M (5),
wishes this relationship to be reactivated. The evidence is
insufficient for us to be able to specify an intention in
Anna's behaviour yet we should want to claim that some
expectation is inferred by M since the initial action (1)
is repeated appropriately each time. Because we are unable
to attribute a precise communicative intention to Anna's
look this sequence is described as an interpersonal routine,
and specifically as a 'rehearsal of expectation'. It con¬
tains the rudiments of turn-taking but Anna's competence in
this respect is qualitatively different to that demonstrated
two months later.
Turn-taking
At 10;21 Anna initiates a routine which involves her
falling into a large floor-cushion. Anna is standing on the
floor next to the cushion holding both of M's hands with her
own, for support. She begins the routine by simply letting
go of M's hands and falling into the cushion. M is surprised
and amused at this and says "Oooh". C rolls onto her back
and holds both arms up to M. M lifts her up and supports
her standing next to the cushion again. The cycle is repeat¬
ed three more times without variation and is terminated by
M who stands Anna on her knee instead of next to the cushion.
The difference between this routine and the last lies
in the variable delay which Anna interposes between her turn
and that of M. She does this by waiting after rolling onto
her back, and then throwing up her arms suddenly in a move¬
ment which indicates 'Now it is your turn'. Although this
routine exhibits a similar rehearsal of expectation to the
last I take this signalling of the other's turn to be a sig¬
nificant advance and have described it as an instance of
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Turn-taking.
A further advance is demonstrated two months later,
when there occurs a sequence which is still a turn-taking
routine but which has embedded within it a ritualistic ex¬
change component and the beginnings of joint action. This
occurs at 12;17.
Joint action
Anna is playing with a set of tuning pipes;"'" she can
blow them competently. At the same time her mother is
holding a small hurdy-gurdy, which plays a simple tune when
its handle is turned. Both are familiar toys to Anna but
this is the first occasion she has been filmed playing with
either of them. Anna walks over to M's chair, blowing the
pipes as she goes, takes the hurdy-gurdy from her mother and
gives her the tuning-pipes. M accepts the tuning-pipes
but does not blow them. Anna turns away and blows the hurdy
gurdy at several points on its surface. No sound is pro¬
duced and Anna gives the hurdy-gurdy back to her mother,
takes the pipes and blows them again. At this M says "Look,
Anna" and slowly turns the handle of the hurdy-gurdy so that
its tune is played. Still holding the pipes to her mouth
Anna tries with her right hand to turn the handle of the
hurdy-gurdy which her mother is holding. Anna is unable to
turn the handle effectively and soon turns away thus ending
the sequence.
One aspect of this routine which immediately strikes us
is what appears to be a clear example of the extension of a
schema, something like 'Blowing through something causes a
sound to be made', to an object for which this schema does
not hold. There are other occasions when this schema is
tested as we shall see in our dicussion of solitary activity
Giving and exchange are already established rituals in Anna's
repertoire and it is interesting to note that when first
These consist of four small pipes joined side by side, each
of which when blown produces a pure tone. They are used in
the tuning of stringed instruments.
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taking the hurdy-gurdy Anna gives the tuning-pipes to her
mother; she could quite easily have held both, one in each
hand. But perhaps the most interesting feature of this
episode is the way in which Anna accedes to her mother's
clear suggestion that they should try to play the hurdy-
gurdy together, it is another month before Anna herself
directly initiates a joint action sequence, but at 12;17
she participates in a number of such routines, initiated by
M. (There is in fact an earlier example with another toy,
at 11;12, but on this occasion the attempt at joint action
is so unsuccessful - due to insufficiently precise motor
control on Anna's part - that the nature of Anna's action is
uncertain and the continuation of the routine is impossible.)
The episode just described is the first in which Anna's be¬
haviour is such as to justify a claim that Anna interpreted
appropriately, and acceded to, her mother's suggestion that
they should attempt some task together and that Anna demon¬
strated some appreciation of the mechanics of the task.
An interesting sequel to this routine occurs at 13;5.
Anna spontaneously picks the hurdy-gurdy out of her toy-box
and gives it to M. M holds the toy on the arm of her chair
close to C and plays it. Anna takes the toy and tries to
play it herself but cannot. She then takes the hurdy-gurdy
to another adult (A) who is present and gives it to her."'"
A takes the toy and plays it. Again Anna takes back the toy
and tries to play it herself. When again she cannot she
turns and bangs the (metal) hurdy-gurdy against the arm of
a tubular steel chair. She turns to her mother, smiling and
banging the toy, apparently sharing her own pleasure at the
metallic sound produced.
Progressive routines and games
At around this time interpersonal routines become rec-
ognisably games, which continually evolve and develop, and
""This person is a family friend with whom Anna is quite
familiar and who is present at several of the recording
sessions.
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have embedded within them clear directive, representative
and expressive communicative acts of a non-verbal nature.
These routines come to involve the management - as opposed
simply to the occurrence - of the interpersonal, and the
newly-established modes or turn-taking and exchange shade
into the beginnings of co-operation and dia_logue. The
earlier cyclical routines begin to disappear in favour of
what we may call progressive routines which cannot be rep¬
resented as a closed system as in Figure Three (page 138).
Two episodes at 15;9 illustrate this point.
Anna has a toy which consists of a vertical plastic
tube, six inches long and of half-inch diameter, mounted on
a hemispherical base. Onto the pole may be slid six plastic
shapes; these are pressed down against the force of a spring
in the base. The compression of the spring is released by
the action of a trigger on the base of the toy, causing the
six shapes to fly off. This toy acquired the name 'Pinger'.
It will be noted that three operations are involved in play¬
ing with the pinger; sliding the shapes onto the pole, pres¬
sing them down so as to engage the spring and pressing the
trigger to fire the shapes off again. Anna begins this
routine by collecting the (loaded) pinger, setting it on the
floor near her mother and firing it. M slides the shapes
one by one on to the tube and presses them down while Anna
watches. Anna then fires the pinger again and her mother
reloads it. On the next occasion, however, after pressing
the trigger Anna herself collects the shapes and slides them
on to the tube. (This is a difficult task which Anna has
been practising for three months. She was first observed to
attempt to put on the shapes at 12;17 but could not do so
reliably until the present session.) Anna then presses the
trigger; when nothing happens she waits while M presses down
the shapes to engage the spring. Anna then fires the pinger
successfully. Once more Anna loads the pinger, waits for M
to 'prime' it, then fires it herself. 'She now reverts to an
earlier activity and the routine is ended.
Our second example is centred around a bag of sweets
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and begins with a cyclical routine involving Anna and her
father. Anna is standing holding a paper bag of sweets in
one hand and a single sweet in the other. Her father slowly
reaches out to take her sweet. Anna stands still until his
hand is very close then turns, moves two steps away and holds
out the hand containing the sweet. Again her father reaches
for that hand; C waits until he is quite close then withdraws
her hand. Her mother says "Let mummy have a sweet". Anna
turns towards her mother and holds out her hand but as soon
as M reaches for it she runs away and 'offers' it to her
father again. Before he can move she turns and runs over
to a chair where her Teddy is sitting and holds the sweet
to his mouth. Anna's father says "Oh, lucky Teddy", at which
Anna puts the sweet into her own mouth and turns to smile at
her father.
The assertion of self
We can see from these two examples that Anna is now able
to change the pattern of a routine and to interpose new moves
which alter the course of an existing cyclical routine. Two
factors are identifiable in this process. The first, as
seen in the first example, is Anna's increasingly precise
motor control which reduces the constraints upon the kinds
of action she may attempt to perform within the context of
an interpersonal routine. It allows her to become a more
active participant in routines in which she had previously
been more passive, and it lays open opportunities for activ¬
ities which previously had been impossible. These activities
themselves become occasions for experimentation and innova¬
tion. The second factor is Anna's evident cognition of the
nature of other persons whose motives and behaviour are pre¬
dictable to her, at least in the case of sweets, and are
clearly distinguished from those (sic) of her teddy. This
cognition is further evidenced by the fact that in the pro¬
gressive routines we are now beginning to observe Anna is
frequently both the initiator and the innovator. It is M
who becomes the more passive partner, filling in the spaces
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which Anna creates in their activity. Furthermore, it is
about this time that Anna begins sometimes to reject M's
moves; at some point in a sequence Anna will 'undo' M's move
and substitute a move of her own which is often similar to
but is sometimes quite different from M's. I want to argue
that Anna's innovations and her rejection of M's actions are
both indicative of a new level in Anna's cognition of self.
If we treat 'wanting that which is-not' as analogous with
'not-wanting that which is' then we may say innovations in
interpersonal routines - and directive communicative act
types"'" - are similar to rejections of the moves of others
- and, by extension, to refusals and negation. Both of
these kinds of behaviour constitute an assertion of self by
the child. We take it that from such assertions we can
arrive at the level of the child's cognition of self. We
shall take up these threads again in Section 4.4, in deriving
the model of Anna's cognition.
At 17;25 there occurs another routine which I should
like to describe in some detail because it neatly illustrates
the degree to which Anna can now control her relation with
others. Anna begins by taking a picture-book to M and climb¬
ing onto her lap. Anna sits holding the book and facing
away from M.. M leans slightly to one side, points at the
pictures and describes them to Anna. This initial phase of
the routine lasts several minutes. Anna herself points at
the pictures and vocalises, usually without clear words but
sometimes naming the objects she sees, and she turns the
pages of the book at will. After some time Anna gets down
and exchanges the book for another in her toy-box which she
takes back to M and continues as before. Throughout this
time M provides, as it were, a verbal accompaniment to the
child's activity. Next Anna climbs down with her book and
goes over to the chair where her father is pretending to be
""We may here generate a hypothesis that in the context of
communicative activity there will be an identifiable change
in either the form or the nature of the directives which
Anna performs, at around 15 months of age.
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asleep. 'Waking Daddy' is an established routine in which
Anna touches her father who pretends to wake up with a start
then immediately falls asleep again. This game continues
for three cycles before Anna's father sits up and lifts her
onto his knee so that they can look at her book together.
It is as if having already changed her reading matter Anna
then decides to change the reader.
Reciprocal routines
This example marks the beginning of a type of routine
which seems principally concerned with Reciprocity. These
routines, which are often very complex and only rarely in¬
volve the earlier cyclical components, display the previously
established skills of rehearsal of expectation, turn-taking
and exchange but yet these skills do not appear to be the
focus of the interaction as previously they were. The
critical feature of interpersonal routines which are concer¬
ned with reciprocity appears to lie in the nature of the
roles of M and C. And we can identify a gradual change in
these roles in the case of turn-taking and joint-action
routines also. Whereas previously M was the more active
partner and C the more passive, we now find, as I have just
described, C becoming the more active and 'directive' inter-
actant. But there is another set of changes involved also.
For while in earlier routines of all types C's apparent
relative passivity required that the roles of M and C in
their interpersonal exchanges were fundamentally different,
we now find their status as interactants - at the level at
which these interactions occur - becoming more nearly equiv¬
alent. Specifically, in turn-taking and joint action routines
we begin to see M and C performing similar roles in the ac¬
complishment of some task."'" We also find routines developing
in which M and C perform similar roles but which do not ob¬
viously involve the accomplishment of any task. It is these
routines which represent the beginnings of a period when the
""See routines 2 8 and 29, Appendix A.
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inter-relation of M and C seems principally concerned with
reciprocity.
At 16;29 there is an episode recorded in which Anna sits
in a chair on one side of the room while her mother sits on
the other side of the room. For several minutes Anna points
round the room, babbling quickly and looking back and forth
from her mother to whatever she is pointing at. At first
her mother takes it that Anna is naming various objects and
complements Anna's vocalisations by repeating these names
with elaborations. Latterly however it becomes clear that
C is not naming - she does not utter the names of objects
which she does know and she does not repeat their names as
M says them - and M then begins to talk (literally) nonsense
back to C. They continue like this for some time until C
abruptly stops and gets down from her chair. A short time
later during the same recording session there, is another
essentially similar episode.
These are routines which appear to have no focus other
than the pleasure of interaction. M and C both obey the turn-
taking rules of dialogue, in that their vocalisations carry
the characteristic terminal fall in pitch and they mesh
accurately one with another, but their exchanges lack any
identifiable referments. M seems to regard her role as
simply that of filling in the spaces which occur in the
'dialogue' in order to keep it going. The interpretation
of C's behaviour which is most consistent with the evidence
is that she is rehearsing the vehicles of dialogue - or
perhaps of verbal interactive acts - but without performing
or attempting to perform communicative or interactive acts;
that is without reference and predication and without the
intention that M should perceive any intention (Ei) which
resides in C's vocal output. We should, however, want to
argue that in her behaviour C conveys - and M apprehends -
the intention that M should respond in a way which (at least)
permits the continuation of the routine. If we compare this
behaviour with that in the episode we have already described
at 17;25, in which M and C engage in what can more legiti-
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mately be described as dialogue, we can I think claim two
things. First, we can say that at around 16 to 17 months
of age there is occurring a significant and qualitative
change in the style of the interpersonal routines involving
Anna and her mother. Second, we can claim that this change
involves an adjustment in the status of M and C such that
now having equal access to the procedural rules of joint
action, turn-taking and of dialogue they can now, within the
terms of the routines in which they engage, adopt similar and
interchangeable roles and have equivalent status in deter¬
mining the course of these routines."'' We believe the dev¬
elopments which culminate in such a qualitative change to
be identifiable within earlier interpersonal routines.
Role-parity and the beginnings of dialogue
There are two further episodes I should like to describe
which highlight the correspondence between the roles of M
and C. Both of these occur at 19; 13. The first is centred
around a plastic duck which is about the size of a tennis
ball. The duck can be pulled along on its wheels by a cord
attached to its breast; as it is pulled its head turns from
side to side by virtue of an eccentric bearing on the axle
of the wheels. The duck's wings are mounted on the sides of
its body and can rotate through 360° in a vertical plane.
On each wing are four thin strips of different coloured
plastic, representing feathers, which can be removed and
replaced quite simply. Anna commences this routine by taking
the duck to M and holding^out to her. M takes this action
to constitute a request that she should 'repair' the duck.
(The cord is wound round one of the wings.) Anna takes the
duck again and holding it in her left hand moves its wings
and head, vocalising quietly. M takes up this behaviour and
also moves these parts, describing them and the different
ways they turn. Together Anna and her mother remove and
""We must here insert the proviso that Anna's moves are con¬
strained by the limitations of her grasp both of formal
language and of the physical world.
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replace the wing feathers and describe these also. Now
Anna takes the duck to her father and 'talks about it".in
the same way as she did with her mother. He too responds
to Anna's approach and looks at the toy with her. Soon
Anna gives the duck to her father and moves away to begin
a new activity.
This episode contains all the elements of dialogue
except the formal language which characterises true dialogue.
Such words as do occur in the sequence - and Anna is still
producing mainly single words - are largely repetitions from
within M's utterances, but I do not believe they should be
seen just as examples of Naming or as 'vocal accompaniments
to action' (though they are both of these things),.- Anna's
words seem to constitute her attempt to match her verbal
contribution with that of M in an episode in which their
behavioural contributions are already matched. If this is
so it represents an extension of the process we have been
describing and suggests one way in which Anna's acquisition
of language might be tied in with other interpersonal behav¬
iour.
By contrast the second episode from this session con¬
tains no verbal input at all from Anna. It involves a toy
car on which she can sit and push herself along with her feet.
The seat of the car hinges forward to reveal a space six inches
square by six inches deep. Anna pushes the car over to M
who immediately lifts the seat and puts -in a foam block which
was lying nearby. Anna walks round and looks in then holds
out her hand towards where three other blocks are lying.
These are passed to her one at a time and she puts them in.
M closes down the seat and says "Would you like to sit on it?"
Anna climbs on and^pushes her. Anna pats the horn on the
steering wheel. (This is the only way she can press it hard
enough to make it produce a sound.) C and M press the horn
in turn for a little, then Anna pushes the car forwards with
her feet. M grabs the car from behind and pulls Anna back.
She turns and smiles then pushes herself forward and stops
facing her father. As M pulls her back again Anna waves to
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her father. He looks on but makes no comment. When again
Anna pushes herself forwards and stops she turns to look at
M, and laughs when M starts to pull her back. Finally Anna
pushes the car forward beyond M's reach and climbs off sig¬
nalling that this game is ended.
Barring the short horn-pressing segment this episode
contains no identically repeated moves. The meshing of the
behaviour of M and C is fluent and confident and the pattern
of that behaviour changes constantly. In this sense we are
not here dealing with a 'routine' at all but with unique
and original interactive behaviour. Furthermore within the
episode Anna performs at least three (nonverbal) communica¬
tive acts.^" as shown in Appendix a two further interpersonal
routines were identified in +the tapes of Anna (at 20?08)
but it was felt that after this age they no longer consti¬
tuted a useful method of describing her behaviour. In the
terms of our original formulation routines were posited as
the fore-runners of truly communicative behaviour; these
later episodes are markedly different in style from the
earlier routines we described and they now include activity
which consists with our definition of communicative behaviour,
and which properly belongs in Section 4.3. The constraints
upon Anna's interactive abilities do .not now appear to be
the level of her cognition of other persons nor are they to
do with uncertainty over the sorts of things it is possible
to communicate about. Rather the remaining barriers are her
cognition of the way the physical world is ordered and her
capabilities within it and also her limited grasp of formal
language.
Summary : Examination of hypotheses
We turn now to consideration of the hypotheses set out
at the beginning of this section and to a summary of the
Near the beginning of the episode there is a directive -
that M should pass to C three foam blocks - and later there
are two expressive acts - a wave to her father on being
pulled away from him and a laugh of pleasure to her mother.
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points our discussion has attempted to bring out. Because
the interpersonal routines which have been recorded will
presumably constitute only a small sub-set of all the rou¬
tines which occur between M and C a statistical examination
of their features would not be justified. We must, however,
assume that the recorded routines are representative in
style and format at any given age of the child and permit
the drawing of some general conclusions.
(see page 137) is sustained by our data in that during
the earlier recording sessions (up to 11;12) M initiates
roughly three times as many routines as does C. Latterly
(H2) C initiates much more frequently than M. However, C's
intentions are not at all confined to those routines which
are already established; even at 10; 2]/t)we find her instigat¬
ing an entirely original episode. In the sense in which it
is framed H2 appears to underestimate the child's abilities
as within our data there is no time when Anna (only) uses
an established method to initiate an already rehearsed rou¬
tine. She does indeed do this - for example at 11.12 - but,
importantly, she has already demonstrated her ability to
engage her mother in a new routine with an unrehearsed tech¬
nique (10;2l(t)). This implies that the child moves fairly
swiftly from a state of being primarily a recipient of inter¬
personal initiatives to one of being herself an initiator.
We can say that this change occurs at around 10 months of
age; it will be interesting to look for some corollary in
her communicative behaviour.
Regarding H3 we can readily identify a range of tech¬
niques which Anna uses to gain M's attention and thereby to
commence a routine. These almost always involve Anna being,
or moving to be, within arm's reach of M. Sometimes M takes
Anna's approach alone to be a signal that her participation
is expected though more often the process is mediated through
some object which C offers or shows to M. Only rarely in our
observations - for example at 16;29(t) - does Anna initiate a
routine when she is at some distance away from M. In general
it appears that almost from the beginning of our observations
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of Anna she is cognizant of the possibility of her initiating
interaction with M and further that she recognises the nec¬
essity in so doing of gaining or directing M's attention.
As stated also underestimates the child's abilities.
What we observe from 10 months onwards is not Anna beginning
to use 'established techniques to initiate new routines' but
rather her increasing confidence in and refinement of tech¬
niques which are already plainly demonstrated by, for example,
her use of a request at 10;21.
The refinement of Anna's ability to direct M's attention
proceeds hand in hand with a developmental shift in the form
and nature of the routines in which M and C engage. As we
have described these progress from simple, cyclical episodes
involving the rehearsal of expectation and exchange, through
turn-taking and joint action routines which become progres¬
sive in form, to a stage when they are reciprocal in nature.
Characterising this shift is a gradual increase in the extent
to which C controls the structure and outcome of the inter¬
action, culminating at 16 to 17 months in a qualitative
change in C's status to what we may call role-parity with
M. The features postulated in are clearly seen during
this period. Only after 17 months, however, does the average
length of an episode increase markedly (H^ )^ up to this age
both short (a few seconds) and long (three to four minutes)
routines appear to be evenly distributed. The appearance of
routines concerned with reciprocity and the advent-of C's
role-parity with M are marked, as we have said, by a change
in which the mechanisms of turn-taking and joint action
become subordinated to the goal of reciprocity; from being
the foci of the routines in which they occur, between 10
and 17 months, they become skills which are used as tools
in later interactions. in attempting to account for the
child's growing level of interactive awareness over this
period I candetect neither physical invariance nor gradual
change of other than the most general kind in the mechanisms
by which turn-taking and joint action are achieved. The sit¬
uations in which they occur and the toys and events through
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which they are mediated are simply too varied to throw up
evidence as to what precisely constitutes the data from
which the child might derive rules concerning the nature of
other persons and the conduct of interaction with them.
Perhaps our other data will shed some light on this.
While it is true that with increasing age there is a
greater tendency for Anna to terminate a routine by switching
directly to some other activity, such that after 15 months
this is the means used in about half of the terminations
for which she is responsible, this effect is not as marked
as might be expected. Even before she was walking confident¬
ly Anna diverted from a routine to a new activity on several
occasions. This suggests that mobility alone is not a
primary factor (H^) even though it greatly increases the
scope of the child's activity. In fact the distinction which
I have made between 'withdraws' and 'diverts' as methods of
termination may be an artificial one? often the new activity
is itself pursued for only a short time. ■ It appears in most
cases that at some point the child decides to end a period
of interaction and the means by which this is done depends
more on external factors - the occurrence of some extraneous
event or the proximity of a particular object - than on any
factor connected with the routine itself. Only in one set
of instances can we claim with any confidence that the reason
for Anna terminating a routine is intrinsic to that routine.
This is in cases when she is unable successfully to perform
her turn and abandons the attempt, usually turning away but
not usually commencing a new activity. The behaviour occurs
only in turn-taking and joint action routines between 11 and
16 months and disappears entirely by the time reciprocal
routines are established. This is consistent with our claim
that in reciprocal routines the mechanics of the routine are
subordinate; incomplete and ineffective moves can be toler¬
ated and C will accept or request assistance rather than
withdraw. I believe this demonstrates C's appreciation that
her goals and intentions are accessible to M even though





It will be recalled that in Chapter Two we identified
our task as being to describe the development of the child's
ability to express communicative intentions. We said that
communicative intentions are expressed in the performance
of a communicative act, and we further identified two com¬
ponents within such an act; the child's intention of some
effect (Ei) and his intention that his mother will recognise
his intention of this effect. Typically, we argued, the
kinds of intention a young child will attempt to convey are
that 'M should do or believe X', expressed in the performance
of (rudimentary forms of) the Directive and Representative
communicative act types, respectively, in accordance with
the method described in Chapter Three for the identification
of interactive acts the effects (Ei) which Anna conveyed to
her mother were established.' Those which were expressed by
means of a directive act are listed in Appendix B and those
by a representative act in Appendix C. Since we are also
interested in the child's cognition of the conventions gov¬
erning the expression of communicative intentions a descrip¬
tion of the act - and of if this was markedly different
from - is also given. The actions of Anna's mother are
not described but it is indicated whether a request was
granted, refused or diverted.
Directive acts
Development in the nature of requests
It might be argued that the interpersonal routine repor¬
ted on page 138 contains the implicit request, repeated
several times, that 'M should repeat the act which precedes
the display lighting up'. This sequence is not listed in
Appendix B because we cannot certainly attribute this (or
any other) communicative intention to C's behaviour. There
is however a similarity between this episode and several of
Anna's early requests which strengthens the argument that
"'"See Appendix K for a protocol for the identification of a
communicative intention by Anna.
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interpersonal routines constitute a testing-ground for skills
and techniques which are used in later communicative activity.
If we look at Anna's requests up to 13;05 we see that they
consist of three explicit requests for food or for an object,
two requests for assistance in standing and two requests
that some event be repeated. In these last two cases there
is no sense in which the child involves herself, or even
attempts to do so, in the causation of the event; she simply
expresses her wish that it should recur to which expression
M attributes the force of a request. We may summarise all
clS
of these^occasions on which 'C uses M as a source of pleas¬
ure' , as represented in Figure Four.
Figure Four
C uses M as a source of pleasure.
Contingency
Intention
The pleasure ascribed to C can result from the provis-
•ion by M of some desired thing or from the activation by M
of some contingent relation in the world which C knows to
exist but which she cannot herself deploy. We must take it
also that the achievement of the standing position is a
source of pleasure to a child of this age.
At 14;02 Anna requests 'that M sound the tuning fork'.
On this occasion she follows up the request - which is gran¬
ted - by attempting to repeat this event herself. Although
her attempt is not successful it is significant because it
marks a shift from a phase in which Anna uses M to cause the
occurrence of some event to one in which she uses M to show
how some event is caused in order that she may attempt to
I propose to use the term Request as a short-hand for all
communicative acts of the directive type.
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cause it herself (see Figure Five). We may say also that
this discovers an elaboration of the structure of the child's
intentions. Her intention now is not identical with the act
by which it is introduced but extends over time to govern a
sequence of acts. The child can now entertain intentions
Figure Five
C uses M to show how some effect is achieved.
Contingency
at different levels such that a procedural intention - such
as a request - is embedded within a superordinate goal. This
is the case when at 14;26 Anna is trying to replace the cork
in an empty sherry bottle. She accidentally knocks over
the bottle and picks it up in both hands with her thumbs
pointing toward the base so that it is impossible for her to
set it upright. Still holding the bottle Anna looks at her
mother. M has not been watching but immediately appreciates
the problem and sets the bottle up for her. Anna then con¬
tinues trying to insert the cork.
Before this stage - and there is similar evidence from
Anna's solitary activity - the consummation of an immediate
intention typically ends the episode; often the child appears
uncertain as to what to do next. This implies a restriction
of the intention to the act through which it is manifest;
the act ia the intention. Over time there must be a separ¬
ation of means and goals allowing, as we see, the embedding
of a communicative intention within an overall plan. This
must involve a derestriction of the intention from any spec¬
ific act and implies that the child can now conceive of the
failure of a particular act to achieve her goal and can modify
such an act or introduce subsidiary acts. Again we can find
a demonstration of such a modification at 14;02. M finds and
Intention
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picks up a piece of soap which Anna has been eating. Anna
sees this and reaches for the soap, looking at it and saying
"Duh". M says "No" and holds the soap away from Anna's out¬
stretched hand. Anna tries again, holding M's gaze and
reaching. Again M refuses. Anna then transfers the object
she is holding from her left to her right hand and reaches
for the soap with her left hand, maintaining eye-contact
with M. When again M refuses to give her the soap Anna
throws down the object she is holding and turns away. The
restatements of her original intention by C and her subsequent
withdrawal indicate that she knows her intention to be acces-
s ible to M and that she believes herself to have used a con¬
ventional - that is an understood - means for its expression.
Several of Anna's requests for assistance and commands
at 15;09 signify a third phase in the nature of her requests.
At this time she requests that she be passed an out-of-reach
object so that she can play with it, that the door be opened
so that she can go out of the room, that M should give her
a towel so that she can carry on with her game (of collecting
washing), that a box be opened so that she can play with
what is inside. These may be represented as occasions on
which C uses M to create the conditions in which she can pur¬
sue some goal (Figure Six). C's communicative intention is
now clearly distinct from her intention with respect to the
physical world, that is her goal; the fulfillment of her
communicative intention has the status of a sub-goal.
Figure Six







As might be expected Anna's requests over the succeeding
seven months became considerably more diverse in form and
more clearly articulated but there is no further development
in their nature. By 15 months the child has demonstrated by
the nature of her requests that she can conceive of states
of the world which she herself is unable to achieve. She
knows also that others are able to achieve effects beyond
those of which she is capable and that it is in principle
possible to enlist the aid of others to achieve these effects.
Besides being rule-governed the young child's cognition must
therefore be of other than a purely sensori-motor nature,
receiving input only from the consequences of her own action.
It must be allowed that schemas may be formed on the basis
of events which are observed without participation. Since
the child's learning is limited by her hypothesis-forming
capacity (see Section 1.2), it seems likely that learning
of this kind will be restricted to events and relations
which are of a level of cognitive complexity similar with
those which are already represented in the child's cognition.
In effect we are arguing that observational learning may
permit the elaboration, generalisation and formation of
schemas at a given level but cannot directly give rise to
schemas of a kind more complex than those which are already
present.
'Communicative competence'
Before moving on to a discussion of the form of Anna's
requests I should like to refer to two later episodes which
I believe to be illustrative of Anna's ability to take
account of M's understanding of a communicative intention
and if necessary to modify in an intelligent way the act
expressing it. On earlier occasions when a request is not
granted after C Anna's repetitions tend to be expansive,1
1
that is exaggerated performances of the same basic act.
^"1 am excluding occasions on which C accepts a refusal of
her request and either withdraws or performs the requested
action herself. Both of these occur at 15;09.
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In the sequences below Anna resorts to forms which are not
expansive restatements but are quite different means of
conveying her message.
In the last sequence listed at 18;16 Anna requests that
Panda be passed to her - which is granted - and then gets
down from her chair and touches the pinger indicating that
it should be fired at her again. Interposed between these
moves is a delay during which Anna raises her arm. Clearly
M did not attribute to this arm-raise the force of a request
since she did not respond; hence the action is not described.
It does seem, however, that C must have intended M to take
her arm-raise as a signal to fire the pinger; when the act
fails to communicate her intention she adopts a more certain
means in getting down and touching the pinger directly. If
this is so, besides highlighting the intelligent way in which
the child can monitor the accessibility of her intentions
to M, it suggests that in the process of her learning how to
perform requests there will be (perhaps many) occasions when
the form of the child's act is so far removed from a conven¬
tional - that is understood - form that the adult is unaware
that a communicative act is being attempted. The lack of
reinforcement should serve to eliminate such non-effective
forms from the child's repertoire but their occurrence,
albeit hypothetical, would support the case that the child's
search for ways of communicating is an active and experimental
process.
A rather different story unfolds when at 19;13 Anna
requests that a table-lamp should be switched on. This
request is refused, in fact because the light would interfere
with the camera. Anna then turns and points at another light
which is on (C^) as if to check that her meaning was under¬
stood by M. M elaborates saying "Yes, that light is on".
Anna then points to a third light which is off and babbles.
M gets up and switches this light on. With this confirmation
that her meaning is clearly understood by M Anna points again
at the table-lamp and exclaims loudly. M says gently "No,
we can't put that light on". Interestingly Anna accepts
this refusal at once and returns quietly to the game she
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had just interrupted. Apparently the non-fulfillment of
her request matters less to the child than the possibility
that her request was not understood, and she proceeds in an
ordered way to check that it was indeed understood by estab¬
lishing the relation between the form of her act and the
"meaning it expresses.
We can infer from this episode that C believed her
initial request should have been accessible to M, as in fact
it was. In general her communicative activity, though still
not founded on a verbal component, is now becoming increas¬
ingly transparent and, by 21 months, when the course of M
and C's interactions suggests that a request might be appro¬
priate it is frequently rendered unnecessary by M's anti¬
cipation of C's intentions. On the basis of the evidence
just presented we may claim that the child can perceive the
extent to which her meanings- are understood by M and, in
cases where she is uncertain, can perform acts which estab¬
lish for her the extent of M's understanding.
Development in the form of requests
In looking at the development of the form of Anna's
requests we shall want to address ourselves to two questions.
First, are.there at any level physically invariant features
of requests and if so what might be the source of these?
And second, do developments of form generalise to all requests
or are they restricted to particular topics or types of
request? We will get some way to answering these questions
by posing in each case the more pragmatic one, What are the
physical features of an act by C which prompt M to attribute
the force of a request to that act?
With the exception of the two early requests that she
be helped to stand all of the requests Anna makes up to
14;26 have to do with topics - objects or events - that are
already a current focus in her own or another person's activ¬
ity. This has as a consequence that in performing a request
she is not required to bring to M's attention some new or
non-salient refer^ent; she has only to convey the fact that
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she has some intention with respect to a pre-existing topic.^
Only at 15;09 - and twice at this age - does Anna begin to
introduce refer^ents which are new. In the early period
we must distinguish between the different types of request
which are attributed to Anna. The most obvious distinction
to draw is between requests for objects (Gimme) and requests
about objects or events (Request repeat and request assis¬
tance) . Gimme is a type of request which is largely stable
in form in this early phase. Characteristically it involves
reaching, with the line of regard either towards M to check
that she is attending or towards the object to specify it
more clearly. The child does not usually switch her gaze
from M to the object or vice versa within any one act though
if a repetition is involved-as at 14;02 - the other line of
regard tends to be used. There may or may not be a vocal¬
isation associated with the request. In the case of requests
repeat and requests for assistance on the other hand there
is no standard format of this kind. Here whether or not M
takes some behaviour to constitute a request is almost entire¬
ly constrained by the context in which it occurs. Thus when
at 13;05 Anna takes the hurdy-gurdy to M, to which action M
attributes the force of a request that she should play the
hurdy-gurdy, C is superficially behaving precisely as in the
exchange routines recorded at 12;17 and 13;05. it is entirely
possible that as far as the child is concerned her behaviour
is equivalent in all of these cases and that it is M's res¬
ponse which distinguishes between them, granting to one the
status of a request and to the others that of a move in an
exchange routine. Had m acted differently in response to
C's 'request' the child's subsequent act may have revealed
a clear distinction on her part between these episodes, we
cannot say. The present point is that there is nothing in-
It is perhaps a shortcoming of our procedure for the identi¬
fication of requests that any attempts Anna makes which are
not picked up by M cannot be established. It may well be
that during this time Anna tries to perform requests with
respect to extraneous things.
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herent in the action the child performs per se which distin¬
guishes requests repeat from other interpersonal acts in this
early period; the basis upon which M attributes a request
must therefore reside in the context of that act and the pre¬
ceding events and presumably in her understanding of her
child.
By 14;26 there is no longer the possibility of such
lability on the child's part. At this stage Anna requests
that she be lifted off her car. M misunderstands this re¬
quest and moves away at which Anna evinces clear distress.
Although Anna entertains and attempts to communicate a
definite and quite precise intention there is again nothing
inherent in the act she performs which specifies that inten¬
tion. It must be inferred by M from the context of the act's
occurrence.
Referring and the use of words
Over the succeeding months there is only one significant
advance in the form of gimme types of request and this is the
simultaneous development of pointing and naming. In general
pointing is used to specify some desired object which is
either out of the child's reach or is at some distance from
her but not for an object which is in another's possession;
the child always reaches for objects in another's possession
whatever the distance between them."'" There are, however,
several reasons for arguing that the development of pointing
is not a development in the form of gimme requests as such
but is rather a development in the child's ability to refer
which is used in such requests as well as for other purposes.
It will be sufficient here for us simply to list these rea¬
sons. First, at about the same time as pointing first occurs
within a request (15;09) it also occurs in naming games and
in representative communicative acts. Second, this request
"'"Reaching means arm extended with palm upwards and fingers
cupped. Pointing is initially characterised by palm down¬
wards and all fingers extended. Later only the first finger
is extended with the others curved downwards.
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at 15;09 is significant also in being the first occasion when
the child attempts verbally to specify the desired object.
We might say that the child points manually and verbally at
the same time on this occasion. And in fact on all future
occasions when pointing forms part of a request there is
also a verbal component. Third, referring by verbal means,
although lexically and phonologically imprecise at this stage,
begins to be used for purposes other than specifying reques¬
ted objects. Fourth and perhaps most significant, it is only
with the advent of pointing and naming that the child begins
to perform gimme requests with respect to objects which are
not a current focus of attention or activity. It would
appear then that we can claim that the type of request we
have designated gimme remains basically similar in form
throughout the period of our observation of Anna with the
one qualification that the development of the ability to
refer to distant or non-topical objects by pointing and nam¬
ing, beginning at 15 months, affords a new dimension and en¬
larges the scope of these requests.
Turning again to the other types of request we see from
Appendix B that from 15;09 onwards all of the requests which
Anna performs which have to do with an object which is not
in her own nor in M's possession have verbal referring ex¬
pressions associated with them. It would seem that as far
as the child is concerned her problem in performing such
requests lies not so much in conve_ying to M the precise nature
of her intention as in making clear what object or event it
is that she has some intention about. In cases where the
refer^ent is involved in current activity its specification
is not usually a problem, but when it is novel its specifi¬
cation receives the emphasis within the child's communicative
act. Once the referrent is established and if its nature and
the context of C's act do not reveal her intention then that
emphasis will be altered within her subsequent act, . Thus
at 15;09 Anna walks to the door, puts her hands against it
and says "ad-ju-ju". M took it that C was 'naming' the door
in spite of the fact - as she reported - that naming utter-
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ances usually have a rising terminal pitch contour. When M
2A does nothing Anna shouts"ud-du-du-du"; M gets up and opens
the door and Anna goes out. Or again, in the light episode
at 19;13 which has already been described, involves the
2~j clear word "lye". Once light has been established as the
topic none of C's three succeeding acts contains this word
although two of them do have a vocal component. In other
cases C's identification of the referrent is sufficient for
M to deduce C's intention and no subsequent act by the child
is necessary.
Conclusions on the form of requests
What seems clear is that within the context of requests
concerning novel objects the child uses verbal referring
expressions - naming - as a means of identifying for M the
object with respect to which she has some intention. Further¬
more, such instances are among the earliest occasions when
the child utters identifiable words. With someone as adept
at perceiving her child's needs as is Anna's mother there is
little incentive for the child to use words on other occasions,
at any rate for communicative purposes; we might suggest that
the need to disambiguate the (novel) refer^ent of a request
constitutes for Anna a major factor in her early use of
language.
Two further, related points must be made regarding the
form of Anna's requests. The first is that right up to the
end of the period during which Anna was recorded there remains
no standard format to her requests for assistance and commands.
(Requests repeat largely disappear after 14;02.) The only
possible exception to this lies in her use of the names of
objects to identify them as topics of her intentions. How¬
ever, naming also occurs on occasions when the child is not
ostensibly performing a request. The second point is that
so long as the child utters only single words, or combinations
of words which do not have sentential structure - for example
noun phrases"'" - then these words will function as referring
"'"At 20; 08 the child produces "hunna-wu" which is to be taken
as meaning '(the) other one'. nQ
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expressions when they occur within requests. The predicate
- that is the complementary part of the proposition the com¬
municative act is designed to convey - resides totally in
) the context of the act's occurrence. At 21;09 and again at
22;00 on the other hand the child produces utterances put¬
ative ly having a Verb+Pronoun+preposition structure.1 On
these occasions it is the predicate which is explicit and
the refer_ent which is to be understood being represented
by the pronoun. It is possible that this signals the begin¬
ning of a new phase in Anna's requests, in which her com¬
municative acts will become much more explicitly verbal.
Unfortunately the recording of Anna had ceased before the
examination of the tapes threw up this possibility. It is
worth noting that the propositions expressed more verbally
within these later acts are not in any way more complex than
others which have already been expressed non-verbally.
Representative Acts
In summarising those communicative acts by Anna which
are putatively representative acts, in Appendix C, I have
explicitly described the inherent proposition as that which
is attributed by M. According to our definition, in the per¬
formance of a representative act C conveys to M her belief
in the truth of a proposition X and intends that M should
believe it also. When such acts are performed without words
or with only a subsidiary verbal component, as are nearly
all of these examples, they are open to alternative inter¬
pretation by M in a much more fundamental sense than are
directive acts. Non-verbal representative acts are ambiguous
not only in respect of the proposition they convey; their
very classification as representative depends upon M's res¬
ponse. For example, at 17;25 Anna holds out to M the empty
squeezy bottle with which she has been playing. M comments
"oh, you've finished with that have you?" which forms the
1"Tid-do" and "Id-di-do" both of which M translated as 'take
it off', 'it' being an item of Anna's clothing.
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basis of the attributed proposition 'That C has finished
playing with the bottle', compare this with C's act at 19;13
of handing her cup to M while looking at another object
(described in Appendix B). On this latter occasion C's
subsequent act conveys to M the message that C^ was to be
taken as a request ('that M should put her cup on the table').
One might argue that the proposition 'C has finished with
the cup' is implicit within this request. The important
distinction for us is that M does not explicitly attribute
this proposition and it is not therefore admissible by our
procedure.
The nature of the proposition attributed by M was estab¬
lished in one or more of the three following ways. Either
it was identified from the gloss which M provided for C's
act at the time of its occurrence and/or it was revealed by
an 'aside' by M to the author at that time and/or it was
elicited by questioning M at the end of the recording ses¬
sion. What such attributions in effect inform us of are
the kinds of propositions which M believes her child to be
capable of representing.
Kinds of representative act
There are four principal kinds of representative act
which Anna performs, which I have termed as follows. 'Com¬
ments' about the state of the world are classified as Obser¬
vations. This category includes naming, either spontaneously
or in response to a question from M, though after 16;29
examples of naming are not included in Appendix C because
they are frequent and not apj^rently significant. Three
'comments' by Anna of a personal nature are also classified
as Observations. Expressions by Anna which refer to her
activity, either in progress or just completed, are classified
as Performatives. On only one occasion does Anna explicitly
negate M's counteraction of C^. This occurs at 18?16 and I
have described as an Assertion. C^ is a repetition of
C^ in behavioural terms although C-^ was not apparently inten¬
ded as a communicative act. (Had C^ been communicative it
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would have counted as a personal observation.) Finally there
is a type of representative act which occurs after a pair of
moves by C and M and in which C appears to offer a Clarifi¬
cation of the proposition which was intended to convey
These are broadly similar to repeated requests, the distinc¬
tion between them residing in M's interpretation of the
force of C^.
The importance of M's interpretation
In looking at interpersonal routines we identified
10 months as being the approximate age at which Anna moves
from a state of being primarily a recipient of interpersonal
initiatives to one of being herself an initiator. If this
observation is reliable we should expect to find communica¬
tive activity beginning in earnest at this time also. In
the case of directive acts there is indeed an apparently
sudden onset at around 10 months. This is not however the
case with representative acts; although there are two earlier
examples it is not until 14 months that we see a marked in¬
crease in behaviour which M is prepared to interpret as
bearing the force of a representative.
If we look at the form of those acts which M treats as
being of a representative kind, as described in Appendix C,
we find that up to 18 months they most frequently involve
the child holding some object out to M. By this C appears
to be specifying the refer^ant of her act but the remainder
of the proposition and the force with which it is to be taken
must be deduced (or imposed) by M from the context of the
act's occurrence. In fact the physical behaviour constitu¬
ting a representative is in several cases identical with
that which M might on another occasion take to be a directive
act. There is, in other words, no apparent behavioural
feature which distinguishes representative acts from other
communicative act types, at least before 18 months of age."'*
"'"There does occur a rather unreliable contrastive feature
which is that the vocal or verbal component of a directive
act usually has a falling terminal pitch contour while that
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This begs two questions: What is it about the context of
occurrence of some communicative acts which persuades M to
treat them as representative acts? and Why is their reliable
appearance delayed by almost four months after the appearance
of directive acts? We shall return to these questions shortly.
At 10;21 Anna vocalises while pulling herself up to a
standing position. M's gloss ascribes a performative type
of proposition to this vocalisation. as a segment of inter¬
action, albeit at a minimal level, the example differs from
both interpersonal routines and from sequences involving a
directive in a quite particular way; the child does not
acknowledge m's comment as such. In fact if we look through
Appendix C we find that up to 18 monthsthe occasions when Cg
is linked to by m's response are comparatively rare. We
cannot say, however, that the child does not take account of
m's response. It seems that in performing what m takes to
be a representative act the child requires no particular
action on the part of her mother, she requires only that her
mother should publicly acknowledge her act. This at any
rate is the typical course of an incident involving a Per¬
formative or an Observation by the child; C-^ is an act which
m interprets as a representative, m^ is an acknowledgement
of the proposition she attributes to C-^ and this acknowledge¬
ment is most often in the form of an affirmative. After this
the child does not usually perform an act which is themat-
ically related to the two preceding moves. She may perform
a similar but unrelated act, or she may return to solitary
activity; in any event she does not as a rule signal that
she has registered m's response. On only two occasions before
18 months does C perform a subsequent act C^ which is_ related
to the preceding and M^. At 14;26 she walks over and
gives to m the duck she is presumed to have offered (and then
immediately walks away) and at 15;09 she drops onto m's lap
of a representative act often has a rising terminal pitch
contour. However only about half of the acts of each type
carry a vocal or verbal accompaniment and their intonation
patterns are not exclusive.
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the laundry she has just held out to her (and likewise walks
away). Had the child expected any action from M which was
related to her being given the duck or the laundry it seems
most unlikely she would simply have walked away. Thus in
the case both of Performatives and Observations, prior to
18 months, we find that characteristically the child appears
to expect from M simply an acknowledgement of her act G^,
and indeed M's recognition of this requirement must be the
basis upon which she ascribes a representative force to such
acts by the child.
We have already noted that the physical qualities of
an act by the child which M takes to constitute a represent¬
ative act are to us indistinguishable from those of an act
which M might treat as a directive. We suggested that the
basis of M's discrimination must reside in the context of
the acts occurrence. But there is no reason to suppose that
distinctions of context, subtly construed, should be any
more evident to us than are possible distinctions in the
form of the child's act. Herein lies the justification for
our use of the mother as an 'explicator' of the child's
developing communicative abilities. Leaving aside the per-
locutionary aspect - intonation - there is only one context¬
ual feature which appears to be common to most of Anna's
representatives before 18 months; that they occur in the
middle of, or just after, a period of solitary activity.
But this will not do as a distinguishing feature, for many
of Anna's requests also arise out of her solitary activity.
It would appear that on the basis of the evidence here
available we cannot say how M knows that calls (only) for
an acknowledgement and is to be treated as a representative
act.
The source of representative acts
Prom our earlier discussions we may find some pointers
to the reason that representatives only appear reliably some
four months after the first requests were recorded. Remem¬
bering we have observed that the propositions M attributes
to the child's acts in effect inform us of the kinds of
propositions M believes the child to be capable of repre-
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senting, we are prompted to examine the sources of M's belief.
One such is her communicative experience with the child.
And we recall that it is around 15 months of age that cyclical
interpersonal routines begin to disappear in favour of pro¬
gressive ones in which turn-taking and exchange shade into
the beginnings of co-operation and dialogue. And in the case
of requests it is at 14 months that we find the child begin¬
ning to use her communicative ability to pursue some goal
which exists over and above any immediate communicative in¬
tention. It seems reasonable to suppose that once Anna is
capable of entertaining hypotheses about the world and about
her own action which enable her to pursue definite goals then
she will be able also to offer 'comments' about her action
and about her surroundings and that her mother will recognise
these as such. The attribution of a proposition with the
force of a representative is precisely what would be entailed
by this kind of recognition by M.
Renegotiation of roles
In the session recorded at 16;29 Anna is very social
and babbles incessantly.. Naming comprises a high proportion
of her verbal output, but examples of this are not included
in Appendix C because they were so frequent and without
apparent significance. At this point we may note also that
Performatives do not disappear, as might be suggested by
their omission after 15;09, but they do seem to become per¬
sonally directed rather than communicative. Session 17;25
is in one sense very different to that of a month earlier
and in another sense quite similar. On the one hand Anna
plays almost completely on her own, only once involving her
mother (and her father) in a sequence of any duration, but
on the other she pauses frequently during her play to show
or to name an object to her mother. Her mother reported
that over the period from 16 to 18 months she noticed this
inconsistency frequently. While Anna was at times quite
aloof and would interact only in short bursts and often from
some distance away she was at other times highly communica-
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tive and appeared to enjoy interaction for its own sake.
There may be a connection between this behaviour and the
qualitative change we identified as occurring at 16 to 17
months in the style of interpersonal routines. After this
period there is a change in representative episodes which
again mirrors the change we noted in the case of requests.
Representative acts in dialogue
From 18 months onwards it characteristically happens
that the topic or theme which Anna has introduced by perfor¬
ming a representative act is no longer abandoned after H's
acknowledgement of it. More usually the theme is pursued
within a further pair of moves. At 18;16 we find an example
where C herself extends the theme in comparing the motion
of her roundabout to that of the spool on the VTR, and at
19;13 we see M not simply acknowledging C's identification
of flowers but asking a question which develops that idea:
'What do you do with flowers?' The interpersonal elements
of dialogue which were identified in Section 4.2 are here
combined with a relatively explicit exchange of propositions.
Anna's comprehension of speech addressed to her is evidently
sufficient for the achievement of a kind of dialogue, but
there is evidence that she knows her own speech to be an un¬
certain means of conveying a message. At 19;13 M holds up
a picture of a spinning top and asks 'What's that?' Anna
points to the picture and says 't8'. When M queries 'What
is it?' Anna does not repeat her utterance but turns and
points at her own spinning top which is lying nearby. By
this C demonstrates that, at least in this case, pointing
- referring by behavioural means - is a more reliable form
of identification than is naming. Now if we reconsider the
light episode discussed on pages 158-9, which occurs during
the same recording session, we find that here the topic is
clearly understood by both C and M, and C's efforts are
directed to ensuring that M has apprehended the predicate
'(that the light) should be turned on'. In this C also
resorts to non-verbal means. It would 'appear that at this
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time, when the interpersonal routines of M and C have reached
a reciprocal form and when their competence at communicating
with each other now permits a form of dialogue, that (i) C
can establish non-verbally how far her communicative inten¬
tions are understood by M and (ii) in cases where M queries
or appears to misunderstand a verbal reference C will resort
to non-verbal means. This is as we should expect if language,
construed as an ordered set of skills for the conveying of
simple messages, is progressively substituted into behaviour-
ally expressed messages by the developing child. In repre¬
sentatives, as was the case with directives, it is the refer-
~ent of a message which is the first part to be verbally
expressed. Initially the word occurs simultaneously with a
behavioural form - pointing - and if this communicative
attempt is unsuccessful the child will adopt an exclusively
behavioural means of Clarification.
At 21;09 the child moves beyond the purely referential
use of language. 'All-gone,', used on two occasions, functions
as the predicate of a proposition whose subject is made clear
by C's action in the first case and by M's question in the
second. The status of the word 'do' is uncertain but in any
reasonable gloss it is clear that the word does not function
as a simple refer_,ent. Once again, the same processes seem
to be occurring in representative acts as was the case with
directives; after 21 months the child moves on from the use
of words only as simple referring expressions to their use
as telegraphic representations of a whole proposition.
Finally in this section I should like to examine how
far the incident at 13;05, classed as a Clarification, is
analogous to the clarification occurring at 19;13. At 13;05
M reported that while she took it that C was 'explaining
what she should have done with the cups' she had no idea
quite what she should have done. An explanation of the
incident which would be more consistent with M's report and
with the other data is that Anna's first act of giving three
cups to M was intended as a request (for example that M
should fit the cups together). When M does nothing C takes
m.
back the cups and babbles at M. The act which M has treated
as a representative would under this description constitute
C2 in an attempted directive sequence in which M failed to
recognise the intended force of C^. Strictly taken our
methodology does not allow us the possibility of claiming in
any particular case that M was wrong but the other data in
Appendices B and C do suggest that this episode should be




Our purpose in examining the child's solitary activity
is two-fold. Principally we want to discover changes in the
level of the child's cognition about her physical world and
about her role within it - what she knows and what she is
attempting to discover - but also we are looking for supple¬
mentary evidence that the propositions attributed to the
child's communicative acts consist generally with her cog¬
nitive structures. It must be emphasised that our aim is
not to duplicate nor to redraw the results of much careful
work by students of early cognitive development, such as the
acquisition of the object concept or of the concepts in, on
and under (see Edwards, 1973; Neilson, 1978; Bower, 1979).
While our data would be analysable in terms of the appearance
of behaviour witnessing the child's cognition of general
concepts, we shall be more interested in particular cases.
We require to know how far the child is able, and perceives
herself to be able, to master the constraints on successful
action in her own surroundings. For example, with complex
toys which can be mastered in different stages and at differ¬
ent levels we shall chart the child's progress so that her




While the data for this section were originally drawn
in a format similar to that of Appendices B and C I have
here dispensed with the behavioural details in order to take
the analysis a step further. Appendix D shows three entry
columns for any instance of purposeful action by Anna, of
which the first records the effect, Ei, which her action
was apparently intended to achieve. Some of these actions
were unsuccessful and the second column records the reason
that the event which occurred, E ^, did not conform with the
effect the child intended, E^ ^ Ei. These reasons fall into
four types, Motor, Behavioural, Perceptual and Strategic,
as defined below. The third column allows a description of
the factors - areas of knowledge - presumed to be relevant
to the construction and execution of C's intention, Ei.
Occasions when 'E^ Ei is due to Motor reasons' are
those on which Anna appears fully to grasp the requirements
for the achievement of Ei but fails pu^Ly because of motor
incapacity or imprecision. An example of this occurs at
10;10. Anna is holding the edge of a towel in both hands
and is attempting to pull the towel backwards over her head.
She fails because her arms are neither long nor supple
enough to take the edge of the towel completely over her
head; when she lets go the towel falls to the floor in front
of her. Behavioural reasons for failure account for occasions
on which the child's action might reasonably be expected to
lead to success but does not, almost incidentally. For
example at 10;10 Anna is attempting to fire the pinger by
hitting it with her right hand. Although she strikes the
^rigger several times it is without sufficient force to fire
it. (Later in the same session Anna repeats the action and
manages to fire the pinger.) Perceptual reasons are those
which are due to some oversight by the child in the design
of her action. They cover such situations as when Anna in
trying to fit together two seriated cups fails ,to align them
quite correctly or when she cannot locate the hole in a shape
over the pinger tube in trying to replace the shape. The
114-.
most extreme reasons for failure are those of a Strategic
kind. Here the action(s) the child performs could not under
any likely circumstances serve to achieve the effect she
appears to intend. In many cases it is difficult to be sure
of the precise nature of Ei. Again at 10;10, Anna is reach¬
ing up for a towel hanging out of her reach over the back
of a chair. She looks down, briefly raises the edge of the
rug on which she is standing then immediately reaches up for
the towel again. Anna seems to have believed that by raising
the rug she would somehow enable herself more easily to reach
the towe1.
Data Reduction
Many of the actions identified were repeated during the
course of the same or a subsequent session. Where this
occurred only the first instance of several essentially
similar actions is cited. The same entry appearing in the
first column therefore means that the child attempted to
achieve Ei by means of different actions. It is possible
that, this presentation will obscure the occurrence of dis¬
continuities in development (Bower, 1979). Since our interest
lies not so-much in describing and explaining the child's
cognitive development as in charting her self-perceived
ability to master her environment it is not anticipated that
the obscuring of any such discontinuities will present a
problem. We shall now look at Anna's behaviour with respect
to a number of toys and offer some general comments. Follow¬
ing this there is a brief correlation of solitary activity
with her communicative activity concerning these toys.
Finally we shall draw some conclusions about Anna's cognition
of agency from the evidence of this section.
The Wheel
This is a broad wheel, some 6" in diameter, with a
figure of a policeman suspended by two elastic bands from
each end of the wheel's axis. As the wheel rolls forwards
the policeman, whose feet are weighted, remains vertical thus
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winding up the two elastic bands. When the wheel stops the
elastic bands cause it to turn backwards and it returns al¬
most precisely to the place from which it started.
At 8;11 Anna watches the wheel roll past her then crawls
forward to a point just in front of M (who rolled the wheel)
turns and sits and catches the wheel as it returns. She
then releases the wheel, which rolls away from her. Anna
is surprised and crawls after it. In order to predict the
position in which she would be able to' catch the wheel the
child must have appreciated that the wheel would roll back
towards M and she must have had some notions of its path and
rate of motion. That she understands little about how the
wheel might move in another situation is demonstrated by her
surprise at the wheel rolling away when she sets it down
again.
Two months later she can move around more quickly and
at 10;10, in circumstances similar to those above, Anna
lunges forward and catches the wheel as it rolls past. But
it is not until 13;05 that she attempts to roll the wheel
towards M after catching it. On this occasion she pushes
it abruptly and the wheel falls over onto its side. Anna
looks at it for a few seconds then turns away. Although
a.
apjjjrently having grasped the nature of the wheel's motion
she never succeeds in rolling it accurately and with control,
and loses interest in it after 15 months of age.
Seriated cups
Anna has a standard set of twelve round cups, each with
a rim which makes them fit quite securely over one another
in a stack formation. By 12;17 she knows that smaller ones
will fit inside larger ones, though she usually has difficulty
with adjacent sized cups; orientation becomes more important
the closer the cups are in size. Also at 12;17 Anna's behav¬
iour reveals her appreciation to an extent of object-perma¬
nence - an object which has been covered will be exposed if
the covering object is removed - and of containership. (If
a large cup containing a smaller one is turned over the
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smaller cup will fall out.)
We have suggested that at 13; 05 C may have performed a
request 'that M should fit the cups together' but in general
she does not involve M in her play with the cups and is
little interested in M's initiatives. She does, however,
return to a stack which M has made and left standing. At
13;05 Anna removes two cups from a stack and then replaces
G.
them correctly. Although this apj^rently requires her per¬
ception of the precise orientation of the cups and of the
fine difference in their sizes there is reason to doubt this
ability. She is still unable at this time either to build
a stack or to fit the cups inside each other in serial order.
It seems more likely that her ability consists in the per¬
formance of simple reversible actions in a prestructured
situation. This may be related also to her apparent con¬
ception of object-permanenee at 12;17. But her notions of
this and of containership appear to be robust in the session
at 14;02. Anna has no difficulty in recovering a necklace
which was hidden by a complex series of moves in three
seriated cups fitted together. She herself then tries to
put the necklace in a cup.
At the same age there is an ambiguous sequence of moves.
A cup is lying upside down on the floor and Anna has in her
hand the next larger cup. She places the cup in her hand
over the smaller cup, completely hiding it, then slowly
raises the larger cup again. This action is repeated three
times until on the fourth occasion the smaller cup ' remains
inside the larger one as she raises it. At this Anna laughs
and shakes the smaller cup out onto the floor. It is uncertain
whether she was trying to lift the small cup with the larger
one or whether she was simply hiding and revealing the small
cup, but I believe the former to have been her intention.
Her ability to hide and reveal things has already been amply
demonstrated. In raising the smaller cup Anna is not per¬
forming a simple reversible action but is enacting a novel
intention in an unstructured situation. After 14;02 Anna




This toy, which has already been described on page 14-2.
is the only one which remains popular throughout the time
Anna was recorded. Although she has had the toy only a
short time, by 10;10 she has grasped that the shapes slide
up and down on the pole, that the pinger 'fires', that the
trigger on the base has something to do with it firing and
| that banging the base sometimes makes it fire. She cannot
replace the shapes, however, and she does not know that they
must be pressed down to prime the pinger. she cannot per¬
ceive, therefore, why pressing the trigger does not always
make the pinger fire.
Over the following three months Anna's play with the
53> pinger is mainly centred upon discovering how to replace
the shapes. She succeeds in this at 13;05 but cannot do
so reliably until 15;09. That the other aspects of the
pinger are less important between 11 and 15 months is sug-
gested by: (i) at 11;26 Anna fires the tower by carefully
pressing the trigger but shows neither surprise nor pleasure
and makes no attempt to repeat the event and (ii) in a long
sequence with M at 12;17 during which Anna collects the shapes
and passes them to M to put on, then slides them off and tries
_ to put them on herself, she does not try to fire the pinger
nor does she request that M do so. But shortly after replac¬
ing a shape without assistance (at 13;05) Anna does try to
fire the pinger. When nothing happens she bends down and
slowly and deliberately presses the trigger with her index
finger. In fact her finger is not strong enough to press
the trigger sufficiently hard. That she clearly knows pres¬
sing the trigger is what makes the pinger fire is shown by
an almost identical episode at 14; 26. Again her first attempt
is unsuccessful and she bends down to press the trigger more
carefully (but is still unsuccessful).
By 15; 09 Anna has discovered a new and more certain
(T means of replacing the shapes on the pinger. This involves
laying the shape on the floor and locating the pole into the
hole in the shape. Holding both the pinger and the shape
LI
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she turns the pinger the right way up so that the shape
slides down the pole. She only succeeds by this method in
putting on a single shape; although she does try another
one the first shape invariably slides off in the process.
There follows an apparently latent period during which
Anna tends not to play with the pinger on her own but enjoys
having the shapes fired at her by M. Not until 21? 09 does
she manage to put on two shapes and then quite suddenly at
22; 00 she discovers the priming mechanism. It is possible
to press this down without any shapes on the pinger, and
this Anna does alternatively with pressing the trigger at
which the mechanism clicks sharply. These actions are
iepeated many times .
Anna's eventual mastery of the pinger depends upon her
finding solutions to both motor and cognitive problems.
Interestingly, she appears to concentrate upon one aspect
of the toy at a time, overcoming this by discovery and much
rehearsal before moving on to the next problem.
Spinning-top and Roundabout
These toys are remarkably similar in shape and appear¬
ance. Both consist of a 6" diameter horizontal disc through
the centre of which there projects a vertical plastic tube.
The roundabout has a base which is however obscured by the
disc when looked at from above. The roundabout's disc is
suspended from the top of the tube by three strings while
the spinning-top has no such strings, but this is the most
obvious difference between them. Both have small removable
plastic pieces which slot, into holes in the disc.
Anna managed to work the spinning top immediately upon
getting it at 16 months. She sat holding the knob at the
top of the tube, pressing it down and watching the disc spin
round. Most of her subsequent play with the top had to do
with the removable pieces and, as with the removable and
moving parts of her duck, these provided the theme of a sus¬
tained dialogue with M (at 17;25).
She received the roundabout on 18?16 and immediately
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set it upon the floor and tried to press down on the central
tube- When nothing happened Anna indignantly banged the toy
on the floor. M reached down and showed her how to spin the
disc to and fro with her finger. Anna seems to have been
guided wholly by the similarity in shape of the roundabout
to her spinning top and to have believed that the toys would
therefore work in the same way.
General Observations
Anna's behaviour with the roundabout is illustrative
of a prevalent type of activity in the period from 14 to 18
months. She does a great deal of experimentation within a
single mode - for example blowing or pushing or banging -
upon many different objects in turn. In this she seems to
be trying to ascertain the field of operation of particular
modes of behaviour. It may be that at this stage objects
and toys are classified according to the effect each action
has upon them. One would expect, if this happened, that
toys which were operated by one such action would easily be
assimilated into the child's repertoire. And indeed,
between 14 and 18 months Anna adopts many unusual toys - a
plastic tube, a small cardboard box, an empty squeezy bottle
- which produce unusual sounds when blown into, or which are
otherwise interesting - a glove, an old china mug. We also
find her extending quite distinct actions to apply to new
situations such as locating a pinger shape onto M's finger,
at 13;05, and pulling along her telephone as if it were a
wheeled toy like the duck, at 16;01.
During earlier sessions attempts to pick out actions
which were the execution of a clear intention were made
difficult by three factors in particular: (i) that Anna
engaged in much repetitious activity with no apparent motive,
(ii) that her attention span was very short and her activity
was therefore highly labile, and (iii) that many of her in¬
tentions seemed poorly formed and easily went amiss through
distraction, accident or maternal intervention. While the
identification of acts does become more certain after 14
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months, and while many of these acts are experiments with
established forms of behaviour, they do not to me appear
to be wholly concerned with the characteristic modes of this
period; the application of existing means to new ends and
the search for new means to established goals (Piaget, 19 53).
These things are undoubtedly occurring - there are some
sequences which can in no other way be explained - but there
are also sequences, superficially of this kind, in which the
child's principal aim seems to be a quiet exhibitionism for
M's benefit. For example, at 15;09 Anna and her mother are
playing with a school cap, setting it upon each other's head
in turn. Anna fetches a towel and pulls it over her head,
then reappears laughing at M. Shortly after this she puts
the towel in the washing basket - without any suggestion
from M - and proceeds to collect other pieces of rraterial
from around the room which.she puts in the basket. Through¬
out this M observes and occasionally comments and Anna, while
pursuing her own ideas, constantly 'refers back' to M.
After 18 months examples of intended solitary acts which
can be identified by our procedure become quite rare. There
are two reasons for this. First, Anna has distinguished
between effects which she can achieve and those she cannot
Those which she can achieve she does so .without hestiation
and without any (confirmatory in our view) subsequent act,
C„; those which she cannot become, if desirable, the focus
1
of a request to M. Second, the interaction of Anna and her
mother has now reached a fluent and dynamic phase and M,
who knows well what C can and cannot do, will often intercede
2
at points which to us would be interesting. During the last
three months of Anna's sessions the only instances we can
clearly identify are those upon which Anna makes some discovery,
such as how to fit two shapes on the pinger- and how to prime
the pinger.
"'"The 'light' sequence at 19;13 is one example of this.
2
See discussion on page 159.
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Correspondence between Solitary and Communicative Intentions
Without anticipating the substance of the next section
we must now examine the kinds of Ei attributed to solitary
behaviour to check that they generally consist with those
(Ei)s which M attributes to communicative acts. For example,
it would be confirmatory of our conclusion that Anna has
mastered the cognitive requirements for sounding the tuning-
fork at 14; 02 if we could point to an example from communi¬
cative activity in which C requests 'that M should (show her
how to) sound the tuning-fork' at about, the same age. Earlier
in the same recording session Anna in fact performed this
very request. Similarly, at 13;05 she is presumed to have
requested 'that M (show her how to) play the hurdy-gurdy'
and later tries to play it herself, revealing in so doing
that she knows the handle to be important. To take a third
example, at 17;25 Anna commands that the cassette player
should be switched on. When this is refused she gets up
and switches it on herself, confirming both M's interpretation
of her communicative intention and that in pressing the button
on the machine she was trying to switch on.
Perhaps more important than the fact that such parallels
occur across the data - as indeed they should since the
criteria for the identification of Ei were similar in each
case - is the fact there are no cases in which the evidence
from one source is obviously contradicted by that from
another. Often, solitary activity containing specific inten¬
tions toward a toy was the basis for the performance of a
communicative act concerning that toy, as is reflected in the
examples above. With toys which took the child some time to
master, on the other hand, we more typically find phases
during which she will either investigate it on her own, or
she will play socially with the toy, but she will not usually
combine these types of activity. It is in comparing the
propositions attributed to activity separated by type and
by time that we might be more likely to find inconsistencies.
But in cross-checking the data in the Appendices there are
none which are obvious to me.
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Discussion of development in Solitary Activity
When the very young child performs an action which we
can identify as being of a goal-directed nature, as in
catching the wheel at 8;11, the attainment of the goal typi¬
cally ends the episode. That the child had. no further inten¬
tion, nor entertained a hypothesis about what the wheel might
now do, is suggested by her surprise that it rolls away from
her when she sets it down again. At this time the child's
intentions are simple and specific and are directly linked
to the acts by which they are expressed. These acts them¬
selves consist of simple movements which are often repeated
in a cyclical fashion, as in trying to fire the pinger and
in trying to pull a towel over her head, both at 10;10. In
all of the examples up to about 12 months of age Anna's acts
are permitted by the pre-existing structure of the situation
in which they occur. To put this another way, she is able
to expl_oit the natural affordances of a situation. She can,
for example, attempt to fire the pinger if it is already
loaded and move to catch a receding toy. But she is unable
to create the structure within which to act. She does not
attempt both to load and then to fire the pinger, even with
assistance from M, nor does she play with the toy she has
caught. That the limitation of her intentions to what the
existing situation affords is a cognitive rather than a per¬
ceptual limitation is suggested by the fact that on occasions
separated by other behaviour Anna does attempt at one time
to fire and at another time to reload the pinger.
The creation of structure
At 11;26 there is an isolated instance witnessing the
separation of act and intention. Anna crawls to the door
and pushes it shut. This is greeted with applause from M at
which Anna first opens the door a little way and then bangs
it shut again with a flourish. She looks at M who laughs.
Her opening of the door constitutes the structuring of a
situation in which she may then close the door. Similarly,
at 12;17 she attempts to replace a shape she has just pulled
off the pinger.
183*.
Three other developments can be observed from about 12
months onwards. These are, first, the application of exist¬
ing means to new ends - blowing and banging objects in an
experimental way - and, second, the use of simple reversals
of her own or of M's actions. For example, retrieving a
hidden object is well within her abilities at 12;17 provided
she can expose the object by 'undoing' the act which hid it.
Furthermore, the child will then play with the object she
has retrieved. The third development is a sudden increase
in the extent to which Anna copies M's actions. Her imita¬
tions do not necessarily follow immediately upon the act
they copy but those which can be identified do occur within
the same sequence of behaviour. In these processes we no
longer find the child at a loss after the successful perfor¬
mance of an act. Specific intentions now are executed within
a stream of activity in which it becomes possible to identify
longer term goals. This transitional stage culminates at
14 months.
At 14;02 there is a sequence which appears ambiguous,
I believe, only because it is anomalous. Although the weaker
hypothesis - 'To hide and reveal the smaller cup' - has also
been stated in Appendix D, Anna's delight at lifting the smal¬
ler cup by placing the larger one over it convinces me that
this was her actual intention. The description of this event
on page IT& shows that Anna used a non-canonical means of
lifting the small cup, that is a means which is not obviously
afforded by the shape and function of cups. In this we see
the experimental application of a new means to an existing
goal, and it is a means of her own devising which has not
been observed within M's behaviour nor previously used by
the child. This is important because it demonstrates that
the child has discovered the possibility of acting wholly
independently of others. The execution of her intention did
not depend upon a situation which had been structured by
prior activity, nor was the intention itself related to an
event she had previously observed, directly or indirectly.
Likewise at 14;26 Anna investigates a clockwork toy at length
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and discovers some of the criteria for it -working other than
by applying stylized methods such as blowing and banging.
At 15;09 she discovers an entirely novel means to replace
a shape on the pinger.
Derivation of Constructs
The period from 14 to 18 months is characterised by
behaviour which involves 'experimentation within a single
mode' - as discussed on page 119 - and which seems designed
to discover the range of application of particular forms of
act."'" At the same time, however, there are examples like
the three above which demonstrate that Anna is also discover¬
ing new forms of act and is discovering about her own inde¬
pendence as an agent. It is a period of consolidation and
experimentation. The consolidation which is occurring does
not relate only to 'action-schemas' which confirm the effects
of certain modes of behaviour; it is reflected also in the
robustness, of some rules about the world whose application
is implicated in many different circumstances. These are
rules which are independent of the child's action and which
therefore have the status of concepts, but which are not
necessarily coherently related as true concepts must be. A
list of the rules which the child applies would include the
2
following:
1. That objects can be obscured from view but do not there¬
fore cease to exist; object-permanence, containership,
2. That some actions and events are inherently reversible
while others are not,
3. That contained objects fall out when the container is
inverted,
4. That an object's path and rate of motion can be extra¬
polated,
5. That the orientation of objects to one another affects
"'"Most of these are omitted from Appendix D as non-novel acts.
2
To say that the child applies these rules is not to say that
they are always applied appropriately or successfully.
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the action of one on the other, and
6. That objects which look similar will function similarly.
It is not possible to state what might be the cognitive
achievements of the child during solitary activity after
18;16 on the basis of only two novel accomplishments. We
should expect to see a continuing refinement, and application
to new situations, of rules (about the world and about the
limits and consequences of her own behaviour) which the child
has been discovering. One further factor should be mentioned
here. During times when the child is playing on her own M.
very often provides a commentary upon the child's activity
and the events which occur. While the child rarely acknow¬
ledges M's contribution we know from her accession to M's
requests, commands and suggestions that from around 14 months
she understands more and more of the messages M attempts to
convey.1 M's commentary therefore identifies for the child
the ways in which her actions and apparent intentions are
construed by another. It will reveal which of her actions
make sense to others and which do not. M's commentary can
thus exert an important influence upon the socialisation of
the child's thought even in situations which are not inter¬
active. We shall look at this in more detail in Chapter
Five in discussing the data from the secondary subjects.
4.5 A Model for the Cognition of Agency
Collation of the evidence: a schedule of development
We must now attempt to bring together the changes and
developments we have identified in our discussions of inter-
1 —
Data on this is not presented in this chapter. Briefly, up
to about 14 months Anna recognises only that she has been
addressed - and she will usually respond - but increasingly
thereafter she displays comprehension or M's meaning. The
first clear case of this occurs at 14;26 when Anna performs
a representative act in response xo a warning from M to be
careful. (See Appendix C.)
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personal routines, communicative and solitary activity. We
shall do this by noting the changes which occur in each type
of activity at any given age. For example, at 10 months we
note that a new form of interpersonal routine appears - turn-
taking - and also that G now begins to use M as a source of
pleasure in the earliest form of requesting. At this stage
we do not attempt to draw conclusions from the fact that
(related) changes may be observed simultaneously in different
types of activity, but where such co-incidences occur they
are highlighted and the degree to which they may reflect a
common underlying development is discussed.
The data summary is presented in chronological order,
as far as this is possible, and at each age the type of act¬
ivity in which a change has been observed is either explicitly
stated or keyed by its initials; I.R. for interpersonal rout¬
ines, D.A. for directive acts, R.A. for representative acts
and S.A. for solitary acts. The preceding text has included
exemplars for each change that is claimed to occur, all of
which can also be found in the relevant appendix. In this
schedule no examples are given, but no claims are made here
which have not already been made in the prior discussion; only
the correlation of effects is new. It follows that any change
described in the schedule can be traced in the appendices.
Some selection of evidence has been inevitable - developments
occurring together in two types of activity perhaps receive a
fuller treatment than those occurring alone - but I believe
there have been no significant omissions; the appendices
record all of the examples from each activity in the record¬
ings of Anna, and there are no cases in either the appendices
or the preceding text which contradict ,any claim made in the
schedule.
From the schedule is extracted Table 4.1. It presents
a skeleton summary of the most significant changes which have
been identified. Its terms are one step removed from the
data, but once again it c'ontains nothing which has not already
been discussed. The Table does not serve as the basis for
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further treatment of the data; its major functions are
intended to be as a key for cross-referencing developments
in each type of activity and as a shorthand to the schedule
from which it is extracted. For these reasons Table 4.1 is
presented overleaf, near the beginning of the schedule.
A schedule of Anna's development
8 months Anna's acts are simple and direct and are identical
with her intentions. Intentions are limited to the
possibilities naturally afforded by the structure
of a situation and are highly labile, easily div¬
erted by accident, distraction and maternal inter¬
vention. Her acts are often cyclically repeated,
(S.A.) Interpersonal routines at this early stage
are also cyclical and conform to a pattern of
rehearsals of expectation. The limitation upon
Anna's intentions and hence her action appears to
be cognitively rather than perceptually based (S.A.)
There is no communicative behaviour, as strictly
defined.
10 months She now begins to initiate interpersonal routines
and a new form appears in that turn-taking is
controlled by signalling. Anna is beginning to
perceive that she can effect change not only in
her surroundings but in her mother also. (I.£.)
M begins to attribute communicative intentions
to some of the child's actions which are expressive
of her internal state. In fulfilling these per¬
ceived desires M provides data for C that it is
possible for her to prompt actions by M which she
enjoys. In thus using M as a source of pleasure
C is also discovering something of the range of
interactive possibility and is exploring new
routines.
12 months Two new routines are added to Anna's repertoire;
these are Joint action and exchange. The latter
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Table 4.1
Skeleton Summary of the principal Findings for Anna
Age
(Months) Interpersonal Routines Directive Acts




Uses M as a source of
pleasure
12 months Joint action, Exchange
C becomes the more
frequent initiator; often
withdraws due to non-
fulfilment of her turn




15 months Appearance of games;
progressive routines
Uses M to create the con¬
ditions in which to act;
Can refer by pointing and
naming
17 months Reciprocal routines,
M and C have role-
parity. Dialogue
18 months Can modify M's interpre¬
tations
19 months Primacy of being understood
20 months Constraints on interaction with M are now cognition
of the world and of formal language, not her grasp
of mechanics of communication.
21 months Verbal expression of prop¬
ositions, mostly in tele¬
graphic form.
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Representative Acts Solitary Acts
Acts and intention are closely
tied, limited to natural
affordances
Begins to create the structure






Applies specific means to new
goals, discovers new means to
old goals; Perceives and
exhibits independence
Consolidation and experiment¬
ation; Derivation and applica¬
tion of rules
Acts become less labile
Clarification and Assertion;
acts embedded in dialogue
Rarely fails to achieve Ei
Constraints are now cognition





arises quite straightforwardly from the giving
by M of an object to C, and mimics the simultan¬
eous appearance in solitary activity of acts by
C which are simple reversals or are imitations
of prior acts by M. While both solitary acts
and routines are still predominantly cyclical in
form, progressions are beginning to appear in all
types of routine. (I.R.,S.A.) The new ability
of the child to separate intention from action,
which allows her to create the structure within
which to act and thus permits the pursuit of
goals, also finds a parallel in interpersonal
behaviour. Joint action routines represent the
sharing of a goal by M and C, as far as the child
is concerned, and they reveal to C what sorts of
goals are socially recognised and acceptable.
These together with the solitary experimentation
within modes which is now beginning to appear
(S.A.) disclose to Anna the extent of her effect¬
iveness as an agent and as an interactor. Fre¬
quently from now onwards she will withdraw from
an interpersonal routine because of failure to
fulfill her move, implying that she believes her¬
self to be capable of some things she in fact
fails to achieve. Here her cognition seems to
be in advance of motor capacity. (I.R.)
14 months Confirmation of the idea that cognition is in
advance of motor capacity comes from the finding
that C now begins to use M to show her how some
effect is achieved, s.o that she may then attempt
it herself. (D.A.) Often her attempt is unsuc¬
cessful. (S.A.). The child knows her intentions
to be accessible to M and that she is required
only to draw to M's attention the fact that she
has some intention with respect to an already
salient object or topic. Conversely we could
say, the child knows sufficient of the agency of
m.
M to perceive and apply a rule 'that M will .act in
the desired way if she (the child) expresses her
intention in a particular form of act.' M's attri¬
bution of proposition and force is fundamental to
the establishment of a system of conventions relat¬
ing the form and meaning of interactive acts. M's
new willingness to attribute quite complex meanings
must be based in her observations that the child
can now plan and execute novel means to the achieve¬
ment of established goals and that the child can
now act wholly independently of her. (S.A.)
M's attribution of proposition and force is
also fundamental to the appearance in C's repertoire
of representative communicative acts. Initially it
is only M's attribution which classifies these as
such and, right up to 18 months, they are labile
both as to force and as to meaning. At this stage
there are no identifiable contextual or behavioural
distinctions between directives and representatives;
M's decision apparently rests upon whether she is
required to act upon or merely to acknowledge C-^.
The representatives which Anna performs up to 18
months can be classified as Performatives, Obser¬
vations and Personal Observations."'" (R.A.) An
important aspect of Anna's behaviour which does not
receive formal inclusion in our data is the extent
to which she now exhibits to M her pleasure at
achieving an unlikely or novel effect. (S.A.) It
shows to us that the child perceives her own success
"'"Personal observations are, in essence, what Myers (1979)
refers to as expressives which may be performed through
indexical acts. A separate category of expressive acts is
not used in this thesis because examples which fitted this
category were found to cut across our only real distinction
between directives and representatives, which depenos upon
M's response. Thus, directive acts around 10 months which
require some action in Mi and personal observations which
require only an acknowledgement both consist essentially
of an expression of affect.
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and it must assist her mother to perceive and to
act towards the child in ways appropriate to the
level of her competence.
15 months Evidence that this is a period of consolidation
and experimentation for the child comes from all
of our sources of data. Consolidation consists
in the performance of action-schemas and rehear¬
sing their effects upon common toys and objects
but also in the derivation of impersonal rules
about the contingent relationships which pertain
in her world, that is the way her world is order¬
ed. We have cited some of the rules which are
implicated by their recurrent application in
Anna's activity on pages 18^-5. Important features
of these rules, however, are that they are often
applied inappropriately - as when Anna inverts
and shakes a closed container (rule 4) - and that
they are neither extensively defined not mutually
coherent. The experimentation we see at the same
time must be directed to the refinement of these
constructs and to the derivation, by abstraction,
of new ones, broadly in the manner discussed in
Section 0.3 (S.A.).
progressive interpersonal routines are now
the typical mode of interaction between M and C,
having embedded within them identifiable communi¬
cative acts and often developing into games. Such
activity provides a platform for practise with the
mechanisms of joint action, exchange and turn-
taking. In addition Anna can explore the ways in
which her mother behaves and reacts and will thus
elaborate her cognition of M and of what consti¬
tutes socially meaningful activity. (I.R.)
The nature of Anna's requests becomes modified
to the use of M to create the conditions in which
to act. Requests often arise out of solitary
activity and this signifies the abstractability
of intentions for the formulation of strategies
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for their achievement. That the child can
apparently learn by observation as well as by
action supports the claim for an abstraction pro¬
cess which must be intrinsic to perception and
cognition. But the most significant advance in
Anna's ability to express her communicative inten¬
tions stems from the development ot her ability
to refer to distant or non-salient objects and
topics by pointing and naming. While in no way
affectiny the complexity of the meanings M attri¬
butes, referring qualitatively broadens the scope
of topics which Anna can mean something about.
17 months Given Anna's increasing interpersonal skills and
effectiveness as an agent it is entirely predic¬
table that her representatives should around this
time begin to be less labile. From her ongoing
experience of the child M must now perceive her
child as a person independently capable of goal-
directed activity and able to involve her, by
requesting, in the pursuit of goals which are
difficult. Interpersonally, M will have observed
that Anna can interpose'new moves and thus alter
the pattern of a routine in which they are engaged.
At 17 months interpersonal routines undergo a
change of form, representing an adjustment in the
relative status of M and C to an interface at
which they enjoy role-parity, and become reciprocal.
In this type of routine the mechanisms by which
the interpersonal is managed - those of turn-taking,
joint action and dialogue - are subordinate to the
interaction itself, whose main aim is the sharing
of pleasure'. We should expect a child able to
perform in these ways to be able to offer comments
about her action and about events and states of
the world.
18 months Clarification and Assertion, two forms of repre¬
sentative act which are evidently non-labile,
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appear from 18 months and indicate a new level in
the child's cognition of self. Not only can she
interact on equal terms with M in situations where
they concur, but where disagreements arise Anna
begins to assert her own intentions. Distinct
representative acts come to be embedded in dialogue
centred upon a prevailing theme. Another, comple¬
mentary, process which is not formally included
in our data is the negation of M's suggestions
and requests by which M attempts to involve her¬
self in C's solitary activity. This chiefly
occurs during a period of inconsistency in C's
behaviour, referred to on pages 169-10. Assertion
and clarification, together with negation and the
readjustment of interpersonal status, tie in closely
with what Sinha (197S) calls a 'phase of non-
cooperation' (between 16 and 20 months) which
represents a 'renegotiation of power relations',
based presumably in some notion the child has of
developing autonomy. This notion must rest upon
the child's cognition of her own agency, and it
is partially explicable in terms of a diminished
accession to others. As longer term plans develop
the child perceives also the possibility of their
being disrupted (as a result of experience). She
becomes more careful about letting M join in with
her games and especially about giving objects
away. (Exchange routines no longer occur.)
An interesting feature of solitary activity
from now on is that while there are no qualitative
developments in strategy or in skill Anna now
rarely fails to achieve her goal. She can appar¬
ently distinguish in advance those steps within
a strategy which she can execute herself and those
for which she will require assistance. In requests
arising in this way Anna shows herself able to
take account of M's interpretation and if necessary
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to act in an intelligent way so as to modify that
interpretation. Knowing how to do some things,
how to get M to do things she cannot do herself
and being aware that there are possibilities for
action not yet conceived is a healthy condition
for further learning by the child.
20 months The constraints upon interaction do not now seem
to be Anna's grasp of the possibilitites for and
rules governing communication with others but her
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cognition of the world and the lack of^formal
system by which complex meanings may be precisely
conveyed; a language. That being understood is
a primary consideration is revealed by the 'light'
episode at 19;13, but quite clearly interaction
is now fully multifunctional in the child's terms.
Instead of seeing increased solitary activity, as
we might expect if limited cognition of the world
is one of the child's barriers, we actually see
a decrease. This suggests that interpersonal
situations provide a matrix for learning about
the world as good as - or perhaps better than -
that provided by solitary activity. Throughout
the previous six months M has assigned social def¬
inition and significance to the child's behaviour.
There could be no better way than tirough reciprocal
interaction for the child to further her integra¬
tion into, and effectiveness within, her socio-
physical world.
21 months The only further qualitative advance we can observe
is the use of words not only as referring expres¬
sions but as telegraphic representations of entire
propositions. The propositions thus expressed are
in no way cognitively more complex than the mean¬
ings M has attributed to non-verbal acts and
verbal expression is still an unreliable means of
conveying a message.
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Anna's cognition of agency
We are now in a position to extract from this
schedule what can be claimed for the child's cognition
of agency. In accordance with the theoretical distinct¬
ion drawn in Chapter One we try to distinguish between
her cognition of self-as-agent and that of other-as-agent.
Table 4.2 (on page 199) presents the factors which are
presumed to underlie the behaviour recorded in the Appen¬
dices A, B, C and D. The procedure for deriving the terms
used in Table 4.2 requires some explanation. The following
notes are intended to clarify it.
1. Conclusions as to the cognition of self-as-agent are
based mainly upon Appendix D and the discussion in
Section 4.4, on solitary activity. Evidence from
interpersonal and communicative activity is included
if it pertains to the child's abilities in the physical
world. For example, Anna's requests for assistance
reveal the things she believes herself capable of and
what things she believes to be possible but for which
she requires assistance. The conclusions on other-as-
agent are based in Appendices A, B and C and Sections
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
2. Appendix D displays the effect Anna appeared to intend
in performing some act. It is supposed that in perform¬
ing an act she entertains a hypothesis such that the
intended effect (Ei) will be the outcome. The right
hand column of the appendix records the 'factors and
fields of cognition presumed relevant to the construct¬
ion and execution of C's intention'. That is, it shows
the kinds of schemas or constructs which must be
presumed present to permit the entertaining of that
hypothesis. The description of these constructs must
necessarily be tentative with respect to their level of
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abstraction and generality, but, as was urged in Part
One, they are described at the lowest adequate level.
Where the child's act was unsuccessful, the reason
that the event which occurred did not coincide with
the intended effect is often helpful. Seasons for
failure have been divided into four categories; Motor,
Perceptual, Behavioural and Strategic. An act which
fails because of motor imprecision may yet allow us to
claim that the child understood both that the relevant
Ei is possible and how it may be achieved. An act
which fails for strategic reasons permits no such con-
elusion; in fact Ei itself may be obscure.
3. Appendix B records the effect which a directive act
was intended to produce. This reveals - and it can be
verified against the context of other activity at that
age - something of the child's cognition of self, of
other and of the means for conveying messages. In the
case of representative acts (Appendix G) it is the
proposition which M attributes in her acknowledgement
of which is presented. Such propositions have
precisely equal status with Ei in the other appendices.
4. Table 4.2 is a summary of the underlying changes and
developments identified in the Schedule on pages 187-
195. At this stage all direct reference to specific
episodes has been omitted. Because they must be
presented briefly the entries in the Table consist
exclusively of phrases which have been used in the
schedule so that their source may be checked. There
are no ideas introduced in the Table which are not
included in the schedule.
No attempt has been made to ensure that the entries
constitute descriptions at the same logical level.
There is no suggestion from what we know of the charac¬
ter of the child's cognition that logical equivalence
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is required or even recommended. (See Section 1.2.)
To attempt it unnecessarily would be to ascribe
unjustifiable certainty and coherence to the terms
used. In any case, as the child's cognition develops
so must the complexity of the ideas and concepts used
to describe it increase.
5. Age is shown down the left hand side of the Table.
This provides a convenient time-base, but it should
not be over strictly applied. From it can be taken
only the approximate age to which a description
applies.
6. The Table represents a set of continually unfolding
processes and, while there are important landmarks,
these processes do not readily lend themselves to
description in terms of steps or stages. The entries
in the Table should therefore be seen as transitions
through which developing cognition passes, and not
as states which the child achieves at each given age.
The time-base indicates the age at which the behaviour
signifying such an element in cognition was first
observed, but no sudden onset (nor sudden disappearance)
should be assumed. Entries at each age are grouped
together in boxes only for purposes of presentation.
7. The arrows between boxes show how the form of cognition
at any time might provide a basis for or contribute
to the succeeding form. The horizontal arrows between
individual entries are meant to suggest that these
elements are probably inter-dependent.
Table 4.2 is presented on the next page.
Table 4,2
Anna's Cognition of Agency
1^9.
Self-as-agent Other-as-agent




Other as structure -
affording simple acts -
and as source of pleasure
Imitation' and^ signalling -










Other can interpret inten¬
tions and share goals
Other as source of mean-
meanings
Cognition in advance of
motor capacity
Other usable to fulfil
goals




New means to old goals;
some autonomy of action
Other as attributor of
meaning
Other as proficient within
the child's cognition
(as demonstrator)
Other will observe an
agreed system relating acts
and meanings




creation of structure in
solitary and interpersonal
contexts
Reference by pointing and
naming - \
17ms Interpersonal assertion of jother as sharer of pleasure
self i
Developing autonomy




Involves other at will
2 0 ms Other as optimum matrix for
learning
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A model for the cognition of agency
Table 4.2 has presented a summary of the abilities
and constructs which seem to constitute Anna's developing
concept of agency. From these constructs and their inter¬
relations we now want to derive the principal factors
around which the child's cognition is centred at any age.
To do this we must collapse together those items in Table
4.2 which appear to be equivalent or fundamentally inter¬
related and posit a common factor. In a sense this mimics
the psychometrist's method of factoring out traits and
personality factors, but our method is not statistically
based; it must rely upon our adult notions of what makes
sense.
The results of this derivative process will be pre¬
sented in Table 4.3, as a model for the cognition of
agency. The source of many of the terms will be self-
evident, as once again familiar phrases are used, but
some justification is required for the choice of some
terms and the exclusion of others. We do this by ref¬
erence to the age at which they are relevant, in Table
4.2.
8 months Our observations of C's use of M - as 'structure*
to act upon and as a source of pleasure - suggest
that M is not clearly distinguished from other
(physical) aspects of the child's world. When
C is just beginning to perform simple acts she
appears to treat M as (just) another natural
affordance permitting certain kinds of action.
Hence, all we can reasonably claim at this age
is that the child perceives the existence of a
set of natural affordances.
10 months With the beginning of imitation, the appearance
of signalling in turn-taking routines and the
earliest requests we now find G recognizing
that she can have an effect upon M's behaviour.
In learning to prompt particular acts by M, the
201.
child realizes M's reactance.
12 months This realization progresses a step further in
that C's requests now include the use of M to
show how some effect is achieved. C's apprec¬
iation that some simple acts and events are
reversible, together with her new perception
of M, permit her now to create for herself
the structure within which to act and to use
M to create such structure.
The beginnings of true communication
require that C treats M as the source of
meanings and as the legislator upon the rel¬
ation between the form of an act and the mean¬
ing it expresses; the process of conventional¬
isation. The meanings of which the child is
aware will be those which arise out of joint
action, involving the interpretation of inten¬
tions and the sharing of goals.
14 months With her new ability to create structure and
thus to perform a series of acts the child now
has some autonomy of action, which is, however,
limited by the fact that her motor abilities
appear to lag behind her cognitive abilities.
Thus she also uses M to fulfill goals. This in
turn depends upon C's cognition that her goals
are separable from the (communicative) act which
will lead to their achievement. She must know
that M is proficient and she must know some of
the relevant rules for communicating. Again it
is M who attributes to the child's acts whatever
meaning they carry.
15 months From our analysis of the child's acts around
this time we see that she is beginning to apply
rules such that different forms of action are
appropriate in different contexts and with





of her earlier modal experimentation. At the
same time she is discovering new means to achieve
established goals and she is introducing pro¬
gression and innovation in her interpersonal
routines with M. All of these things suggest the
derivation of constructs about both the physical
and the interpersonal worlds enjoys a central
role in cognition, which constructs are continually
consolidated and refined by experimentation.
The data on interpersonal routines show that
pleasure-sharing is important to the child. But
at the same time her ability to formulate strategies
for action and to set up quite complex action
sequences reveal to her the development of autonomy.
She begins to perceive that her strategies are
disruptible and to assert herself in interpersonal
situations. The pursuit of complex action sequences
and her experimentation also permit the child
quite accurately to define the extent of her
abilities, to such a-jroint that she rarely attempts
something at which she does not succeed. Where she
has some goal which she believes herself unable to
achieve she involves M at will.
No significant developments were noted at this
age beyond the general tendency to treat M as the
optimum matrix for learning. The child has dis¬
tinguished what she can do from what she cannot
and knows that in general the best way to discover
how to do something or to get something done is
through M.
Table 4.3, which is presented overleaf, consists of the terms
which are underlined in this brief discussion. All of these
terms are to be taken as •process-states' - that is point-of-
timydescriptions of abilities which are not inherently
stage-like.
Table 4.3






The terms in our model are those, among all the terms
in Table 4.2, which seem to capture the culmination of a
number of different processes at each age. The cognition
thus represented does not become fixed but is applied, and
thus itself develops, through the subsequent links in the
diagram. Some of the terms are boxed while others are not.
Boxed terms are those which appear especially to represent
a qualitative shift in cognition, resulting from a culmin¬
ation of processes. Boxed terms which appear as end-points
are those for which no direct links with subsequent terms
can be made. Again, these are not 'states' but will be
applied and modified through subsequent activity.
The theoretical distinction between self-as-agent
and other-as-agent, on which Table 4.2 is based, is not
formally sustained in the model. It is preserved to the
extent that terms down the left hand side are principally
concerned with cognition of self and solitary action, while
those on the right represent cognition of other and inter¬
action. But they are fundamentally inter-related, as is
suggested by their direct links and by the terms falling
in the middle of the diagram. While the theoretical
distinction helped us to state the problem faced by the
learning child it has not been found to represent a real
distinction within what she knows. (See Chapter Six for
discussion.)
Variability of the model
We now want to look at the factors and variables which
might influence a child's progress through the model, both
to estimate its tightness and to set up some hypotheses for
the secondary subjects.
Consistency in M's behaviour
The first major factor is that the child should realize
- recognise through use - his ability to prompt M to perform
actions which bring the child pleasure. This requires that
M should consistently treat certain of the child's behaviour
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as signals to act before the child has any notion of what
signalling is. This realisation is the foundation for the
creation of simple structure upon which to act and for the
use of M to this end by requesting, both of which follow.
Consistency in M's behaviour is essential to the process
of conventionalisation, as the source of vehicles of communi¬
cation and of rules governing interaction. Clearly, by the
time the child begins to perform requests as a means to some
goal, at around 14 months, M's influence will be evident.
Remember that it is M's attribution which defines an act by
C as a request of a particular kind; if M does not attribute
an appropriate proposition and force then de facto the child
has not performed a request. In the extreme, the child may
well learn something of his own autonomy but he would be
incapable of meaning and therefore of using a proficient
other to further his learning. While the extreme is only
likely to be encountered in cases of severe child abuse of
the kind which occasionally come to light, we must grant an
important role in the development of meaning to the mother's
conception of the child. She must treat him as at or slightly
above his real level of competence.
M's conception of the child
Another aspect of M's behaviour which we must consider
is that which depends upon her conception of her own role
in interacting with the child. For simplicity we can posit
this as a dichotomy though there will of course be a continuum
between the cases. At one end we should find a mother who
perceives her role during interaction as being to present
the child with situations and events to which he may discover
- or in which he may be shown - socially approved forms of
response. This may provide a sufficient basis for learning
and for communicating but it will have the important conse¬
quence that the child would not be considered to intend or
to know things on his own account and M will not generally
recognise his spontaneous attempts to involve her and to
modify their interaction. (In fact there may not be any
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such attempts.). This may have further consequences during
a 'phase of non-cooperation' as will be discussed below.
At the other end is a mother who sees her role as that of
assisting in the pursuit of C's goals without unnecessary
intrusion and in inviting the child to join in with her games
which he may then control. It must be said that Anna's
mother conforms more closely to the latter of these patterns.
What is interesting is what the consequences of different
patterns of M - C relationship might be as the child begins
to derive constructs and become aware of his own autonomy
towards the middle of the second year.
Conflict inherent in C's changing role
Anna and her mother resolve the potential conflict
inherent in the child's perception of increasing autonomy
in two ways. First, they manage to sustain at a high level
interaction whose only obvious outcome is the sharing of
pleasure. Second, M makes clear that the limits to C's
autonomy are not only the degree of her own effectiveness
as an agent but include consistently applied rules which M
dictates. In other words, M clearly distinguishes occasions
and activities in which C can assert herself and experiment
freely from those in which she may not. Implicit here is
M's recognition that Anna's negations and assertions are in
no sense a rejection of M but are part of a process by which
a new relationship will be established between them. In
this way M allows and assists the child to pursue the possi¬
bilities of which she is able to conceive, within defined
limits which preserve the order of the household - among
other things - without unnecessarily restraining the child's
potential and without in any way prejudicing their relation¬
ship.-
The insights afforded by our model allow us to offer
a rather different scenario. For if a mother is not accessible
to the child's attempts to share his goals she is denying
him both her assistance and her confirmation of his own agency.
The interaction between them would then be less rewarding and
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less enjoyable and consequently more fragile. Solitary
activity would provide better opportunities for learning and
for experimentation. Entering a period in which the child
is increasingly aware of his independence and of his ability
to make sense of the world with no clear rules of protocol
would pose new threats to an uncertain relationship and pro¬
mote conflict in other aspects of it. We might expect, for
example, that difficulties would emerge when M is trying to
direct the child's behaviour, at meal-times and in toilet-
training.
The physical world
As to the child's physical world, all that is required
by our model is that there should exist contingent relations
which the child may explwoit, with opportunities for the
creation of structure for action allowing the derivation and
elaboration of constructs capturing some part of the way the
world is. Given that the physical features of the surroundings
in which all the recordings were made were quite similar,
including for the most part identical toys, we should not
expect any variation between Anna and the secondary subjects
to be due purely to physical factors. The secondary subjects
may play more, or be less adept, with toys they do not have
at home, but this should not obscure their overall competence
nor the characteristics of their interaction with M.
A situational factor
One factor which might well affect our data, however,
is the use of a laboratory in a university department for
the observations of the secondary subjects. Although mothers
knew nothing of the aims of the research and were invited to
'play with your child as you would at home, or if he seems
to prefer it allow him to play on his own', it is likely they
would see their role as being to show off what the child
could do. In short, even in non-intrusive laboratory obser¬
vation we might expect to find M adopting a more in^trusive
and imposing role than she normally would. But again, this
should not obscure the style of their relationship.
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Conclusions
Finally"/ we must comment upon the tightness of our model,
in terms of time-scale and in terms of the ordering and inter¬
relation of different processes.
Intuition tells us that the optimum conditions for a
child will be those in which all kinds of experience which
might be useful to him are available. Our model suggests
that principal among these conditions are:
1. Opportunitites for the creation of structure for action.
2. The active and regular participation of another person.
3. The ability and willingness of that other person to
interpret and support the child's activity and to allow
him to direct their interaction.
4. The consistent application of rules relating act and
meaning.
5. The consistent application of limits within which inter¬
action may proceed.
If the child is to become able to function normally and
socially we can safely claim that the first two conditions
are absolute requirements. The other three conditions have
already been discussed above. Within the range of variation
likely to be found in them we have seen that two related
effects will show up? first, in the emphasis the child places
upon solitary activity with exclusion of the other and,
second, in the quality and resilience of the mother-child
relationship.
If we trace down the left-hand side of Table 4.3 it
does appear that a child could arrive at a conception of
agency - a set of definitions of his own ability within a
partially rule-governed world - with only the minimal ful¬
fillment of interpersonal conditions. On the other hand,
if a child is provided with insufficient experience of a
usefully and consistently participating other we should
expect to see restrictions in the breadth of his cognition,
the
m both^physical and the interpersonal realms, and we should
expect its development to be delayed. Beyond this the
question of the flexibility or fixedness of the schedule
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becomes an empirical one, and we must see whether the secon¬
dary subjects shed further light upon it.
Chapter Five;* The Secondary Subjects
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5.1 Introduction and Summary
Having derived a model for the cognition of agency and
specified the parameters within which variation might occur
we turn now to the data for the five secondary subjects.
While similarities between these subjects and Anna would
provide valuable confirmation of the model, we shall be more
interested in differences. The most exacting way to test the
reliability of the model is to derive an independent Table
for the secondary subjects, corresponding to Table 4.2 for
Anna, and see to what extent our model captures it.
Each of the subjects was observed over a period of
approximately three months. Since there is no relationship
between them it would not be sensible to present their data
sequentially within each type of activity as was done for
Anna. In this chapter the children are dealt with in order,
one section for each, and the data in the corresponding
Appendix are grouped together within each observation period.
For the sake of brevity the discussion concentrates on the
differences between each secondary subject and Anna. In
Section 5.7 their data are summarised; Table 5.1, the cog¬
nition of agency in the secondary subjects.
Notes on Appendix format
Appendices E-J are identical in format. Each is a com¬
plete summary of the relevant activity of one child and there¬
fore contains all the main categories of the four appendices
which summarise Anna's behaviour. This requires that each
column should fulfill several functions. The second column
distinguishes the type of activity involved and specifies the
mode of an interpersonal routine or the kind of a request.
The third column then shows how and by whom a routine was
initiated or, in the case of a request, what was G's intended
effect, Ei, and so on. The only major difference in this
presentation - and its major disadvantage - is that the behav¬
ioural detail of communicative activity is lost. Where an




It is shown that there exists a lassitude of around two
months in the timing of some aspects of the child's cogni¬
tion in the lower half of the age range, and that this is
at least partly attributable to M's behaviour. Data on
solitary activity after 18 months was sparse in Chapter Four.
The evidence here suggests that there is a notable increase
in the complexity of intentional structures, presumably on¬
going, which should be represented in the model. Barring
these two points the model is supported.
There is a broad range in the styles of M's interaction
with C across subjects, but all Ms'- behaviour falls within
the limits of the conditions specified on page ZO8- This
allows us to assess the impact of the situational factor.
Its influence is considerably less important than the con¬
ception of her child on which a mother bases her interactive
style. This aspect is further explored in Chapter Six.
5.2 Daniel (7; 05-9?22) flppeneLx E
In line with our findings for Anna, Daniel performs no
representative acts during this period and his only requests
are concerned with changes in posture and with the simple
affordances of M and of objects. There is, however, one
area of difference with Anna (and with Sarah who is discussed
in the next section). This is that Daniel spends very little
time playing on his own and is highly accessible to M's
initiatives, while it is true that these do not generally
lead to recognisable routines or acts - and there are few
in Anna's data over this period - Daniel appears'thoroughly
to enjoy M's attention.
There is one example from which it is clear that he
does know something of his role in affecting outcomes with
M, from a very early age. By 7?16 a routine has developed
in which M supports Daniel in standing by holding both of
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his hands. He then bends at the knees and jerks up again;
after two or three times M will lift him high in the air
then set him on his feet again. What is significant is his
reaction when M, who is trying to alter this activity, does
not lift him up. Daniel pauses after completing his turn,
then exclaims and repeats it. At this M lifts him up once
more but sets him down in a sitting position.
Whereas Anna seemed to discover her ability to signal
M's turn and to perform explicit requests at about the same
time as she started to play much more on her own - at 10
months - Daniel exhibits early interpersonal skills long
before he is much interested in solitary play with objects.
But it should be pointed out - see page 12.9 - that Daniel
had two very much older siblings and was accustomed to more
attention than a singleton might usually receive. The vari¬
ation we see here can, I believe, be tolerated by our model
of agency since it affects only the timing and not the order¬
ing of the processes we have identified.
5.3 Sarah (10; 04-12; 21) RppSrvcL* F
Interpersonal routines
There are ten examples of interpersonal routines in the
tapes of Sarah and they follow a sequence remarkably similar
to that for Anna. At 10;04 there is a rehearsal of expec¬
tation and later an example of turn-taking. There is an
attempted progression in this example, when Sarah tries to
take on part of M's move. This is earlier than Anna attemp¬
ted a progression - not until 11;26 - but Sarah is unsucces¬
sful and there are no other progressive routines with her.
Exchange and joint action routines follow in the same order
and at about the same time as for Anna but Sarah never becomes
the principal initiator of routines. Indeed, she only ever
initiates exchange routines and these invariably break down
after one or two moves when she withholds the object. What
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is not revealed in Appendix F is that on several occasions
Sarah resists M's attempts to initiate interaction and that
there are no protracted interpersonal sequences. An example
at 12;21, in which M hopes to engage Sarah by hiding a sweet,
is included to illustrate this point.
Communicative Activity
Precisely as was so for Anna at this age Sarah performs
rather few directive acts and these are requests for assis¬
tance in standing (or sitting) and for objects in M's pos¬
session. There are no requests having to do with the oper¬
ation of toys. But whereas Anna performed no reliably
classified representatives over this period there are three
examples in Sarah's data. The first, which occurs at 11;01,
is slightly ambiguous. Sarah has been playing on her own
with a set of seriated cubes. She succeeds in placing a
small cube inside a larger one and immediately takes it out
again and holds it up to M who is about six feet away. M
at first takes this to be an offer but when she leans forward
to take the cube Sarah withdraws it and tries to replace it
in the other cube. M then acknowledges that C was simply
showing her the cube.
At 12;21 there is an act to which M attributes unambig¬
uous representative force. In response to a question from
M about what she is doing Sarah turns and shows M the object
in her hand, and vocalises. This is similar to episodes with
Anna at 14;26; Sarah seems to be some two months in advance
in this particular kind of behaviour.
Solitary Activity
There is much more solitary activity in Sarah's first
two sessions than in her second two. Interestingly, the
sessions with most solitary play are the ones before she
performs two observations at 12;21. Furthermore, her play
is in some ways in advance of Anna's. While we can see the
cyclical application of modal behaviour at the same ages-
banging and blowing different objects - Sarah retrieves an
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object hidden by M at 11;01 by a simple reversal of M's
action (12;17 for Anna) and at 10;04 can already create,
by a preliminary move, structure within which to act (11;26
for Anna). At 10;04 Sarah throws a ball into the toybox and
retrieves it. She then throws it in again, but misses and
the ball rolls away across the floor. Sarah reaches in the
toybox for the ball, until M hands it back to her. Or
again, at 10;04 she removes one seriated cube from inside
another and then immediately tries to replace it.
By 12 months Sarah is also more skillful in her motor
control than was Anna. Sarah can carefully place one cube
on top of a stack of four others and when investigating a
friction toy she can move the parts of it quite cuieptly. With
a toy of which she had no prior experience, on the other hand,
Sarah shows no especial interest and no more ability than
did Anna.
Discussion
With Sarah we see evidence of a cognition of other which
corresponds in level and function to that of Anna, but we
see it used less often, and we see a significant, two-month
advance in her representative acts and in the complexity of
her solitary activity. While no doubt some of Sarah's
emphasis on solitary play can be ascribed to the unusual
situation and novel toys in the laboratory, there are sug¬
gestions that her relationship with M is also a factor. It
has been noted that their routines are always short and that
there are no fully-fledged exchanges, and an example at 12;21
shows Sarah's rejection of an attempted initiative by M.
Another example at 12;21 suggests an explanation. Here Sarah
is playing with a pack of cards and seems about to bend or
tear them, for M sharply scolds, "uh-uh". Sarah immediately
tosses all the cards in the toybox, looks round at M and
sits motionless. The abruptness of C's reaction suggests
that this is a we11-rehearsed sequence, which in turn implies
a pattern of M monitoring C's solitary play without partici¬
pating.
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If C was not accustomed to M joining in with her play,
her rejection of M's attempts during the recording sessions
becomes reasonable. And if M is directive rather than
participatory we should not expect Sarah, who is herself
increasingly able, to involve M nor to request assistance
in her activity. Sarah's competence itself justifies the
apparently anomalous early occurrence of representative
communicative acts from within a context which is not inter-
personally oriented. A child who is comparatively able for
this age and 'willful' (in her mother's words) must be
credited early with the ability to comment upon her activity
and its consequences.
Again, the relative emphases on different types of
behaviour and the timing of the developments we are looking
for vary from the model pattern, but the ordering of these
processes is not prejudiced.
5.4 David (12 ? 20-I 5; 01) Appendix Q
Interpersonal Routines
The routines characteristic, of Anna's interaction are
generally represented in David's behaviour but there are
three important differences. First, there are no exchange
routines at all. Second, David never initiates a routine
with M; in addition he rejects or ignores many of M's attempts.
Third, turn-taking and joint action routines are not easily
managed and are of only short duration. There is only one
routine involving a progression, at l4;04; progressive
routines are not prevalent as for Anna over this period. In
spite of these differences a semi-reciprocal and apparently
much enjoyed turn-taking routine occurs at 15;01.
Communicative Activity
There is only one representative act and this is an
observation, by naming, by David that he has discovered a
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teddy in the toybox, at 14;04. Three of the five requests
which David performs are to do with a trumpet which he is
unable to blow. (This toy is also the focus of several inter¬
personal routines.) Characteristically, at 13;05, 14;04 and
at 15;01, David passes the trumpet for M to blow, then attempts
it himself, then passes it back, and so on. There are of
course variations in this pattern, but at 15;01 when he
succeeds in blowing the trumpet he still hands it back to
M so as to distinguish the end of it which must be blown.
This is the only toy with which M and C enjoy a routine of
any length and the only one about whose operation David per¬
forms an explicit request. The other two requests are both
Gimmes for things in M's possession.
Solitary Activity
What is especially remarkable about David's interper¬
sonal and communicative behaviour is that he is never observed
to use M to create the structure within which he may act.
While it is true that Anna did not reach this level until 15
months - at the top end of David's sessions - David's motor
control and the intentional structures apparent in his solitary
activity suggest that there are no cognitive barriers to his
enlistment of'M's assistance.
Comparably to Anna, David at 12;10 engages in quite
long sequences of solitary activity, creating for himself
structured situations if anything rather more complex than
were Anna's. In this, coupled with his better motor control,
he exhibits by 15 months a greater degree of autonomy of
action. Yet there are no attempts to enlist M's help in
creating structure.
Discussion
If the barriers to David's involvement of M are neither
cognitive nor motor, nor are they to do with the mechanics
of communication - since some requests are satisfactorily
performed - the conclusion is inescapable that these barriers
must stem from within the relationship itself. Let us
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examine M's behaviour more closely.
In the case of interpersonal routines we noted that
David is never the initiator. M constantly tries to interest
him in some toy or game, by demonstrating then offering him
a turn, some of which David takes up but many of which he
refuses. It is tempting to suggest that the reason many are
refused of are of only short duration concerns M's subsequent
behaviour. She requires that David should fulfil precisely
the move she defines for him. Two examples may illustrate
this. At 13; 05 M attracts his attention and demonstrates
how to reload and fire the pinger. She repeats this then
sets the pinger on the floor in front of David and says "Now
you". David reaches for the pinger, but knocks it over, and
when he picks it up all the shapes slide off. M withdraws
and sits in her chair again, leaving David looking confused.
At 14;04 M hides a coin in one hand and holds both fists out
to David. Several times the guessing game is repeated with
David first choosing both hands at once, and then trying to
take the coin. M insists that he is cheating and maintains
the format of the routine, thereby disallowing any progression
in it. David soon withdraws.
A similar sort of constraint upon their interaction is
M's failure to recognise C's wish to participate. At 13;05
M untangles the duck's cord and demonstrates how it is pulled
along. She pulls it past David four times. After the second,
third and fourth times David reaches for the cord but this is
missed or ignored by M. When it is his turn she simply drops,
the cord. David picks up the duck to look at it and M sits
up on her chair again.
What we observe here is a relationship in which the in¬
tentions of M and C are not sympathetically interpreted and
only rarely coincide. The result is a set of short, easily
disrupted sequences of interaction and the extensive non-use
of his mother to develop his activity and his learning by a
comparatively able child. Yet, in the requests to do with
the operation of the trumpet, David reveals that he is fully
competent in the performance of (non-verbal) requests, and
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there are no obvious adverse consequences for his cognition
of agency at this age. It might have been interesting to
observe David six months later.
5.5 Victoria (15;02-17; 12) Rpp«r\.<Lix H
From Appendix H we see that Victoria does not play on
her own. Or at least, there are no clearly specifiable
intentions from within her solitary activity. As for the
two previous secondary subjects Victoria's mother is highly
intrusive and is"the initiator of almost all the interaction
between them. But here is perhaps a useful indicator of
the impact of the situational effect of laboratory observa¬
tion. For while both Sarah and David rejected or ignored
many of M's intrusions, Victoria is amenable to them and
they are the source of much joint action. This suggests
that the major factor in the cases of Sarah and David is
indeed their relationship with M and not any temporary dif¬
ferences in M's interpersonal behaviour.
Interpersonal Routines
Victoria's mother customarily initiates interaction by
finding a toy and exploring it herself before inviting
Victoria to play with it too. In so doing she does not
define the precise way in which the toy works nor does she
impose limits upon how they might play with it together.
For example, at 16;05 M finds and shows to C a small lorry
in the back of which sit two men. With C holding the lorry
M shows her how to put the men in. M thei^pushes the lorry
on the floor. C grabs the lorry and puts the men back in
the toybox. M puts the shape from the posting-box in the
back of the lorry and C now pushes it about. M never with¬
draws when C diverts to a new activity but will either watch
or comment and join in.
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Communicative Activity
As for Anna at a slightly later age, the necessity for
Victoria to perform explicit requests is largely removed by
M's close attention and involvement in her activity. This
is in some ways a disadvantage for us as the lack of solitary
activity denies us the opportunity to look for the consoli¬
dation and experimentation we saw with Anna, and the scarcity
of requests obscures whether Victoria is similarly able to
use M to create the structure in which to act. That M's
involvement does reduce Victoria's use of requests is,shown
by two examples in which C clearly needs assistance - and
receives it - but does not perform a communicative act.
At 16;05 C is trying to climb out of the toybox but
cannot raise her foot high enough to clear the side. She
is holding on with both hands to the edge of the box and so
perhaps could not lift her arms in the usual appeal to be
lifted, but nor does she vocalise as we might expect. M
comments and lifts her out, and C chuckles as if acknowledg¬
ing M's assistance. At 16;25 C is trying to put a football
inside a plastic carrier bag. After some time M holds the
bag open for C to put the ball in, although C had not looked
at M nor vocalised nor in any way appealed for help. The
possibility that she was determined to do it on her own is
excluded by her ready acceptance of M's assistance.
There is one representative act in the data, at 17;12.
It is an Assertion of Victoria's refusal to put the pieces
of felt she is chewing into their bag as M has suggested.
She does this by shaking her head and walking over to the
toybox (but she does stop chewing them). This corresponds
well to the age at which Anna's representatives were becoming
less labile, though it is a month before Anna's performance
of an assertion.
Discussion
In these data there is a pattern of much initiation by
M and few requests by C similar to that in the latter sessions
with Sarah and all the sessions with David, but here there
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is an important difference. It lies in the qualities of
the interactions in which M and C do engage. For Victoria's
mother does not monitor and attempt to control C's behaviour
in a directive way as do the others. Rather she offers
topics and objects for interaction and then permits the child
to take them over; she suggests rather than directs. At
the same time she is sensitive to the child's activity and
quickly infers the existence of intentions which might
require her assistance. This makes for more fluent and
relaxed sequences marked by the sharing of pleasure and of
longer duration.
This difference permits us to uphold the claims that
laboratory observation might cause M to adopt a more intru¬
sive and imposing role than usual, but that this effect
should not obscure the child's overall competence nor the
characteristics of his interactions with M. In other words,
the majority of the dissent of the other children can be
ascribed to interpersonal and not to situational factors.
With Victoria the outcomes are quite different.
5.6 Leon (18; 01-22; 08) f^ppeneLLX. 3"
Interpersonal Routines
All of these are reciprocal and progressive, and many
of them contain dialogue. Leon's mastery of language -
phonologically, lexically and grammatically - is in advance
of Anna's. At 20;13 Leon twice engages M in play with the
posting-box although he has previously demonstrated his
mastery of it (at 18;20). The purpose of these routines
appears to be pleasure-sharing and, in the second case, to
provide an opportunity and focus for dialogue. M does not
at all show the tendency of other mothers constantly to
intrude upon C's activity, and in faet she initiates their
interaction only once. Leon is very amenable to M's sug¬
gestions within joint action and is also an accomplished
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interpreter of her intentions. At 18;20 M starts building
a stack of cubes and Leon immediately collects and hands to
her the next in sequence. His skill may reflect the influ¬
ence of close siblings.
Representative Acts
At the second recording session with Leon his elder
brother Anthony (4-§- years) was unavoidably present. In the
event this was not a disadvantage as it provided a source
of ideas to explain some of Leon's actions. At 18;20 M
intercedes in a dispute between Anthony and Leon over custody
of the football. Leon then flaunts the ball in front of
Anthony in a provocative way (with predictable consequences).
The important point is how much of the play between siblings
concerns the possession., and control of playthings. Leon is
here demonstrating (Observing) not just that he has the ball
but that he has a temporary advantage he does not usually
have.
Twice at 22; 08 Leon demonstrates social skills which
presumably derive from the same source. On both occasions
C diverts M's attention by pointing and vocalising about
some (imaginary) distant thing in order to obtain an object
she had been withholding. Situations between siblings in
which such tactics might be used can easily be imagined.
Interestingly, M claimed to be aware of C's intention but
pretended to be fooled for his benefit.
Directive and solitary Acts
Most of Leon's requests are for objects in M's posses¬
sion but there are two requests for assistance, in play with
the posting-box and the seriated cubes. These two toys are
the focus for much of his solitary play; the posting-box he
masters almost immediately upon having the more difficult
shapes demonstrated by M, but the seriated cubes take rather
longer. Following his request at 19;16 Leon can by 21;16
both stack and nest the cubes if M will confirm that each
one in turn is the correct one. By 22;08 the seriation
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problem is solved but he is still unsure before trying it
whether a cube is the right one. Unfortunately Anna lost
interest in her seriated cups at 14 months and was never
observed to stack or nest them all correctly.
Discussion
But for the posting-box and seriated cubes there are
very few instances within Leon's solitary play in which we
can identify a specific intention. We noted in the discus¬
sion of Anna (page ISO) that examples of solitary intentions
become rare after 18 months and we suggested two reasons.
To these we may now add two more. First is the very much
longer time-base over which an intention might hold. For
example, the last sequence quoted for Leon, in which he is
nesting the seriated cubes, lasts over four minutes. Unless
the end-point of the activity is clear also to us it is
impossible to say quite what the child's intention was. An
extended time-base increases the problem. Second is the
increasing complexity of intention structures themselves.
At 18;20 Leon is playing with the posting-box when he looks
round and prepares to sit down. He perceives, however, that
when sitting the posting-box will be out of his reach, so he
first moves it and then sits down. Though superficially
quite simple this example illustrates the point; it shows
Leon's prediction of a future state of affairs and the con¬
sequent embedding by him of an intention - to move the box
closer - within another intention - to sit down - which is
itself already embedded - in the intention to carry on play¬
ing with the posting-box. This demonstrable complexity of
intentional structure deserves a place in our model of
agency.
Leon applies rules something like those which were
identified from Anna's activity. (Leon in fact displays
rather more competence in the world but the details of this
need not concern us here.) He uses M in cases where he is
uncertain how to act and (in the two examples here) quickly
applies the information she affords. He demonstrates his
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autonomy and his ability to get his own way by cunning,
in adverse circumstances.
As with Victoria there is none of the non-cooperation
of C with M which Sinha (1978) leads us to expect. But C
clearly enjoys role-parity within their interactions, is
responsible for much of the initiation and progression, and
knows how to assert himself. Rather than a 'renegotiation
of power relations' our evidence suggests that the important
thing is whether M, on the basis of the child's evident
interactive awareness and growing competence as an agent,
ascribes to him a role equivalent to her own within play.
The child cannot assume power within their relationship
unless M is willing to let him.
5.7 The Cognition of Agency in the Secondary Subjects
The procedure for deriving the terms in Table 5.1 is
identical with that which was used for Anna in Chapter Four.
It is based upon the earlier Sections in this chapter and
upon Appendices E - J. The notes of explanation provided
on pages 196-199 therefore apply also to Table 5.1.
However, the data are segmented by the nature of their
source, so this Table must also be segmented; it shows to
which secondary subject a description applies and vertical
connecting arrows are not drawn between boxes.
The differences between Tables 4.2 and 5.1 are
referred to in Chapter Six when we consider what modifi¬








6.1 An Adaptive Model for the Cognition of Agency
Support for our model from the secondary subjects is
overwhelming, both as to its general terms and as to the
evidence upon which it is based. Trends in the development
of interpersonal routines, in the use of requests and the
nature of solitary activity, and in the developing autonomy
implicit in representative acts, are broadly equivalent
between children for any given age. Only in two respects
does our model, as it stands, require modification, but it
requires the addition of a parameter capturing the effects
of differences in M's style.
The timing of development
The first modification we must make will allow for the
variations across children in the timing of the processes
we have identified. We noted that in no case was the order¬
ing of the model brought into question, but that three of
the five secondary subjects differed with Anna in the ages
at which certain behaviour was first observed. These dif¬
ferences are summarised below.
1. Daniel signalled M's turn in a routine at 7;16. This
is represented in our model as 'realisation of M's
reactance', at 10 months for Anna. While Anna's first
routine at 8;11 did not clearly exhibit signalling she
did at this age request that she be helped to stand,
which constitutes signalling of an equivalent kind. The
model should therefore allow that C can realise - perceive
and use - M's reactance from this earlier age.
2. Both Sarah and David exhibited communicative abilities
on a par with Anna's, but both of them were up to two
months in advance with respect to some aspects of solitary
activity. In particular, their motor control was more
precise and they demonstrated earlier the ability to
structure a situation within which to act. Taken together
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these factors permit them rather more autonomy of action
at any given age. The older children, Victoria and Leon,
did not exhibit an equivalent advance, though Leon in
particular gave the impression of rather better motor
control. To accommodate Sarah and David the entries
'creation of simple structure' and 'some autonomy of
action' must be brought forward by about two months.
Whether the other terms on the left hand side of the
model should also be brought forward is uncertain. The
best course seems to be to permit a range of two months
in the terms which relate to the physical world, which
may be done by lengthening their share of the time-base.
Complexity of intention structures
An instance is reported in which Leon, at 18;20 performs
a series of acts which allow us to infer the simultaneous
operation of three hierarchically arranged intentions.
Evidence about the structure of Anna's intentions was difficult
to assess over this period because there was little solitary
activity. The' addition of a term describing the 'complex
structuring of intentions' is advised by Leon's activity.
A dimension for M's 'style'
From the evidence available, the factor which most in¬
fluences a child's progress through the model is his mother's
conception of him and the role she consequently adopts in
interacting with him. The model in Table 4.3 contains no
representation of this factor.
In Section 4.5' a dimension for M's style was postulated,
ranging from directiveness and control with little attribution
of independence, on the one hand, to suggestion and partici¬
pation on terms determined by the child, on the other. This
dimension falls principally within the realms of the third
and fifth conditions deemed necessary for the cognition of
2
agency. Of our subjects, David's mother tends towards the
''"We return to an examination of the background for these




former style while the mothers of Anna, Daniel, Victoria
and Leon are grouped towards the latter. Sarah's mother
falls somewhere between them in that she is both less in¬
trusive than David's and less participative than the others'.
But Sarah is regarded as 'willful' - that is independent -
and M is strict in her judgements as to what constitutes
acceptable behaviour.
It was suggested at the end of Chapter Four that insuf¬
ficient experience of a usefully and consistently partici¬
pating other might cause the child's cognition to be delayed.
In fact, David and Sarah are physically more competent for
their ages than the rest, and there is no evidence that they
are any less competent at this time in social or interper¬
sonal terms. The effect they show is in not using their
communicative ability to the same extent. It may very well
be that over a certain limit non-participative mothering has
deleterious effects upon cognition, but up to that limit -
and-well within the range of variation found here - its early
consequence seems to be to encourage solitary activity on
the part of the child, with advantageous effects upon his
mastery of the physical world.
Nelson (1973) draws a distinction between bbject-oriented'
and 'interaction-oriented' children, which captures neatly
the differences we have observed. What is not clear from her
account is whether this distinction echoes one in M's style
along the lines we have indicated. Nor is it clear whether
object-oriented children experience more difficulty in nego¬
tiating role-relations with M in the middle of the second
year. This is an important possibility about which our data
offer no indications because the three children studied over
this period had highly participative mothers. Discovering
whether such a pay-off exists would be a useful focus for
further work both in its own right and to assist in clarify¬
ing the ontogeny of what is defined as 'difficult' behaviour.
The author is aware of current research, funded by the
Scottish Home and Health Department, examining difficult
behaviour in three-to five-year olds. The children in this
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study attend a day-care centre at which they receive group
treatment. The purpose of the research is to discover
whether a mother's perception of her child, and of his be¬
haviour, is changed after a number of sessions, and to
ascertain whether her perceptions mirror any real changes
in behaviour. It is possible that a causal link between
child's behaviour and mother's perception might operate in
either direction, or there may be a complex inter-relation.
Whatever the outcome of that research, to establish whether
there are specifiable precursors and explanations for such
difficult behaviour from within the second year would be a
valuable contribution.
Our present problem is to represent within our model
the demonstrable effects of differences in M's style. This
is done by dividing Table 6.1 into two parts, representing
the different pathways favoured by mothering styles corres¬
ponding to the two ends of the dimension we have described.
Table 6.1 (overleaf) presents an adaptive model of agency.
Notes on Table 6.1
1. An adaptive model
The derivation of a useful concept of agency and its
application to the study of communicative development,
explored in some detail in Chapters One and Two, rest upon
the assumption, explicitly stated and justified in the Intro¬
duction, that the child should best be seen as the active
constructor of his knowledge, intelligently directing his
search for new knowledge as a means to achieving active
mastery of his environment. In this light we argued that
communication constitutes a primary information source for
the child, since 'people become associated with the pleasure
that is inherent in the game of contingency detection' (Watson
1373). Now if a child's mother acts and interacts with him
- for whatever reason - in ways which do not permit and aug¬
ment his learning and the exercise of his cognition, to con¬
centrate upon solitary activity would be for him an adaptive
response. Extended over time as a feature of their inter¬
action, such a mothering style promotes, as we have seen, the
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early appearance of some aspects of cognition. A model for
the cognition of agency which captures the child's active
response to varying conditions must, then, be an adaptive
model. Table 6.1 shows how the emphases within the cognition
of agency vary in accordance with the child's adaptive
response to the interpersonal circumstances of his learning.
Part (a) shows adaptation to a mothering style characterised
by direction and control and part (b) that to one of sugges¬
tion and participation. Again it must be stressed that these
are the two ends of a continuous dimension.
2. The links between terms
In part (a) the fact that the child is capable of com¬
municating with and using M as fully as any other child is
conveyed by the (almost) identical presentation of terms.
But the fact that he does so less often should be read from
the dotted lines connecting some of these terms. Corres¬
pondingly, his tendency to rely more upon solitary activity
and the consequent enhancement of mastery of the physical
world are represented by the double lines between relevant
terms. Part (a) includes one additional term, 'disruptibility
of plans', at 12-14 months. While part (b) children may
also perceive this disruptibility it does not for them
feature as an obstacle to interaction as it does for David.
Excepting the modifications discussed above, part (b)
of Table 6.1 is identical with Table 4.3. This is because
the activity of Anna closely corresponded with that of the
secondary subjects representing this end of the continuum.
3. Time-base
The terms down the left hand side, dealing principally
with cognition of the physical world, have been vertically
extended to convey the age-range in which the relevant
activity was first observed. The time-base should be taken
only as a general indicator.
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4. Conditions
The conditions for the cognition of agency listed after
Table 4.3 (page 208) remain necessary in the adaptive model.
Should mothering style move so far beyond a certain point
of (unsympathetic) direction and control as to preclude any
of these conditions it is postulated that there would be
noticeable and deleterious effects upon the child's cognition.
5. Conclusion
The cognition of agency does not develop suddenly. The
status of agency as a concept in the child's cognition depends
fundamentally upon his capacity to derive rules about the
world, and about others, and thus effectively to act and to
communicate.
6.2 Review of Theory and Methodology: an evaluation
The nature of knowing and learning
There are no reasons to doubt the value of an approach
based in action, either as a general principle or as a par¬
ticular approach to (communicative) development. In a suf¬
ficiently well elaborated model of cognitive development we
could presumably chart the child's search for knowledge quite
specifically. But one aspect for which the approach outlined
did not allow is the possibility of learning by observation.
With the exception of Daniel all of the children in this
study manifestly used their mothers to show them how to do
things. Furthermore we saw the earlier appearance of what
were taken to be requests for repetition. For a child to be
able to request that M should perform some act in order that
he may then try, he must, by our theory, possess some repre¬
sentation of that which is to be done. We can escape the
counterargument, that if this is so and if cognition is con¬
structed through action then requests repeat should not appear
before requests for assistance, only by claiming that it is
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M's attribution which is all-important in the child's per¬
formance of a request repeat; that there is no clearly for¬
mulated communicative intention. We should have to claim
that the child is principally discovering what count as
communicative acts, with any propositional content being
subsidiary. This claim is not unreasonable, and is supported
by the disappearance of requests repeat from Anna's data
after 14 months. It is clear, however, that if the child
subsequently performs a request for assistance in recreating
the same event - as does happen - we must allow a significant
role to observational learning. This can be accommodated in
our theory provided it is not taken in an abstract sense.
Learning of any kind must be bedded in hypothesis formulation
and the child's early hypotheses relate only to the immediate
and the salient.
The theory further demands that observational learning
should be restricted to the elaboration, generalisation and
formulation of schemas of a kind equivalent to others in
the child's cognition. The hypotheses which are confirmed
or dismissed by observation cannot be any more complex than
those which are tested through action. There is no evidence
here which clearly contravenes this principle but in many
ways the evidence is not of a kind which can thoroughly test
it. A proper examination would require the systematic
comparison of things which the child has learned by observa¬
tion with things which he has learned through action; it would
be a major piece of work in itself.
Two Kinds of Agent?
In Section 1.3 we distinguished cognition of self-as-
agent from cognition of other-as-agent, and argued that
neither was logically prior to the other. The postulate
that 'only through the discovery of his own agency could the
child conceive of the agency of others' is equally strong
with the postulate that 'only through perception of the
contingencies afforded by others could the child learn of
his own agency'. We suggested that cognition of each kind
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would provide 'building blocks' for the other.
Our data suggest that these aspects of cognition are
psychologically as well as logically equivalent. Up to
about 12 months what the child knows about others is inti¬
mately related with what he knows about the physical world.
He makes no distinction in kind between affordances of the
world and affordances of others as far as agency is con¬
cerned, since the two are closely interdependent. There¬
after, once the child becomes able himself to structure a
situation within which to act, he treats the other as pro¬
ficient within his own terms. There is no apparent lag in
either kind of cognition; the function of the other remains
the provision of contingent relations - such as conventions
relating acts and meanings - and the child assimilates and
uses these in the same way as other, physical, relations.
Nor does David's cognition of his mother seem in any way
different from the others' in spite of his infrequent use
of her as a co-interactant.
In practice the distinction we have drawn is not reflec¬
ted in the child's activity in any identifiable way. It
seems safe to conclude that it does not represent a real
distinction in cognitive terms. Where it has been useful,
however, is as a methodological tool, in providing a means
to identify the kinds of knowledge involved in the cognition
of agency and in suggesting the types of activity which
should be observed.
Three Kinds of Activity
Classifying a portion of a child's activity as inter¬
personal, or communicative, or solitary is not an exact pro¬
cedure. Decisions as to what constitutes a useful, interest¬
ing or important chunk of action or interaction are no doubt
constrained by the interpretations a researcher unwittingly
reads into the events he observes. What is taken to be the
starting point of an episode or sequence is critical to the
evaluation of what transpires. One case of an ambiguity is
explicitly presented in the text, at the end of the discussion
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of Anna's representative acts, but all other possible ambig¬
uities have been denied, simply by the process of descrip¬
tion.
Nevertheless, there is clearly a distinction between
interaction which involves the performance of interactive
acts - as we have defined them - and that which does not,
and both of these differ from solitary activity. The data
is not compromised by the facts that a solitary act may
have been identified within an interpersonal routine and
that a communicative act may have arisen out of a period of
solitary activity. The justification for looking at each
separately and for independently assessing the contribution
each can make to a model of agency lies in the outcome that
each type of activity threw up unique kinds of evidence and
that these were reconcilable within a superordinate model.
Interpersonal routines, for example, provided a sequential
model for the mode of the child's interaction with his mother.
What begin as his first appreciation of his ability to signal
acts and events, in rehearsals of expectation, are then
practised through turn-taking, joint action and exchange
routines, and reach their functional purpose in reciprocity
and dialogue where child and mother enjoy role-parity. This
account of development in the mechanics and rules of communi¬
cative interaction in turn provides a background to and
justification of the proposed schedules for the development
of requesting and commenting. Similarly, the abstractions -
we can make about solitary acting mirror in kind those
drawn from communicative activity in terms of the complexity
of the child's intentions.
Once again, there is no reason to suppose that types
of activity are distinguished by the child as sources of
different kinds of information. Except for David our subjects
switched fluently and frequently between all three, and while
David communicated less often he was not unsure of the means
for so doing. In circumstances in which the child's range
of experimentation is not restricted by, for example, the
absence of a familiar other, the distinction between types
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of activity is of only theoretical and methodological value ;
it is not reflected in cognition.
Sources of Data in Developmental Studies
We have argued that in order to achieve a maximal demon¬
stration of the child's various abilities he must be studied
under circumstances which fulfil the important conditions of
salience, of opportunity for free experimentation and of the
active and sympathetic participation of a familiar other.
The qualifications which must be made upon data derived under
more formal conditions, to allow for the confounding influ¬
ences of task comprehension (Sinha and Walkerdine, 1975) of
attention (Greenfield, 1982) and of meaningfulness (Donald¬
son, 1978) in effect mean that performance will most nearly
reflect competence if we do not constrain the child's activity
within rigid experimental paradigms. The conclusion is drawn
that these criteria are best observed in the non-intrusive
observation of free play involving child and mother.
In non-intrusive observation the scientific emphasis
shifts from the establishment of conditions under which data
may be gathered - the experimental set-up - to the deriva¬
tion of methods for deciding what count as data and for hand¬
ling and correlating these data. The requirements upon these
methods are, ideally, no less stringent than their counter¬
parts in formal experimentation, and the evidence which
emerges is, I would suggest, at least as rigorous and more
reliable.
The Operationalisation of the Indicators
The method formulated for the identification of communi¬
cative intentions owes a great deal to speech act theory and
to the thinking of Myers (1979) on early interactivity. An
adaptation of this method served the examination of solitary
activity. Here we must assess their value in relation to
this work. But first there remains one theoretical dis¬
agreement which must be discussed, with Searle (1969) aad
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with Myers (1979b). It concerns whether or not all comm¬
unicative acts must convey a proposition.
We have committed ourselves to the view that learning
must proceed through the formulation and testing of hypoth¬
eses - in Section 1.2 - and to the view that such hypotheses
are based in schemas, arranged within a discursive language
of thought and together constituting what the child knows.
Hypotheses are tested through action, and action is thus
the source of learning. In acting the child intends some
effect in the world; any effect which he can intend must
arise from an internal representation and is a proposition,
as some part of a schema or construct, which proposition is
manifest in the child's act. Since the relation between
schemas, and constructs, is ordered, intentions expressed
during solitary activity are essentially equivalent with
communicative intentions; all must be a faculty of learning
and all must reflect an underlying proposition. This is the
same as saying that the ability to have and to express
communicative intentions must be a faculty of learning.
Now speech act theory proposes a set of acts with no
propositional content, which for us presents a problem.
Simply stated, the problem is this: If there are indeed
communicative acts which do not convey an underlying prop¬
osition we cannot account for their appearance in the child's
repertoire. In our terms a non-propositional act cannot
represent the testing of a hypothesis and cannot therefore
provide for learning. In other words, we have no way to
account for the means by which a child might learn what
constitutes the performance of a non-propositional act.
If we are to sustain the argument concerning the origins
and development of the ability to communicate we must
depart from speech act theory on this issue and maintain
the claim that any act which is or could be communicative
must have associated with it an underlying proposition.
We turn now to an assessment of the methods formul¬
ated for the identification of intentions.
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Communicative Acts
Two shortcomings of the procedure were mentioned in
the text. One was our inability to identify as communicative
any acts by the child which his mother did not recognise and
mark by her response, and the other was our incompetence to
claim that a mother's attribution may have been wrong or
inappropriate. Since examples of both kinds are cases in
which the child's performance of a communicative act was,
by definition, not successful their exclusion does not affect
our conclusions about the child's ability for successful
performance. While it is possible that a greater laxity
would have added breadth to the data, for example in clari¬
fying the means the child uses to discover what count as
communicative acts, this does not merit the sacrifice of
reliability in evidence about what he can achieve.
One other drawback to the procedure is that cases in
which C2 was behaviourally similar to were comparatively
rare, and in some requests and most early representative
acts there was no clearly relevant subsequent act at all.
In the main, the latter were cases in which the child appeared
to accept his mother's response as appropriate and fulfilling
of his intention. While the use of affective indices and
situational clues was explicitly permitted, reliance upon
them becomes much greater when there is no confirmatory act.
But this only underlines the importance of treating a mother's
responses as critical in the identification of communicative
acts. If the child accepts her response as appropriate and
fulfilling we obtain direct evidence as to the nature of his
intention.
The procedure remains applicable from the earliest obser¬
vations, in which the child's meaning is to an extent deter¬
mined by his mother's interpretation, up to and beyond the
time when verbal means of expression begin to be used.
Unfortunately our observations ceased at the time when words
were beginning to be substituted into non-verbal frameworks
but there is no obvious reason why the procedure should not




At the younger end of the age-range the identification
of intentions was made difficult by the child's short atten¬
tion span, the poorly formedness and lability of putative
intentions and the imprecision of motor control. Arguably,
this is no fault of the procedure but reflects the fact that
up to 10 months or so of age we are witnessing the tentative
beginnings of directed action. Events in the world do not
conveniently attribute intentions in the way a mother does,
and we (as well as the child) must rely solely upon- his un¬
certain activity.
However, the difficulties we found in specifying inten¬
tions after about 18 months point clearly to an inadequacy
of the procedure; they suggest that the usefulness of a pro¬
cedure analogous with that derived for communicative acts
is restricted to the period in which the child's goals are
very short term and require only a small number of moves for
their achievement, that is to the period up to about 18
months. In solitary activity there is no parallel to the
sentence by which a complex intention might be explicitly
and briefly expressed. For example, a verbal request 'to
put the seriated cups together' represents briefly - and
rests upon the same understanding as - an attempt: to do this
himself which might take several minutes and involve numerous
sub-goals, such as finding a cup which is lost and so on.
The communicative act presupposes no less ability on the
child's part than the solitary goal but it is much more
easily identifiable. The procedure used here served our
purpose, in establishing the extent of the child's competence
as an agent in his surroundings, but it does not have the
broader value of specifying the precise rules and constructs
which comprise his cognition of the world.
What seems to be required for an assessment of cognition
in solitary activity towards the end of the second year and
beyond is the provision of a series of tasks, ordered in
their complexity and having defined sub-goals and end-points.
This could be undertaken within a non-intrusive paradigm.
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Interpersonal Routines
The analysis of this activity involved the least
rigorous of the three formulations and the one which was
most open to bias in its application. For example, the
researcher must himself decide what constitutes the initi¬
ation of a routine, what counts as a progression within an
otherwise cyclical routine, when a temporary interruption
becomes a termination and what caused this, and so on. On
the other hand, our purpose in looking at this type of behav¬
iour was not to provide a basis for specific claims about
cognition but simply to identify early patterns of mother-
child interaction. This is evidence of a different order
to that concerning the developing nature of communicative
intentions, for example; the description of observable
events does not require such a formal method of analysis.
It was suggested that interpersonal routines would
disclose something of the child's use of the skills essential
to successful communication (which include gaining and
directing attention, signalling and turn-taking, and exchange)
and thus reveal the forms of interactive framework through
which communicative acts might begin to be performed. The
study of routines was, in fact, much more useful, and useful
over a longer period than had been anticipated. They show
an orderly progression from the early forms in which the
child is beginning to perceive the possibilities of his role
as an active participant, through forms in which the mechanics
of interaction are practised and refined, to a culmination
in early dialogue, role-parity and pleasure-sharing. They
provide a descriptive framework within which to place evidence
from other sources more directly relating to the child's cog-
rLtion over almost the whole observation period. By the time,
around 20 months, when routines become so long and incorpor¬
ate so many sub-routines and communicative acts as no longer
to constitute a useful form of description, their purpose
from the child's point of view is also fulfilled. He now
knows what it is to cooperate and to communicate with others;
his main requirements are to discover principles about the
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world and to master formal language.
A concept of agency?
In Part One agency was characterised as a set of
rule-governed abilities and constructs which together
permit effective action and communication. We developed
a hierarchically ordered approach to intentionality
which, while not approaching the comprehensive and
authoritative treatment of this difficult area by Dennett
(1979), is not at odds with what I take Dennett's pos¬
ition to be, and which served our purpose of deciding
how agency might be investigated. We concluded that
solitary and communicative activity should be studied,
using specified methods, and a model was derived of these
developing abilities and constructs. Two questions yet
remain: Is the model really testable? and What does the
model tell us agency is?
Confronted with the problem besieging all psycho¬
logical research, of how to estimate competence from the
observation of performance, I have argued that the appro¬
priate framework for studying infants is that which most
avoids formal, experimental constraints. In order to
sustain claims which are at all scientific, explicit def¬
initions must be provided for what will count as data
gathered in this way. But these data must be interpreted
and while the data themselves may be rigorous they can
only be interpreted in ways which are not inherently
falsifiable. The value of the model can however be
judged in practice. If it is a good model we should be
able to take any child for whom the necessary external
conditions apply (page 208) and describe his behaviour in
terms of the model. And it should make no difference who
is interpreting the data and applying them to the model.
This practical method is the means which has been used
here to test and modify the model. The usefulness of the
model therefore resides in its general applicability, and
it can be falsified only by failing to apply in some cases.
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What does the model tell us agency is?
It supports the idea that agency is not a unitary
concept - may not "be a concept at all in the sense in
which developmental theorists customarily use the term
- hut is an abstraction we can make based on the child's
ability to do things. The cognition of agency we may
claim the child to have is, precisely, the product of
his perception of his ability to master the physical
and interpersonal worlds. The model tells us, within
the limits of exactness of its terms, what these abilities
are up to the time, around 20 months, when the progress of
his mastery affords the child the means to discover sol¬
utions to any problem he can conceive.
Suggestions for further work
Several indications have already been made as to
avenues for further research. These include a comparative
analysis of the roles of learning by observation and by
action in early cognition, and the formulation of proced¬
ures within a paradigm of non-intrusive observation for
analysis of the constructs about the world the young child
is deriving.
A third line'of work suggested was into the ways in
which communication is used for the negotiation of rel¬
ations between mother and child. We have seen evidence
here that the middle of the second year is a time, at which
the child learns what it is to assert himself, and this is
manifest in such things as negation, rejecting or ignoring
his mother's suggestions and refusing to cooperate, as
well as in more positive things such as clarification and
the directing of joint action. Clearly a relationship
which is not resilient and stable over this period is one
in which later difficulties might be exagerrated. A fuller
treatment than we were able to give of this area would
require a formal system for describing and classifying a
mother's initiations and responses within their contexts,
for relation to the child's characteristic modes of inter-
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action with her. It may be possible to establish routes
to subsequent difficult behaviour stemming in a specifiable
way from mothering style.
The transition to the reliance on speech as a means
of communication and discourse remains a topical research
area, and the methods used here for the identification of
communicative intentions could be used to plot this trans¬
ition more closely. At the same time, the model here
derived for the cognition of agency should be applied to
the child's early verbal productions in the analysis of
their semantic content. This could be done either by
additional work along the present lines or by an examin¬
ation of the already large corpus of data on early speech
in the literature. It would involve comparing the nature
of cognition as portrayed in the model with those aspects
of the concept agency presumed to be implicit in the child's
putative use of this semantic category.
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AppendixB:CommunicativeActsfthDirect veTyPerformedbyn AgeDescriptionofC-^DescriptionofC2(ifd f .fromC-^)IntendedEffecti)lassificationOutcome 8;11CrawlstoM,raise leftarm,vocalises 10;10Displaysexcitement, vocalisingand hittingthepinger 10;10Vocalisation,sus¬ tainedgazean armreach 10;21CrawlstoMnd vocalises 10;21Reachesforbject andvocalises 11;12Sustainedg zwith bobbingupandd wn whilestanding 13;05Takeshurdy-gurdy toM 14;02Handstuningfork toMPullsherselfp onM'schair Takeshurdy-gurdy toA Triestoplayit herself
Thatshebehelped tostand Thatt epingerb firedagain Thatshebegiven somecak Thatshebehelped tostand ThatMgiveheran objectsheh lds Thatshebegiven somecak ThatM(A)playthe hurdy-gurdy ThatMsoundt e tuningfork
RequestassiGr nt d Requestrep aG ant d Gimme Gimme Gimme Requestrepeat /demonstration
Granted
RequestassistRefu d
Granted after repeat Granted Granted
Requestrep aG ant d
co
DescriptionofC2
AgeDescriptionofC-^(ifd f .fr mC-^) 14;02 14;26 14;26 14;26 14;26 15;09 15;09ReachesforsoapM isholding,lo ki g atsoap,nds ying "D3h"Eyecontactwi hM whilereaching^(C^) Reacheswithh r otherhand Sittingonherca holdsupnea d, says"get-off" SeeingMgivejuic toanotherchild, mandsfromacros theroom Reachesforb ttl anotherchildholdsSitsmotionless, manding Standswatching Knocksoverab ttle andpicksitupthe wrongay;looksatM Pointsa ds ysApproachespoints "u-dxt,uhud-du"andsays"d " moreloudly Walkstohedoor,§ uts"u -du-du- putshands_againstdu" it,says"ad-ju-ju"










Apparently ignored, then granted
ThatMseth bottleupright
RequestassiGr nt d
Thats ebepass d anobjectuf herr ach
Gimme/ Requestassi
Granted afterC,









09Turnssmallboxin herands,givesth boxtMandsys "huh-dhdu"
2^ 25
15;09Climbsonachair, dropshersweetover theback;exclaims loudly 16;01Switchesoncassette player.(Its) LooksatMndsay "Daddy" 16;01Sittinginhertoy-box raisesbotharm 16;01Goestbookcase, pointsaduck,say- "De" 17;25Pointstcassette piayer,says"du, du,u"
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AgeDescriptionof(ifd f .fromC^) 17;25 18;6 18;6 18;6 19;3Mpullstoy-boxt ofthewayx_Creach s ands ys"uh" Reachesforballoon Mholds Picksupballoon, triesobl witup thenhandsittoM Triestoswitchon theorch;handsit toMTurnsandmove away(asdirected byM) Climbsuponachair sitsandwait Pointsanda, says"da-daa" Getsdown,touche pinger,says"da-daa" climbsonchairag in Pointsatable-^Poi tanother lamp,says"la-lye"lightwhichion Pointstahird lightandbabbles Pointstable- lampagainnd exclaimsloudly
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Appendix K: Protocols for the Application of Procedures
to Identify 'Acts'.
To clarify the ways in which the procedures described
in Section 3.1 were applied in the analysis of the video¬
tapes, three worked examples are included nere. They are
(1) an interpersonal routine at age 12;17» described in
the text on page 140 and keyed by the number 4 in the
margin,
(2) a directive act at age 14;26, described on page 161
and keyed by the number 18, and
(3) a solitary act at age 12;17, cited on page 183 and
keyed by the number 59.
The photographs provided were obtained by freezing
the video-tape at specific frames and using a polaroid
camera. Regrettably their quality is rather poor.
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In Plate Pour Anna then tries to turn
the handle of the hurdy-gurdy while
M holds it steady.
But she is not successful; she turns
and moves away blowing the tuning pipes
and thus terminates the sequence.
Plate Pive.
It has been concluded that Anna
initiated this sequence, by approaching
M, and also terminated it by moving
away when she could not successfully
play the hurdy-gurdy. The routine
consisted of two exchanges, the
attempted extension of a schema
concerning blowing, and one of the
first examples of joint action.
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Directive Act.
Our purpose in studying directive and
representative acts is to identify the
child's communicative intentions. The
procedure is described on pages 115-125.
At the beginning of the sequence in which
this directive act is identified M sits
Anna upon her lorry and holds her on while
gently moving the lorry backwards and
forwards. Plate Six.
After only three or four seconds M leans
down and kisses Anna on the side of her
right cheek while still pushing her back
and forth. M is standing behind and to
the right of Anna. Anna immediately says
"Get off" and holds up her right hand.
Plate Seven.
M stops holding Anna and moves back, saying
"Get off? All right", M-^. By so doing
she indicates to us that she takes C's
utterance and arm-raise to be a rejection
and/or a request that she should withdraw.
M has thus attributed a communicative
intention to the child's act, which we may
now putatively call C-^.
Anna now brings down her right hand and
sits motionless, manding in a distressed
way. Although behaviourally dissimilar
to C-^ this appears to be a restatement of
the communicative intention which was
intended to convey. M quickly moves
forward and lifts Anna off the lorry, Mg«
Plate Eight.
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In lifting Anna off the lorry M reveals
that she takes to he a directive act
with that intention. While C-^ and
are behaviourally dissimilar, the
association with Gg of an expression of
negative affect suggests that they
carried the same communicative intention
and that was not an appropriate
response to C.. We may say that M was
correct in attributing an intention to
C-^ but that she identified it wrongly.
G actually intended that she be lifted
off the lorry.
Solitary Act.
Not all communicative sequences rely so
heavily as the above on the child's
expression of affect for their clarifi¬
cation. In the case of solitary activity,
however, the child's expressions are a
principal means for identifying the effect
an act was intended to achieve.
In this sequence Anna picks up from a low
coffee table an empty cigarette packet
which still has on the lower half of its
cellophane wrapper. She turns the packet
over in her hands, then holds it by the
top with one hand and slides off the cello¬
phane with the other. Plate Nine.
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Plate Nine
Anna partially crumples and then drops
the cellophane, but we cannot say whether
or not this was intentional. Almost
immediately she picks up the cellophane
with her right hand and presses it against
the bottom of the packet. Plate Ten.
She appears to be trying to replace the
wrapper, and we tentatively identify this
as an act with that intended effect.
E,, the event which occurs, is that the
cellophane is squashed and crumpled against
the bottom of the packet. Adults know
that it is almost impossible to replace the
wrapper on a cigarette packet and might
reasonably question whether C was trying to
do this. However, G now changes the
packet to her right hand and the wrapper to
her left and again presses them together,
Cg. Then she bangs the two together in
apparent frustration at her failure to
achieve the effect intended. Plate Eleven
Finally, Plate Twelve, Anna throws down
the crumpled cellophane.
It is the repeated expressions of negative
affect which suggest that and G^ were
acts with a definite intention which was
not achieved. That intention seems to
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